232. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense Clifford1
Washington, April 10, 1968.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Before you go to The Hague for the Nuclear Planning Group meeting on April
18-19, I believe you should be familiar with the US interpretations of
Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding alliance
arrangements for nuclear defense. The FRG
has requested in particular that we make it clear that the realization of
the NPT will not affect the work of the
NPG.
The language of Articles I and II of the NPT
was chosen in order to protect alliance consultations on nuclear defense as
well as on nuclear defense deployment arrangements. These are not explicitly
sanctioned by Articles I and II, since the USSR was not prepared to provide such an endorsement of NATO arrangements.
In Secretary Rusk’s October 10, 1966
talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko,2 it was
clearly understood that Articles I and II of the NPT deal only with what is prohibited and not what is
permitted. Article I of the NPT prohibits
the transfer of ownership or control of nuclear weapons (understood to mean
warheads and bombs and not delivery vehicles). It does not mention alliance
consultations or deployment arrangements not involving a transfer of nuclear
weapons. We worked out interpretations on these and other aspects of
Articles I and II with our allies (and in particular the FRG) which were presented to the Soviets on
April 28, 1967 in the form of answers to questions posed by our allies (Tab
A).
The FRG agreed with us that it would not be
desirable to request comments from the USSR
on these interpretations, since the USSR
could not be expected to be bound by unilateral interpretations or a treaty
made by others. However, the Soviets were informed that if they took an
official position in opposition to these interpretations, a very serious
problem would arise. The Soviets also were told that we expected that during
ratification hearings the US Senators would ask similar questions
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as allied governments, and we
expected to make the same responses on our understanding of Articles I and
II.
We have not heard from the Soviets any indication that they will contradict
the US interpretations when they are made public in the process of
consideration of the treaty either by the US or by our allies. This does not
mean that they will necessarily agree with them.
We do not believe it would be in our interest or that of our allies to have a
public discussion of the US interpretations prior to the time when the
NPT is submitted to the Senate for
advice and consent.
On March 13 the FRG Embassy here requested
that a statement be made by you at The Hague NPG meeting and also at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in May to the effect that the
NPT will not hinder the work of the
NPG or further nuclear defense
arrangements within the alliance compatible with Articles I and II of the
NPT. (Memcon and FRG working paper attached as Tab B.)
We think it would be useful for you to make such a statement on both
occasions suggested by the FRG and see no
objection to using substantially the language proposed by the Germans.
We have slightly rephrased the FRG language
(Tab C). I suggest that you include such a statement in your presentations
both to the April 18-19 NPG Meeting and at
the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in
May.
Tab A3
QUESTIONS ON THE DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ASKED BY
U.S. ALLIES TOGETHER WITH ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES
1. Q. What may and what may not be transferred under the
draft treaty?
A. The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is
permitted.
It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of “nuclear weapons” or
control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the
transfer of other nuclear explosive devices because a nuclear explosive
device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be
easily adapted for such use.
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It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of
nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to
any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or
warheads.
2. Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit consultations and
planning on nuclear defense among NATO
members?
A. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear
defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them
results.
3. Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit arrangements for
the deployment of nuclear weapons owned and controlled by the United
States within the territory of non-nuclear NATO members?
A. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons
within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear
weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go
to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling.
4. Q. Would the draft prohibit the unification of Europe
if a nuclear-weapon state was one of the constituent states?
A. It does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar
succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of
one of its former components. A new federated European state would have
to control all of its external security functions including defense and
all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not
have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While
not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would
bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over
them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.
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Tab B4
Washington, March 13, 1968.
Memorandum of Conversation
SUBJECT
PARTICIPANTS
- Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, German Embassy
- Adolf von Wagner, Third Secretary, German Embassy
-
John M. Leddy, Asst.
Secretary for European Affairs
- Edwin D. Crowley, EUR/GER
Minister von Lilienfeld said he called on instructions of his Government
to express German concern as to possible effects on the work of the
NPG of the Soviet exploitation of
the NPT. He gave Mr. Leddy the attached paper containing
talking points which he described as a “non-paper” having no official
status. He recalled that the NPG was
closely connected with the earlier MLF
to which the FRG had attached
importance. The FRG also attaches a
great deal of importance to the work of the NPG both from the standpoint of defense policy and from the
psychological point of view.
Mr. Leddy, referring to the
talking points, asked the Minister whether he considered our
participation in the NPG had had a
restrictive effect. Minister von Lilienfeld said there is a feeling in
German circles, especially in military circles, that the US is resisting
the sharing of knowledge and decision-making in the nuclear field.
Mr. Leddy pointed out to the
Minister that the NPG was established to
meet the problem to which the Minister referred and that he thought it
was doing good work. He was not aware of any basis for the reported
German concern that our participation has had a restrictive effect. As
to the desire expressed by the Minister that the Secretary of Defense
make statements at the NPG Ministerial
meeting on April 18 and at the NATO
Ministers’ meeting in May, we would look into the matter. He said we
certainly will not talk to the Soviets about the NPG. The situation is clear on that score.
The Minister explained that it was not the desire of his Government that
the Secretary of Defense make formal declarations. The German Government
had in mind that the Secretary would include in his
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remarks at these meetings statements along
the lines set forth in his talking paper.
Attachment5
Talking Paper
I have instructions to raise the question of the possible repercussions
which the non-proliferation treaty might have on the nuclear
arrangements within the Alliance. We raise this question particularly
with respect to the ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group
schedule in the Hague on April 18 and 19.
The interpretations which the US delegate in Geneva handed the Soviet
Co-Chairman on April 28, 1967 deal with this problem. These
interpretations had been the subject of consultations within the
Alliance and also bilaterally between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany.
The interpretations safeguard the nuclear arrangements as they presently
exist within the Alliance. We consider it desirable, however, that the
US Government make it clear vis-a-vis its allies that the
Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not impair the future work of the Nuclear
Planning Group nor the further development by the Nuclear Planning Group
of nuclear arrangements already existing. We are motivated by the fact
that the Soviets have time and again criticized the already existing
nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. We, therefore, have reason to
expect that—by referring to the Non-Proliferation Treaty—they will
attempt to block any further development of such arrangements,
especially in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group.
Although the legal validity of such attempts were to be doubted, they
could produce a dangerous political impact, thus hindering the future
work in the Nuclear Planning Group and jeopardizing concrete
improvements in the field of consultation on nuclear matters.
We recognize that the Nuclear Planning Group already has produced some
good results and has done important preliminary work for an improvement
of nuclear consultation within the Alliance. But we
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share the opinion of other members of the
Alliance that there is still a long way to go before satisfactory and
final arrangements of the problems the Nuclear Planning Group is dealing
with are reached. Work within the Nuclear Planning Group proceeds slowly
and sometimes there is the impression that a certain restrictive
tendency impedes faster progress. As far as we know, Secretary General
Brosio occasionally has
expressed similar concerns on this matter.
All these reasons make it even more urgent that the US Government gives
the clarification we request. We feel, however, that this should not be
done through interpretations to be handed to the Soviets. We, too, would
consider it prejudicial if hereby a discussion about the Nuclear
Planning Group would be initiated with the Soviets. We would appreciate
it if the Secretary of Defense at the ministerial meeting at the Hague
on April 18 and at the Conference of the NATO Defense Ministers in May 1968 could make such a
statement.
In our view it would be desirable if such a statement would state
- —that the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not
interfere with the determination of the US Government to further
actively the work of the Nuclear Planning Group and to cooperate
in the aim of finding a solution satisfactory to the non-nuclear
partners of the Alliance for the formulation and execution of
nuclear planning within NATO;
- —that the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not hinder the
further development of nuclear defense arrangements within the
Alliance compatible with Articles I and II of the NPT.
Tab C6
Proposed Statement to be Included in Presentations by
Secretary Clifford at April 18-19
NPG Meeting and May NATO Defense Ministers Meeting
The US Government holds the view that the entry into force of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty will not interfere with the work of the Nuclear
Planning Group. The US Government intends to continue to pursue actively
the work of the Nuclear Planning Group and to seek to find solutions
satisfactory to its non-nuclear partners in NATO for the formulation and execution of nuclear planning
within NATO. It also is the view of the
US Government that the Non-Proliferation Treaty will not hinder the
further development of nuclear defense arrangements within the alliance
compatible with Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
