Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

208. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson ¹

Washington, November 27, 1965, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Once more on the pause

This is such an important question that I think you may want to look at it once again. Bob McNamara and I have the impression that your mind is settling against a pause, but we both believe that the matter is too important to be decided without making sure that the question has been explored to your satisfaction. I have mentioned our concern to Dean Rusk and while he is still against a pause at present, he has encouraged me to raise the matter with you once more.

On November 17 I sent forward a memorandum from George Ball to you² which outlined a scenario for a pause, and gave the pros and cons. The scenario is out of date, but the pros and cons are still pretty solid, and I attach them at Tab A, together with the conclusions and recommendations then reached by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.

In the last ten days, one or two additional considerations have developed.

• First, the Sevareid episode,³ rightly or wrongly, has strengthened the impression among critics at home that we have not gone the full distance in seeking negotiations. There is now increased value in proving our good faith by a new pause.
• Second, Westmoreland’s recommendations for 1966 deployments have increased, and the fighting in the Plei Me area shows that we may have to look forward to a pretty grim year.⁴ This again strengthens the argument for one further demonstration that our determination to seek peace is equal to our determination on the battlefield.
• Third, McNamara’s budget shows that the alarming figure he mentioned at the Ranch may turn out to be an understatement. Thus the argument for preceding that budget request by one or more peaceful effort is strengthened.
• Fourth, there is growing evidence that we can count on quiet but strong Soviet diplomatic support in pushing Hanoi toward the conference table during another pause. At the minimum, a pause will certainly intensify dissension between Peking and Moscow, with Hanoi in the middle. Moreover Dobrynin said to me that they were thinking of a pause of only 12-21 days.⁵
• Finally, it is clear from the McNamara/Ball discussions in London⁶ that Prime Minister Wilson has some new Vietnam gambit up his sleeve which he means to discuss with you on December 17.⁷ (He has not said what it is.) We will spike his guns and those of everyone else like him if we have a pause in effect at the time of his visit.

Thus, both the domestic and the international arguments for a pause seem to me substantially stronger than they were two weeks ago, and on balance my own judgment has shifted over toward McNamara. I think that any pause should be very hard-nosed, and we should expect that it will not lead to negotiations, but it will strengthen your hand both at home and abroad as a determined man of peace facing a very tough course in 1966. It is quite true, as I have argued before, that the bombing is not what started the trouble, but it is also true that we have a great interest in proving our own good faith as peace lovers.

I also think that the diplomatic risks can be minimized by firmness and clarity about what we are doing, and that hardline criticism at home can be answered by what is done after the pause ends.

Do you want further work from Rusk and McNamara on this?⁸

McG. B.

Tab A⁹

III.

PROS AND CONS

Pros

The principal arguments for a pause are:

1. A pause could lead to either successful negotiations or a tapering off of military action in South Viet-Nam. Although the odds of this happening at this time may be long, the stake is high enough to justify the risks involved. It seems quite clear that the other side does not believe it can agree to negotiations or a cessation of military action while the bombing continues and we cannot know whether or not they desire a settlement until we try them out by a pause. Even if this pause does not bring about the desired result, it can set the stage for a later pause which may bring the desired result.

2. The President’s offer of unconditional negotiations greatly strengthened our position throughout the world. A pause can have a similar effect by taking away from the other side the one valid argument they have against negotiations.

3. American casualties are mounting and further involvement appears likely. A pause can demonstrate that the President has taken every possible means to find a peaceful solution and obtain domestic support for the further actions that we will have to take.

4. There are already signs of dissension between Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and the Viet Cong. The pause is certain to stimulate further dissension on the other side and add to the strains in the Communist camp as they argue about how to deal with it.

5. A pause could reduce the likelihood of further Soviet involvement. It would not only help to convince Moscow that we genuinely desire a settlement but would also decrease the ability of Hanoi or Peking to bring pressure upon the Soviet Union for escalating their support.

6. Judging by experience during the last war, the resumption of bombing after a pause would be even more painful to the population of North Viet-Nam than a fairly steady rate of bombing.

7. The resumption of bombing after a pause, combined with increased United States deployments in the South, would remove any doubts the other side may have about U.S. determination to stay the course and finish the job.

Cons

The principal arguments against a pause are:

1. Although Hanoi has repeatedly stated that it cannot “negotiate” as long as the bombing goes on, there is no indication whatever from Hanoi that a pause would lead to meaningful negotiations or actions. Hanoi’s continued military reinforcement of the South, plus what Hanoi undoubtedly considers a still weak security and political situation in the South, add up to what appears to be a very small chance that a pause would produce a constructive response.

2. Hanoi’s objective with respect to the bombing is not a “pause,” but rather a complete cessation. They could be expected to do all in their power to exploit a pause, not to move toward an acceptable settlement, but to prevent our resumption of bombing and cause us to lose the one card that we have which offers any hope of a settlement that does more than reflect the balance of forces on the ground in the South.

3. Regardless of any resolve we have made beforehand, a unilateral pause at this time would give Hanoi an excellent chance to interpose obstacles to our resumption of bombing and to demoralize South Viet-Nam by indefinitely dangling before us (and the world) the prospect of negotiations with no intent of reaching an acceptable settlement. For example, they could offer to enter into negotiations on condition that the bombing not be resumed and that the Viet Cong be seated at the conference on a basis of full equality with the Government of Viet-Nam. As it would not be possible to accept this latter condition, they could place us in the position of having resumed the bombing over a “procedural” question with respect to a conference. Thus, in the absence of any expression of interest or intent on their part to move toward a settlement that we would find satisfactory, the other side could at this time use a pause to reverse the present international situation, which is very favorable to us.

4. There is danger that, in spite of any steps we may take to offset it, Hanoi may misread a pause at this time as indicating that we are giving way to international and domestic pressures to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam and that our resolve with respect to South Viet-Nam is thus weakening.

5. Resumption of the bombing following a pause of considerable duration would assume a much more dramatic character than otherwise and could present the Soviets with those difficult choices that we have heretofore been successful in avoiding presenting to them.

6. Apart from the foregoing considerations, it will at this time be very difficult to obtain GVN acquiescence to a pause and could adversely affect the tenuous stability of the present government. Any overturn of the present government in South Viet-Nam could set us back very severely. Even if we obtained the acquiescence of the GVN, it would be very difficult to obtain their continued cooperation, particularly in public statements, throughout the duration of the pause.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of Defense believes that a pause, with the associated obvious efforts to bring the DRV to a settlement, should be carried out. His main reason is (1) to lay a foundation, especially in the minds of the American people and of our allies, for the increased U.S. deployments, casualties, costs and risks that are in prospect. He believes also (2) that a pause now has a bare chance of starting a chain reaction toward a settlement. He thinks that, before intensifying the military confrontation and risks in Viet-Nam, the United States should make every effort to back the DRV/VC down by other means.

Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense believes (3) that, even if a pause does not produce the full result this time, it would contribute toward a settlement later—that the “tacit bargaining” process with the Communists will probably involve several stages before the DRV/VC sights are brought down to a “settlement level” and that a pause now, even if the bombing must be resumed, will contribute to that end.

The Secretary of State feels the balance of arguments is against undertaking a pause at the present time and that a pause should be considered only at such times as the chances appear to be greater than they now seem that it would lead in the direction of a peaceful settlement acceptable to us.

The Secretary of State thus recommends that we continue our discussions with the other side through all possible channels, particularly exploring “what would happen” if there is a pause in the bombing. If such probes at any time give firm indications of a response by specific and acceptable actions on the part of Hanoi, a pause should then be undertaken. This is also entirely consistent with our public position and maintains what he feels is our present favorable international posture.

George W. Ball
Acting Secretary

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6AA, High Level Comments re Bomb Pauses. Top Secret; Sensitive. A note on the source text states that this memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch in Texas at 8:30 p.m. on November 28, and there is an indication that the President saw it.
2. For the covering memorandum, see Document 202.
3. See footnote 2, Document 203.
4. On October 19, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces attacked a Special Forces camp at Plei Me, 25 miles southwest of Pleiku, beginning a month-long campaign that pitted U.S. and ARVN troops against VC/NVN forces. On November 14, the campaign culminated in a battle in the Ia Drang Valley when elements of the U.S. First Cavalry Division engaged VC/NVN troops in more than division strength in the fiercest fighting of the war to date. On November 22, Westmoreland informed CINCPAC that because of the influx of North Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam, he would require a minimum of 13 additional battalions and probably twice that amount. (COMUSMACV telegram 210122Z to CINCPAC, repeated to the White House; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Cables)
5. The last sentence of the paragraph is in Bundy’s handwriting. He is referring to a conversation with Dobrynin on November 24. In a November 24 memorandum to the President, Bundy described the conversation as “the most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance.” Bundy related that Dobrynin “expressed again the well-known Soviet view that a renewed and longer pause would be helpful.” Dobrynin suggested a pause of 12 to 20 days to allow for intense diplomatic effort, but offered no advance assurances of the results of such discussions. Dobrynin repeated the observation that it was impossible for North Vietnam to negotiate while under U.S. bombardment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memos of Conversation, 1964-1966)
6. No records of these conversation have been found.
7. See Document 231.
8. The source text does not indicate the President’s decision on this question.
9. Top Secret. As Bundy noted in the covering memorandum, this attachment comprises sections III and IV of a November 17 memorandum from Ball to the President. Section I was entitled “Basic Elements of a Second Pause,” and section II was “Possible Date-Time Scenario of a Second Pause.” Section III, printed here, was entitled “Pros and Cons of a Second Pause.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII)