Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

91. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 36.3–64

Washington, August 13, 1964.

IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN US MILITARY AID TO JORDAN

The Problem

Jordan has requested that the US sell it some $70–100 million worth of arms. This estimate assesses the consequences and implications of (a) an outright rejection of this request, (b) full compliance with it, and (c) partial compliance. It also examines briefly three related matters: the prospects for the Arab plan for diversion of the Jordan headwaters, the viability of the United Arab Command (UAC), and the anticipated Israeli reactions to this diversion and to the buildup of Arab forces under the UAC.

Conclusions

A. Rejection of Hussain’s request would cause him to turn to the Egyptians or the Soviets for arms. Although Hussain probably believes that he could take Soviet arms and still get some US economic aid, he would be concerned that US military assistance and budgetary support could well be cut off. If the Egyptians succeeded in sending training missions to Jordan with such materiel, Nasser’s influence in Jordan would be increased and Arab-Israeli tensions would be seriously heightened. (Paras. 7–9)

B. US sale of all or most of the requested equipment, while it would lessen Arab resentments concerning alleged US favoritism toward Israel, would impair US ability to check the escalation of the Arab-Israeli arms race. Though Israel would find a large, US-equipped Jordanian army a lesser evil than one equipped with Soviet weapons and under strong Egyptian influence, the Israelis would renew and increase their pressures on the US for more weapons. Any large arms acquisition and expansion of the Jordanian forces would put serious strains on Jordan’s economy, since the UAC is unlikely to foot the entire bill. (Paras. 10–12)

C. Partial compliance through a US package, of a size governed by UAC willingness to pay, which included some supersonic aircraft and some tanks would probably suffice to prevent the Jordanians from shopping elsewhere and from admitting UAR or Soviet training missions. Hussain would be able at the second round of the Arab Summit Conference to claim that Jordan was doing its share in the buildup against Israel. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Nevertheless, partial compliance would have, though to a lesser degree, some of the unfortunate consequences of full compliance. (Paras. 13–15)

D. Arab plans to deny portions of the Jordan waters to Israel, even if only partially implemented, would heighten tensions. Israel has said that it would regard diversion by the Arabs of more water than was allotted them under the 1955 proposals as grounds for war. We believe that they would carry out this threat, and that the Arabs, believing it too, are unlikely to test the Israelis until they feel confident that they have become strong enough to provide an effective defense against Israeli attack. (Paras. 17–18)

E. The UAC goes further than previous efforts to unify Arab military forces, and for the first time money is available to improve the common military effort. The Arabs estimate that it would take 24 months to create the military capability to repel an Israeli attack, but we believe that it would require three or four years at a minimum. It is too early to say whether the UAC will survive for more than a year or two the strains inherent in the Arab situation. (Paras. 19–22)

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 13. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdictions. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here.