Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, August 12, 1964, 7:51 p.m.

86. Amman’s 84 to Department;² Deptels 64, 76 and 78 to Amman.³ Department commends your presentation to King Hussein of USG position on arms for Jordan which we had all foreseen would be unpleasant to King’s ears. While Hussein’s over-all reaction negative, we were encouraged by King’s apparent recognition of at least some of dangers and disadvantages to Jordan inherent in UAC arms buildup and by his stated intention postpone any final decisions until over-all situation has been clarified by September Summit Conference. In accordance his request, you should provide King with copy of resume of USG position on sale of military equipment as contained in Deptel 64 beginning with “A. General” and concluding at the end of paragraph “C. Aircraft.” Paragraph D should not be contained in summary handed to King.

In oral presentation to King before handing him summary of USG position you should stress once again that USG has done more for Jordan in past and will unquestionably do more in future to preserve basic integrity of Jordan than any other country or group of countries. In light of problems posed for USG by Jordan’s arms request, our response to King cannot be viewed as other than generous. We are glad King apparently sees this with respect to ground equipment, as judged by his remark that our suggestions can probably be drawn up in such priority order as to satisfy UAC.

We continue to maintain that a supersonic fighter squadron for Jordan makes no military, political or economic sense. In view total number of supersonic fighters at disposal various countries represented on UAC, we unable understand why supersonic squadron for Jordan could and should have assumed such apparently overriding importance. If UAC had been looking for issue most likely to render permanent damage to US-Jordanian relationship as well as threat to area stability no better could have been found than ordering Jordan to accept supersonic fighter squadron. King says key to present issue is F–104 squadron. This is very issue which faces USG with such impossible choices.

Hussein’s argument that Israel might well not be upset if Jordan acquired supersonic US squadron may be well taken. However, apart from internal economic effects on Jordan, this misses main point, namely, if USG provides Jordan with supersonics that symbolize offensive modern military power, little will be left of its Near Eastern arms policy of avoiding becoming major supplier of offensive weapons to countries involved in Arab-Israel context. If we provide supersonics to Jordan, our arguments against providing similar and possibly larger quantities of material to other countries, including Israel and other Arab states, would lose validity. Once embarked on, end of this road would be clear—a polarized situation in Middle East with Arabs lined up with Soviet Union and US in such ill repute in area that King Hussein could no longer afford political liability of being associated with us. We ask the King to search his mind carefully. If he will do so we believe he will see validity of our position.

In summary, we see Jordan’s acquisition of supersonic fighter planes at this time as beginning of process that may ultimately destroy relations with US. A MIG squadron for Jordan would be little if any better from our point of view. Congress will simply not understand how Jordan needs such extensive US support if it can afford an expensive supersonic squadron. We think King has good arguments that will make sense to most of other Arab leaders. We hope the King will make these arguments with full force and effect in coming meetings with his fellow Arab leaders. The King must know from past experience that we are with him. We would hope he would remain in close consultation with us and not close any doors at Summit.

FYI. At very least we hope you will get assurances from King that in meetings with UAC next week he will avoid any commitments that will foreclose further discussions with us. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3, US–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Killgore; cleared by Symmes, in draft by Bunte, and in substance by Komer and Stoddart; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo, London, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.
2. Telegram 84 from Amman, August 11, reported that Barnes met with King Hussein on August 10, read the President’s message (Document 85), and continued along the lines of telegram 78 to Amman (Document 84). (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN)
3. For telegram 64 to Amman, see Document 82. Telegram 76 to Amman, August 7, stated that in a meeting with Talbot and Macomber before leaving Washington, Khammash said he found the U.S. package insufficient to withstand pressures from the United Arab Command. He handed back the resume, saying he would prefer not to have to give it to the King. The telegram instructed the Embassy not to give the King the resume until officials in Washington could consider possible revisions in the manner of presentation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN)