137. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1
Text of Cable from Ambassador Porter (Seoul, 2769)
The result of a two-and-one-half-hour conversation today between President Park, the
Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense and the Foreign Minister on one hand, and Locke and Porter on the other, was that the South Korean Government has agreed to make available one “light division” to augment allied forces in South Vietnam. The timing of the availability of these additional troops is to await South Korean Government assessment of Assembly willingness to pass enabling legislation. In the meantime, Porter and the Minister of National Defense may open conversations to determine “arrangements” which will permit activation of such a light division.
Park, who clearly maintained control of the essentials of the conversation for the Koreans, said that when the Minister of Defense turned in a report indicating he was unable to recommend the dispatch of more troops because of Korean security problems, the President had returned the report to the Minister, telling the latter to find a way to meet the obvious needs of the Vietnam situation. He also made clear to the Minister he wished to help President Johnson. Locke went through the points cited in a State Department telegram,2 putting special stress on the current coming U.S. troop contribution, the need to increase pressure on the enemy at this point when his problems are severe, the excellent effect additional Korean contribution would have on the situation, and on public and Congress in the U.S.
President Park revealed that the Defense Minister had replied to his request for re-study of the possibilities by indicating that if rear and logistical elements now supporting Korean troops in Vietnam could be replaced by civilians, enough combat troops would be gained to form a “reinforced regimental combat team.” Additionally, Park continued, this regiment could be found in Korea which would bring the total new contribution to the level of a “light division.”
The Prime Minister and the Defense Minister then spoke in turn. Both opposed sending more troops. The former said his opposition resulted from the assurances given by the Americans that the previous [Page 298] troop dispatch was the last which would be requested and because such assurances had been passed to the Assembly and the public. He qualified his resistance to a new dispatch, however, by stating that something must be found which would enable his President to face opponents of the new dispatch, adding that he had been disappointed by the American refusal thus far to “take initiative” in that sense. Locke replied that we, too, had exceeded what Congress expected in way of troops for Vietnam because no one could predict requirements, but that President Johnson had faced up to leadership problems in the matter.
The Defense Minister said that in addition to his opposition on grounds of security, he had been very disappointed by the American performance on March 4, 1966 undertakings, that whereas the Koreans had sent every man they had agreed to send, the Americans had not kept their promises.3 Porter replied to this rather characteristic pitch in low key, (knowing Park fully aware of performance figures), and said we would endeavor to phrase future commitments in more precise terms. Locke assured the President that the U.S. is greatly concerned with maintenance of Korean security and economic welfare. He related our intentions re the Military Assistance Program in the coming year, support fund level, and the $10 million program loan.
The Foreign Minister then made a statement which related to his own success in turning off Assembly inquiry into the matter of implementation of the March 4, 1966, agreement. He also referred, as did the Defense Minister, to the “anti-infiltration measures commitment of $35 million” which, he said, Secretary McNamara indicated he had not received from CINCPAC and would consider when he did. Rather than get into a bargaining session then and there, we indicated that this was a matter we could discuss later and perhaps General Bonesteel would have some comments on it when he returns. The Ministers’ performance may have been intended to permit Park to assume a constructive role. If so, it was well designed for its purpose.
Before the discussion ended, Locke asked Park if we could set a date for discussion of the “arrangements” to support the “light division” he had mentioned. Park replied that Porter and the Minister of Defense could arrange for a mutually convenient time to open conversations.
[Page 299]I recommend very careful handling of this matter. Park’s problems will be greatly increased if the Assembly or the press learn of the foregoing, which they would surely interpret, Korean aid, as a commitment. This is a matter of real concern to me in view of local predilection for press leaks.
I will seek an appointment with the Defense Minister immediately after Ambassador Locke has an opportunity to discuss the matter in Washington and I have your comments.
Our arrangement with the President’s staff about the press is that the meeting will be described as a general review of the Vietnam situation.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis. Attached to a memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, December 7, which indicates that the President saw it. The source text is the retyped copy given to the President.↩
- Not found.↩
- Reference is to Brown’s March 4, 1966, letter detailing the military and economic assistance extended to the Koreans in exchange for troops for Vietnam; for a draft, see Document 76. Regarding the letter as sent, see footnote 9, Document 76. The Embassy issued periodic progress reports on the extent to which the United States had met its commitments relative to the 1966 ROK troop deployment. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19 KOR S-US, DEF 19 US–KOR S, and DEF 19–3 US–KOR S)↩