Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IX, International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities

244. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, November 27, 1964.

Mac—

The McNamara-Gordon recommendation to the President contained in their memorandum of October 26 on stockpiling policy² has been reviewed with these results:

(1) There is agreement that a recommendation should be made to the President that he appoint a study group with you as the chairman, to review and report to him on stockpile policy. It would be the President’s decision if he at some later time wanted to place the report formally before the National Security Council for its comments.

(2) In addition to the members proposed by McNamara and Gordon, there should be added the Secretary of Commerce and Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

(3) Ed McDermott suggested that the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and the Budget Director be observers rather than members of the Committee. He does not feel strongly on this matter and the others involved strongly recommend that they be kept as full members.

(4) The placing of the chairmanship in your office is generally agreed to be a key element in this operation because this study is deliberately being thought of as having very important national security aspects which must predominate over the domestic political considerations which have figured too largely in determining stockpile policy up to now. This, however, means that there must be a balanced and sophisticated political and military judgment exercised rather than the heavy-handed military logistics premises that have been used in the past to establish the military premises for stockpile planning.

(5) The NSAM for the President’s signature has been prepared with a view to White House release. It is agreed that there is so much Congressional interest in national stockpile policy and so many strong economic interests involved in the Government’s determinations in this field that it would be virtually impossible to keep the fact of this study secret. On the contrary, it would be in the Government’s interest to announce the study and to pre-empt this field in anticipation of possible Congressional initiatives.

(6) I have talked this over with Francis Bator and we both urge you to recommend that the President sign the NSAM.

CEJ

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 321, Review of Strategic Stockpile Objectives, Box 6. No classification marking.
2. Document 240.