240. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Gordon) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- NSC review of strategic stockpile objectives and post-nuclear attack planning
Background
- 1.
- The U.S. Government currently owns $8 billion of materials, mainly minerals, in its various strategic stockpiles.
- 2.
- Current stockpile objectives have been calculated on the assumption of a three-year all-out conventional war.
- 3.
- In the case of most materials, however, our stockpiles are substantially in excess of these relatively large strategic objectives.
- 4.
- The OEP is currently engaged in a post-nuclear attack planning exercise to determine supply requirements for post-attack rehabilitation, including stockpile requirements.
- 5.
- As you know, proposals to dispose of surplus copper during the current tight market situation have encountered objections because of the possibility that the post-attack planning exercise may result in raising the current copper stockpile objective.
- 6.
- Overall, the volume of disposals of surplus materials has been increasing in recent years. Receipts from these disposals reduce the budget deficit. Senator Symington introduced legislation in the 88th Congress to facilitate disposal operations. With such legislation, the major deterrent to disposals would be the limits imposed by our desire not to disrupt commercial markets. However, we ought also to make sure that disposals are not held up by unnecessarily high estimates of wartime requirements.
Discussion
Secretary McNamara and I believe that an overall review of both the conventional war stockpile objectives and the current post-nuclear attack planning exercise is called for.
- —The conventional war objectives are based on the assumption of a three-year all-out war in which it is assumed that the U.S. will have no access to foreign supplies, except in nearby areas. This and other similar assumptions should be reexamined.
- —The whole concept of developing a stockpile of materials for post-nuclear attack needs a careful review. By its very nature a nuclear attack would reduce the labor force and processing facilities relative to mineral capacity and mineral inventories. Raw materials are most likely therefore to be in surplus.
- —This consideration, in turn, raises the possibility of stockpiling items in fabricated form. But here we face the danger that the items in the stockpile may soon become obsolete.
- —Given scarce budget resources, we must also consider the relative merits of stockpiling items for immediate human consumption—food, clothing, medicine, etc.—against the merits of stockpiling items for economic rehabilitation. And these in turn must be weighed in the light of resources devoted to a shelter program.
In summary, these questions raise substantial issues of national security, and should be considered by the National Security Council.
[Page 643]Recommendation
I recommend that:
- 1.
- You direct the NSC to establish a subcommittee to review stockpile policy.
- 2.
- This subcommittee be composed of Messrs. McNamara, McDermott, Buddy, Heller, and Gordon.
- 3.
- The subcommittee should: first, reexamine the major assumptions used in calculating existing conventional war stockpile objectives; second, review the assumptions, techniques, and goals stipulated in the post-nuclear attack supply requirements study currently being conducted by the Office of Emergency Planning; and third, consider the relationship of economic rehabilitation requirements to other post-nuclear attack supply requirements, such as food, shelter, medicine, etc.
- 4.
- The subcommittee should report to you its findings and recommendations by April 1, 1965.
Secretary McNamara concurs in these recommendations.
I am attaching a draft note from you to McGeorge Bundy, asking him to draw up an appropriate National Security Action Memorandum.2