140. Notes on Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak 1
The President began by putting a series of questions to President Park about the morale of his troops; whether the Vietnamese were improving; and the quality of American support and leadership for the Korean forces.
Park said his own troops were in good spirits; felt that progress was being made; judged that the South Vietnamese were in fact improving; and felt that U.S. support and leadership for his forces were admirable.
The President then turned to the critical issue; namely, his judgment that we need more men quickly in South Vietnam. He described the movement of 10,000 U.S. forces and 600 tons of equipment in 17 days, ending Dec. 18. He said that Westmoreland would have 102 of his 106 maneuver battalions by Christmas. We know that parts of 2 divisions are moving south. The President observed that he was glad Park was here today for the service for Harold Holt. Holt looked at things the way President Park and President Johnson did. There are now fewer of us and we must stick closer together.
Park thanked the President for sending extra food to help overcome the drought in South Korea. President said he was glad to do so and asked about the kimchi. The bureaucracy in Washington gave him more hell about the kimchi than it did about the war in Vietnam, but he managed to get it. Park said he was gratified the kimchi would arrive starting at the beginning of 1968. It would certainly lift the morale.
Mr. William Bundy explained that the problem of canning the kimchi had delayed arrival. It was being sent as fast as possible and the VC would never be able to hold the Koreans once it arrived.
President Park then asked President Johnson if he had received a report of Amb. Porter’s talks about troops on the working level.2
The President said that he had read the report with great pleasure; but he had expected Korea to respond to the need for additional forces. It had been the staunchest and most forthcoming of the allies.
President Park understood that if the U.S. were to get out of Asia, the Asian countries could not stand alone and would then wish they [Page 303] had fought side by side with the U.S. If President Park hadn’t done what he had in Vietnam, his job would have been unbearable.
President Park then explained his domestic situation with respect to the additional forces. Amb. Porter was working with his counterpart. He needed additional U.S. equipment because the pressure by the North Koreans had somewhat changed the attitude of South Koreans with respect to sending forces to South Vietnam. He had to be able to demonstrate to his Assembly that in sending additional forces to South Vietnam he was, simultaneously, getting equipment which would represent at least equivalent protection against North Korea. That is why the requests were focused on anti-infiltration and anti-espionage equipment. President Park repeated that he had to base his sending of additional forces to South Vietnam on the grounds that this would not detract and might increase South Korean security against North Korea.
The President said we were working on Korean request now. Our AID program has been cut by a third in the Congress. Korea, Australia, and other allies must understand that if they don’t put enough now into South Vietnam, the President may not be able to hold the line and then they will face a much more serious situation. President went on to say he would give urgent attention with view to favorable action on the Korean request. But he wanted Gen. Westmoreland to have the troops soon; and Park should start moving them on faith in the U.S. response. He said that Porter’s cable of his talks in Seoul3 had come in just as he was leaving. He hoped for a full additional division from Korea. He would instruct that we get one destroyer to Korea to help as soon as possible. He would have his staff look into the possibility of a second destroyer. We would get the counter-infiltration equipment request by Gen. Bonesteel there as fast as possible. Although MAP has been cut from $620 million to $400 million, President Johnson has ordered that the Korean level be maintained and cuts be taken elsewhere.
President Johnson repeated that he would look next week into Korean requirements and let Park know as soon as possible. In the meanwhile, Park should bear in mind that in the movement of the troops, speed is of the essence.
President Park said he shared wholeheartedly President Johnson’s purpose, but, unlike President Johnson, he must get an explicit authorization from his National Assembly before he can move his forces. At the moment, the National Assembly is filibustering on the budget. He could deal with the National Assembly easier if the U.S. commitment was firm.
[Page 304]President then asked what information does Korea need on U.S. aid?
Park said that he needed the equipment to strengthen his security against North Korea before probes along the 38th parallel were revived next spring when the snow was off the ground. He will send Korean forces, if possible, next March—in any case, before May, if the requested material is in Korea.
President Johnson said that by January 1 Park will know the amounts and delivery dates of the equipment we can supply; but he wanted President Park to get his men there on March 1. President Park agreed to that deal.
President then went down the list: one destroyer in 10 months, but we shall try to do better than that. We shall also look into the matter of a second destroyer. Although MAP funds have been cut 30% there will be no cut in MAP. Counter-infiltration equipment will be sent. Park will have a response after the JCS review of his request in Seoul by January 1. But President Park will target March 1 as the date for putting in his additional forces. Park said he would ask his Defense Minister how soon he could get his forces in and he replied April was the earliest possible.
President Johnson then said: That’s why you’ve got Presidents: to make Defense Ministers work harder. It is a President’s job to do the impossible. The possible is easy. It is the impossible that Presidents must deal with. President Johnson recalled various examples of actions which were initially opposed by his ministers; for example, the kimchi; sending of patrol boats to Korea; and certain bombing operations in the North which he and President Park had discussed at Manila.
President Johnson said he would daresay that if President Park had listened to his Ministers, there would not now be Korean troops in South Vietnam.
Park said, finally, if I have a reply by January 1 I shall see what we can do.
President Johnson repeated that we have got to get additional 100,000 forces to Gen. Westmoreland from U.S., Korea, Thailand, and South Vietnam. And he promised that Amb. Porter would deliver our response by January 1.
President Park then said he would do his utmost to speed up the arrival of the troops. He said that sometimes Korea could move faster than the U.S. when it made up its mind; and he would try his utmost to meet the target date.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL KOR S-US. Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow on December 26.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- See Document 137.↩