Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

92. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, August 20, 1964, 9:43 p.m.

333. Although recognizing desirability first determining if any change in Hussein’s attitude, Department does not wish delay much longer approach to Nasser on UAC and Jordan arms problem. In addition, we plan approaches to other Arab leaders counseling moderation at Summit Two and restraint on military buildup by UAC.² Accordingly hope you can obtain audience with Hussein immediately following his return.

Request you elicit whatever he willing tell you about his talks with Nasser. Specifically you should inquire if after further reflection he is still intent on forcing supersonic issue prior September 5. If he maintains position reported Embtel 94³ you should then make presentation along following lines:

As result King’s message to President⁴ USG willing to take another look at supersonic problem, but only if we are given sufficient time to do so. US refuses to be forced into hasty decision on matter with such obviously far-reaching implications for US interests in area and for very viability and integrity of Jordan. We feel that all-out US support of Jordan over the years and close US/Jordan relationship entitles us to ask for enough time to take another look. Moreover, this would be way of wisdom for Hussein as well as US.

Therefore if Hussein willing to hold up a few months longer at most, US prepared to (1) send survey team shortly to review whole RJAF modernization problem, in light probable infrastructure and supporting costs; (2) based on this report USG prepared review whether supersonic jets can be made available, either as replacements or additional squadron. We would consider any and all types US or other Western aircraft although it must be made clear that no commitment of any kind involved; (3) we would promise to let Jordan know our decision as soon as possible, in any case before end of year; (4) we also ready discuss with Jordan advanced flight training limited number pilots. This program could start October.

We well aware Summit Two conference will be held in heady atmosphere of new spirit of Arab solidarity and that King must not (and does not wish to) appear out of step with that spirit. Nevertheless, we believe we have been forthcoming in our response to King and that in addition he has good argumentation to support delay if he willing use it. We also believe there are other Arab leaders who can understand his position and who will be on side moderation and wisdom.

Important point is that King will be able show he has acted on UAC plans and proposals and that we have been forthcoming. He can stress that based on available UAC funds he was able to obtain generous USG offer of equipment for Jordan ground forces and assurances of US willingness discuss further sales when UAC finances clearer. He can say that USG has undertaken begin immediate survey air needs of Jordan including problem of infrastructure and supporting costs. If King pressed by UAC or Summit leaders for details on type and nationality of plane, he should say that much depends on results of survey and on kinds of UAC fund guarantees he able obtain from Summit for both materiel items and maintenance support. (FYI. If queried by him you may say that US air survey would consider all types US and other Western aircraft. End FYI.) Hussein can also say that USG in conjunction with comprehensive survey of RJAF is prepared to initiate advanced flight training in October for limited number of pilots.

We believe King should be prepared say to other Arab leaders that although he would have liked fuller and more final answers from US he is encouraged by forthcomingness of US response. We think he could also add that, as Summit leaders aware, he depends on US and other Western sources for nearly one-half Jordan budget. It therefore understandable USG, which has borne heavy burden support economic development and budget of Jordan for almost decade, would wish examine carefully new pattern of expenditures with widespread implications for Jordan economy. He could say regretfully that this fact of life and that he could not blame USG for wishing consider carefully what it should do. Finally we see no reason why King could not also say on basis longstanding and fruitful relationship that he is confident fuller and more definite US responses will be forthcoming in due course.

King could then take initiative with other Arab leaders to say he would be greatly helped if better guarantees of funds from UAC could be assured. If necessary, he could say he recognized Soviet equipment might be easier obtain without requiring funds in hand. Nevertheless, problem not simply arms and could not be considered in vacuum. He had his whole economy to consider and very viability of Jordan.

You should then tell King that USG convinced that King and other Arabs mistaken in believing, as they apparently do, that planned UAC arms buildup can quickly alter Arab-Israeli arms balance. Rather than improving Arab military stance relative to Israel, present UAC pressures will stimulate intensified arms race of self-defeating nature. Not only would Israel be likely continue obtain hardware it needs, but risks of preemptive actions would rise particularly if MIGs introduced into Jordan. Moreover, effects of arms buildup on Arab economics, particularly that of Jordan, could leave them weaker rather than stronger relative to Israel.

Finally, acquisition by Jordan now of supersonic squadron bound to increase Israeli pressures for additional arms from UK, France, and especially US, particularly if issue should be forced during US national election period. Results could be contrary to Arab interests, preventing US from continuing its present restrained arms policy, and ultimately leading to polarization with US selling to Israel and Soviets selling to Arabs. This is neither in Arab interest nor ours.

We therefore once more urge King not to force supersonics issue at this time, not to take final decisions at Summit Two, and to use the argumentation mentioned in order to show that as Arab leader he is responding to UAC spirit but in wise and statesmanlike manner.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 4 ARAB. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Killgore and Symmes; cleared by Stoddart, Bunte, Director for Operations in G/PM Howard Meyers, Newsom, and Komer; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs James P. Grant. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Taiz, Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, London, and CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE for Ramsey.
2. Instructions to this effect were sent in circular telegram 332 to Khartoum, Beida, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat; telegram 103 to Jidda; and telegram 36 to Kuwait, all dated August 20. (All ibid.)
3. Telegram 94 from Amman, August 14, reported that on August 13 Barnes had sent King Hussein the resume of the U.S. position as instructed in telegram 86 to Amman (Document 88), and that in a discussion of the U.S. package later that day, the King stated that the package was constructive, except that it ruled out the supersonic squadron that he considered essential to his position vis-a-vis other Arab leaders. Barnes concluded that without F104s, the King would accept a MIG squadron. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN)
4. An August 15 message from the King to President Johnson, transmitted in telegram 99 from Amman, August 15, argued the case for a squadron of supersonic fighter aircraft. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN)