205. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1
We have now done a careful official translation of the letter which Fanfani addressed to you through Ambassador Goldberg, on which Goldberg informed Valenti. Text is as follows:
Begin text
New York, November 20, 1965.
The President of the General Assembly
[Page 577]Mr. President:
In the interview which you graciously accorded me at the end of May you repeated anew your firm intention to seek assiduously a negotiated solution for the conflict in Vietnam.
In the hope of being able to assist in the realization of this noble purpose, I bring to your attention the following:
On Thursday, November 11, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and the President of the Council, Van Dong, expressed to two persons (known to me) the strong desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Vietnam and, in summary, stated—according to what they wrote me—that “in order for the peace negotiations to come about, there will be necessary (a) a cease-fire (by air, by sea, by land) in the entire territory of Vietnam (north and south); the cessation, that is, of all belligerent operations (including therefore also the cessation of debarkation of further American troops); (b) a declaration according to which the Geneva Agreements of 1954 will be taken as the basis for the negotiations—a declaration made up of the four points formulated by Hanoi, points that are in reality the explanation of the Geneva text and which, therefore, can be reduced to a single point: application in other words, of the Geneva Accords.”
The text of the communication which I have received adds that “the Government in Hanoi is prepared to initiate negotiations without first requiring actual withdrawal of the American troops.”
To the same interlocutors Ho Chi Minh said: “I am prepared to go anywhere; to meet anyone.”
These are the essential points that one of the two interlocutors of Ho Chi Minh and Van Dong sent me in writing last night and which, in this letter of mine—confided to Mr. A. Goldberg, the US representative to the UN, so that he can deliver it promptly and confidentially—I bring word for word to your attention.
You surely have other elements by which to judge the importance of the above. As President of the 20th Assembly, as a high official of Italy, as a sincere friend of the United States and of yourself, I hope that this contribution to the sought-for peaceful solution, always more necessary and more urgent, may be a useful one. And I am at your disposition for any step that you consider opportune in the matter.
With sincere pleasure at your recovery and with best wishes for your high mission, I send my respectful greetings.
Yours,
(Signed) Amintore Fanfani
The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States
Washington
[Page 578]End text
As we read the message, it represents a simple restatement of the familiar Hanoi position. Although worded in the most palatable form possible, the second of the stated requirements for peace negotiations amounts simply to our accepting in principle the familiar Hanoi four points, the third of which required the establishment, under the NLF program, of an immediate coalition government in Saigon in which the NLF would play a leading and probably dominant role. We have never accepted this as a basis for negotiations, and never could without surrendering the most crucial of our objectives.
The language about a “cease-fire” has never been expressed in quite this way before, but would amount to an immediate ban on our air operations in the North and on our continuing ground reinforcements, without any compensating act by Hanoi whatever in the form of stopping infiltration, reducing activity in the South, and withdrawing at least regular units. As you know, we have repeatedly told Hanoi through third parties that we cannot consider even stopping the bombing without compensating action in these three areas, and we have in effect said the same thing publicly in more general form.
Accordingly, the message in substance adds up to a reiteration of a firm and inflexible Hanoi position consistent with all our other readings. It corresponds closely with what several third parties have told us of the position asserted by Ho and Pham Van Dong, and also with Hanoi’s most recent public statements. The only possible glimmer of light is that Hanoi would not insist on prior withdrawal of US forces—but this too we have long believed they would not press for in the last analysis, and a similar statement was conveyed to us explicitly when the North Vietnamese approached the French just at the end of the pause last May.2
I have consulted with Bob McNamara and Mac Bundy, and it is our recommendation that you approve an instruction to Ambassador Goldberg to discuss the matter promptly and fully with Fanfani along the following lines:
- a.
- Thank him profusely for his helpful effort.
- b.
- Explain carefully the generally familiar nature of the message and its unacceptable elements.
- c.
- Make clear that we would be most interested in pursuing the matter, in any appropriate way, if Fanfani’s sources should be in a position to indicate, on the basis of a report which Fanfani might make to them, that there is some new light or some change in the unacceptable elements, which in effect amount to a reiteration of preconditions for any useful discussion.
So that the record would be left in no doubt whatever, we have worked out with Ambassador Goldberg an informal written aide-memoire3 that would be left with Fanfani to supplement Ambassador Goldberg’s oral presentation and to provide a complete record, for future reference both to Fanfani and to ourselves.
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy and described on the source text as “Final Draft.” The President was at the LBJ Ranch in Texas November 19-December 12.↩
- See vol. II, Document 313.↩
- The aide-memoire was approved by Rusk on November 29 in the form of a letter from Rusk to Fanfani, December 4. (Memorandum from David H. Popper (IO) to Rusk; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The letter is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 918-919. William Bundy prepared a draft aide-memoire for Fanfani, November 22. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam Negotiations, Fanfani) Goldberg prepared a revised version on November 24. (Ibid.)↩