Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

167. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

MISSION OF CYRUS R. VANCE

Special Instruction

You should arrange for a secret conversation with President Park with only his interpreter and/or personal assistant, Yi Hu-rak present. You should decide who should accompany you. You are to convey the following in any manner and with any elaboration you deem desirable.

1. The immediate release of the USS Pueblo and its crew is required to reduce quickly the tension in the area and the danger of war. This is of transcendent importance. But there is another aspect that is extremely important to President Johnson.

2. The country and the Congress have welcomed the President’s restraint in the face of this great provocation, just as it has welcomed President Park’s restraint in the face of the Blue House raid. If the crew and the vessel are not returned quickly, this will not only become a very serious matter between the U.S. and the North Koreans, but it can become a very serious matter on the American political scene. President Park knows the problem of free elections. This is an election year in the U.S., and the issue could become a major one in the campaign in such a way as to affect U.S.-ROK relations and our position in Southeast Asia. This is the second reason why the U.S. must do its utmost and use every possible means to obtain the immediate release of the crew and the vessel. The private meetings channel is at present the only one which offers any prospect of obtaining release and we must give it every opportunity to show whether it will produce results. We cannot throw this matter into open meetings of the Military Armistice Commission, or insist on a Republic of Korea representative attending the public meetings, which would certainly produce a breakdown of these talks.

3. The President is deeply appreciative of the closeness of the exchanges which have been taking place in this very grave situation. It reminds him of the close and continuing contacts between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill during World War II and he wants to keep it that way. The President understands President Park’s domestic problems and he wants President Park to understand his. There is no substitute for this personal trust and confidence at a time like this.

4. We are not going to abandon the Republic of Korea when the USS Pueblo and its crew are returned, but we will remain in Korea in even stronger force than before. President Johnson urges President Park to be calm and patient, not to permit any of his officers to engage in rash acts which might lead to fighting on the DMZ, which would create a wholly new set of problems and dangers and strains on our alliance, as well as interrupt the great progress that the Republic of Korea has been making under President Park.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret. Attached to a February 9 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson. Rostow’s memorandum indicates that the President approved the instructions for Vance, which had also been approved by Rusk.