I attach a copy of a conversation that Dean Rusk had with Ambassador
Dobrynin after our meeting at
the Ranch. The Secretary tells me that he and Thompson both interpret this
conversation as confirming their view that the Soviets would make an
effort to move things onward during the pause. In this sense they
incline to think that it substantiates their belief that Dobrynin’s talk with me was
important.2 My own valuation remains somewhat more cautious,
although I must say I think the two talks together are worth a little
bit more than the 4# you said you would not pay for what Dobrynin said to me!3
Attachment
Washington,
December 8, 1965, 6 p.m.
Memorandum of Conversation4
SUBJECT
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Anatoliy F.
Dobrynin,USSR
- The Secretary
- Llewellyn E. Thompson,
Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
The Secretary said with respect to the hostilities in Viet-Nam, that
it was not clear how we turn at this point. We had been in touch
with Hanoi
[Page 625]
and with
various capitals around the world. We had also had conversations
with the Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter here in Washington.5 The Ambassador inquired if we had been in
touch with Hanoi after the General Assembly discussion.
The Secretary replied that we had.6 There had
been no indication of the slightest interest in bringing this affair
to a peaceful conclusion. He did not fully understand why the two
co-Chairmen could not take some initiative. He said that both we and
Hanoi had referred to the 1954 Agreements. Hanoi puts four points as
its interpretation of these Agreements but the Secretary wished to
point out that the NLF is not
mentioned in these Accords.
The Ambassador asked if we had talked with them with regard to the
other points. It appeared to him that we were asking unconditional
surrender. He said he was not speaking of Hanoi but of the
Liberation Front. He said that even yesterday the Secretary
indicated he did not want to speak with the people when we were
fighting; namely, the NLF. At least
they were doing the major fighting.
The Secretary pointed out that our combat troops had not been in
Viet-Nam until Hanoi had moved in.
The Ambassador said our own figures showed the great number of
South-Vietnamese that had been fighting us. He said no one from
their side could accept that it was only Hanoi.
The Secretary said that among the fourteen million people in South
Viet-Nam there was an overwhelming consensus that they did not want
Hanoi. We were prepared to support the elections in South Viet-Nam
but the Liberation Front said, “no.”
The Ambassador asked under what formula we would propose elections.
The Secretary replied on the condition that there was peace in the
country which would permit elections.
The Ambassador pointed out that Diem had refused to talk of elections. He then
inquired about the possibility of stopping the bombardment of North
Viet-Nam. Were we prepared to consider this? Parenthetically, he
noted that a twelve hour suspension of fighting had been
offered7 and that our press spokesman had said neither yes
nor no.
[Page 626]
The Secretary asked that if the Ambassador were in Viet-Nam, would he
put his arms down for twelve hours. The other side had said they
would not shoot people who went to church unarmed.
Dobrynin said that this was an
aside and he returned to the subject of bombing, which was the main
thing.
The Secretary said he had been careful not to close the door on this
in his public statements but he could not understand why it was
impossible to find out privately what would happen if we did stop
the bombing. He had asked Mr. Peter and we had asked Hanoi. Ho Chi Min had sent Linus Pauling a
message which Pauling interpreted to mean that the four points were
not a precondition of negotiations. If this were a fact, why did
they not say so?
Dobrynin said they could not
talk of negotiations while the bombing went on. He said, frankly, he
did not understand the American stubbornness. The United States was
a big power. No one would think we were weak if we stopped the
bombing to create a better atmosphere. His feeling was that we were
too sensitive to domestic criticism.
The Secretary said this was not the problem. Dobrynin said he did not understand
our position and he made clear that in these and other remarks he
was speaking personally. He said the suspension for four days had
not been enough and may even have done harm. This did not give
anyone any chance to do anything about it. He asked what harm it
would do to have some criticism in the United States. He was sure it
would be understood abroad.
The Secretary said he agreed this was an informal conversation. He
continued that we don’t even know the direction of the attitude the
Soviet Union would take if we stopped bombing. Would they try to
arrange a settlement on the basis of the 1954 Accords? Dobrynin said that stopping the
bombing would create a better atmosphere. He could not give any
undertaking as to what would happen but the Soviet Union would not
try to influence North Viet-Nam while they were being bombed.
The Secretary remarked that only the United States is not supposed to
have face. During the Berlin blockade we had talked to the Soviet
Union privately. (The Ambassador interjected that there had been no
fighting going on.) The Secretary continued that during the Korean
war we had private talks that had led to peace.
Dobrynin said he did not see
any loss for the United States in stopping the bombing. No one would
seriously say that the United States was a weak power. He asked
whether the Secretary thought the Soviet Government would think that
we had lost face.
The Secretary said it was not a question of Moscow, but of Hanoi.
Apparently they thought the United States was about to collapse,
judging from the publicity they gave the demonstrations in this
country
[Page 627]
against United
States policy. Perhaps stopping the bombing would make them think
this was so. Neither he nor the Ambassador knew what Hanoi’s
reaction would be.
The Ambassador said he did not invite us to resume bombing after a
suspension, but implied that this was our option. He asked whether
the Secretary thought that more and more bombing would convince the
other side.
The Secretary said he was prepared to bet a new hat that when Johnson
defeated Goldwater, Hanoi had said to themselves that they could
have a larger war without reaction from the United States.
Dobrynin said the question was
how to finish the affair. Why not begin with the suspension of
bombing? The only argument he had heard was that this would be a
sign of weakness.
The Secretary said that Hanoi had never even hinted that they would
do anything if the bombing stopped. Dobrynin pointed out that both the Hungarians and
the Soviets had suggested that this could be a step on a way out.
Neither of them, however, had the authority to speak for others.
The Secretary said it was hard for us to understand the failure to
carry out the agreement on Laos. Hanoi had never complied with it
and there was nothing we wanted more than one thousand percent
compliance with it in every respect. The other side had referred to
the military clauses of the 1954 Agreement. Why not get back to this
and the 1962 Agreement? We have said that we wanted no bases or
forces in that area. The South Viet-Namese could determine their own
fate provided North Viet-Nam did not intervene by force. Dobrynin said that in view of what
the Secretary said regarding bombing in North Viet-Nam, and he was
aware that we were already bombing in Laos, he did not see any way
out or how the conflict could fail to be enlarged.
The Secretary said we did not want even the present level of
hostilities. Dobrynin said
that he had heard talk of bombing Haiphong and Laos and Cambodia.
The Secretary said the problem was how could we find restraint on
the other side? Dobrynin
repeated that the United States was a big power but did not want to
make any gestures. We were increasing our troops. Were we trying to
impress the Soviets? The Secretary said no, we were trying to
impress Hanoi. Dobrynin asked
what would come afterwards. Would we intervene in North Viet-Nam? If
this occurred, then what would happen?
The Secretary said that Dobrynin had used the phrase “unconditional
surrender.” Speaking frankly, this was an abuse of language. We were
not asking the other side to surrender or do anything but to stop
their intervention. Dobrynin
said we were trying to force the Liberation Front to admit they were
only tools or stooges of Hanoi. He pointed out that they had
representatives in Peking and Moscow and elsewhere. The
[Page 628]
other side was asked to
accept unconditional discussions, ignoring the Liberation Front, and
to accept the United States position that it was only Hanoi that was
involved. This made the situation very difficult for Hanoi, as well
as for the Soviet Union. He was not sure that some of the people in
South Viet-Nam would continue their activities no matter what
happened.
The Secretary pointed out that we were not shooting them until Hanoi
came in. Dobrynin repeated
that from the beginning we demanded Hanoi accept our condition that
we were not fighting local people but Hanoi. He said there could be
no armed intervention unless there were local people fighting and we
did not wish to recognize the people that were fighting us.
The Secretary replied that we wished to recognize them all, including
the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Montagnards.
Dobrynin contended that the
Secretary was saying to the other side, “Accept our formula and then
we will have unconditional talks.” He asked if we were at war with
Hanoi.
The Secretary said we had told Hanoi that they could talk about their
four points but we wanted to talk about our points. He did not see
any other way than to sit down at the table to do this.
Dobrynin again said his
personal feeling was that the best thing was to stop the bombing. He
could not say what would happen but he was sure the atmosphere would
be better.
The Secretary inquired whether if we did stop bombing and there were
no response, would the crisis then be greater?
Dobrynin responded that if we
stopped it only for a short time and put it in the form of an
ultimatum, this might be. The Secretary asked what if we stopped and
there were an ultimatum from Peking or from Moscow as to what would
happen if we resumed? We did not even know if this would happen or
not.
Dobrynin said there was
nothing to discuss now while we continued to wage a big war.
The Secretary said it was extraordinary that there could be
discussions only if one side stopped shooting.
Dobrynin replied that he
presumed we would continue shooting in the South, although he was
not suggesting we do so.
The Secretary raised the question as to whether North Viet-Nam would
keep infiltrating the South. Dobrynin said that the Soviets were sure that North
Viet-Nam did not have control of all Viet Cong units. The Secretary
rejoined that we were very sure and had good information that there
were very few that Hanoi did not control.
After a brief discussion reported separately on non-proliferation,
the Secretary said that both the Soviet Union and the United States
had
[Page 629]
enormous stakes in
Asia. We believed that frontiers should not be changed by force. If
help were needed to demarcate the frontier or to settle disputes, we
should both help. We had a considerable community of interest in
this.
Dobrynin said that as far as
he knew, there was no question of frontiers. The Secretary said the
Chinese had asked for changes in their frontier with India.
Dobrynin interjected that
the Soviet Union had made clear its disapproval of this.
The Secretary said they also had some claims for a large chunk of
Soviet territory.
Dobrynin replied that there
had been reports in the press to this effect but in fact they had
asked for only five kilometers. (It was not clear whether he was
talking of square kilometers or what.) Dobrynin continued that he thought we must give more
attention to our relations, which were not developing well. He did
not know if this deterioration was deliberate or a result of a chain
of events. He made reference to the Penkovsky papers8 and a recently published Dodd Committee
report9 which accused the leaders of the Soviet Union
of being murderers. He also mentioned a man who paraded near the
Soviet Embassy with a placard saying that Kosygin and Brezhnev were murderers.
The Secretary remarked that he understood there were ten thousand
demonstrators in front of our Embassy today. Dobrynin continued that he now
understood that Soviet attaches had no right to buy books in
Brentano’s on certain subjects unless they asked the Pentagon first.
He thought this was incredible. The Secretary replied that we were
aware of the instructions given to the Communist Party in this
country. Dobrynin said they
did not come from his Embassy.
The Secretary concluded by stating that perhaps he would be in touch
with the Ambassador again on how to proceed. He again referred to
the bitterness in this country after the breaking of the Laotian
agreement. He also referred to a recent interview charging us with
aggression.10 He
said the Soviets must realize what disappointment the breaking of
the Laotian agreement had caused here.11
Dobrynin said the Soviets were
in favor of compliance. The Secretary asked if they could not get
together with the British and demand compliance.
[Page 630]
Dobrynin said this was
difficult now as our planes were flying there. The Secretary said
this should not be a problem as we were ready to comply completely.
He continued that the Soviets had accused us of being dragged along
by the Germans. We thought that the Soviets were being dragged along
by Hanoi. Dobrynin referred
to the number of times he had come to the Secretary to try to get
discussions going on Cambodia, but he had refused. The Secretary
replied that this was because Sihanouk had raised these matters in
complete hostility to Thailand and South Viet-Nam. We had been
working with Thailand and South Viet-Nam to get these matters
settled before a conference.
At this point, since both the Ambassador and the Secretary had dinner
engagements, the conversation ended.
