Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

226. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 9, 1965.

1. I attach Bob McNamara’s account of his telephone conversation with members of Congress on South Vietnam. It is highly instructive. Before he left for Chicago and the Coast, Dean Rusk had seen Sparkman, Church, and Javits.² He gave me the following account of their views:

Sparkman thinks we need a resolution and that it should be quite a tough one. He would favor a pause if there is even a 5% chance that it would be successful in opening the road to negotiations.

Senator Church does not think a resolution would be a good idea unless we are proposing some major change, like bombing Hanoi, or putting ground forces in Laos. He is strongly in favor of a pause.

Senator Javits is in favor of a resolution and would like to be helpful in any way he can about it. He would also favor a pause unless the military authorities say it would have a major military impact on the effectiveness of our effort in the south. (This last sounds like an effort to have it both ways.)

2. I continue to be a strong believer in a December pause, and of course the time is getting shorter every minute. Rusk and McNamara and I plan to review this matter again on Saturday morning,³ and at that point it may be wise for us to call you and take a final reading. It will be very difficult to do a good job of the pause if the decision is put over beyond that point.

3. My own basic reason for supporting the pause is simply that we are going to have to do these other tough things in January. I think the criticism the pause will get will be rubbed out by the energy of our January message, and on the other hand, I think the peace-lovers will support our January actions a whole lot more if there has been a pause beforehand. I find that Komer strongly shares this view, and that Califano seems to be shifting toward it.

McG. B.

Attachment

Washington, December 9, 1965.

Memorandum by Secretary of Defense McNamara⁴

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RELATING TO SOUTH VIETNAM

I called but was unable to talk to the following men:

Senator Lister Hill—has had minor surgery and will be out of his office for two or three days.

Senator Stuart Symington—out of the country

Senator Henry Jackson—in Vietnam

Representative Glenard Lipscomb—in the Far East

Representative Robert Sikes—in the Far East

Representative George Mahon—on vacation; cannot be reached until 14 December

Representative William Bates—in Europe

Representative Philip Philbin—in Europe

Representative Mendel Rivers—in Europe

With each of the following I summarized the current situation, the prospects for continuing increases in Viet Cong strength, the possibility that the conflict would increase in intensity, and the need for increased U.S. deployments if we were to avoid a military defeat or stalemate. I estimated that the cost of our South Vietnamese operations would require a January Supplement of some $10-12 billion and a FY ’67 budget of equal amount. I asked for their opinions on expanding U.S. forces; requesting Congressional support; intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam, and initiating diplomatic initiatives, (e.g., a pause in the bombing, an appeal to the UN, visits to Communist states by peace emissaries).

1. Senator John Pastore

a. He asked theoretically where we are going if we put in 400,000 men.

b. Most of the American public doesn’t understand what we are up against—the American public won’t take the war for long.

c. We should make a serious effort to settle the conflict (through use of pause, etc.) before we start bombing on an expanded scale or further increase the number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

d. The President should come before the Congress and see the matter debated before he expands U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.

2. Senator Mike Monroney

a. He is leery of escalation beyond the current level of conflict. The country doesn’t want to see the war expanded beyond its present boundary.

b. The country would accept the deployment of a total of 400,000 men if it believes the war will not spread beyond South Vietnam.

c. We should not undertake an expanded military program without holding out the opportunity for peace negotiations through the UN or through other third parties.

d. He seriously questions whether we should substantially expand the bombing in North Vietnam—he does not believe the added bombing would be worth the risk.

e. We should go to Congress for a Joint Resolution if substantial additional forces are to be sent to the Far East.

3. Senator Warren Magnuson

a. The people now feel we are at war and we should do whatever is required to finish the job—in particular, we should deploy whatever troops are necessary.

b. He is not certain how the bombing program should be changed, if at all. He is unclear as to how effective it has been to date, but he is certain the people would support more if the President considers it desirable.

c. Peace moves should be made to coincide with whatever additional military action we take.

d. The President should request Congressional support in the form of a Joint Resolution.

e. He wished to emphasize again the President should with one hand carry on the war and with the other hand fight for peace.

4. Senator Leverett Saltonstall

a. Increasingly, the people are asking what do we want and how far are we going.

b. The Congress will support the deployment of additional troops, but such action should be complemented by a request for some form of Congressional Resolution.

c. The increasing number of casualties is beginning to stir up the people to ask why are we in South Vietnam; what can be done about further losses; how far are we going.

d. Expanding the bombing program in the North is a terrible risk, but we must consider it. He would support a Presidential decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong because we must do enough to bring the Viet Cong to a sensible peace negotiation. He believes we should mine Haiphong Harbor.

e. He doesn’t believe a pause in the bombing would accomplish anything. We must keep the military pressure on so that Hanoi will be forced to sit down at the bargaining table.

5. Senator Robert Kennedy

a. It is difficult for him to provide a worthwhile judgment after only two or three minutes of thought.

b. People are becoming more and more concerned as the casualties rise. They do not understand the alternatives open to us and these should be explained to them. The political situation is extremely dangerous because the people do not understand the war.

c. He cannot give an answer as to whether or not we should expand our troop deployments after only two or three minutes of discussion.

d. We should take some form of dramatic political action. Such action might be built around Christmas. Political action is absolutely required if a further military buildup is likely. Among actions which might be considered would be an appeal to the Pope; a cease fire; contacts with the Liberation Front in Algeria; a longer suspension of the bombing. Political actions are important for support both within the U.S. and also abroad. He sees no sign of any major effort on the political side.

e. If we do authorize an additional military buildup, some form of Congressional action is desirable.

6. Speaker John McCormack

a. We are committed in Vietnam and we must do everything necessary to carry out our commitment.

b. He is on the side of expanding our military strength in Vietnam.

c. The situation is comparable to that faced by the Free World when Hitler started his aggression. If South Vietnam goes, the rest of Asia will collapse like dominoes before an aggressive China.

d. Whatever additional bombing is necessary he would initiate.

e. Without further thought, he would be hesitant to ask action of Congress, but he would want more time to think about this question.

f. Whatever decisions are made by the President he will back up.

7. Representative Gerald Ford

a. People are asking: are we getting too deeply involved on the ground; are we fully utilizing our air power; why don’t we stop the flow of goods into the port of Haiphong.

b. Before supporting an expansion of our ground forces, he would like to see us use more air power against military targets in North Vietnam, and, in particular, he believes we should mine Haiphong Harbor.

c. He believes it would be wise to ask for Congressional support of an expanded program of military deployments.

8. Representative Edward Hebert.

a. We should do whatever is necessary to win. If more troops are required, send them. If more bombing is necessary, including mining the Haiphong Harbor, initiate it.

b. We haven’t made clear to the people why we are there.

c. Diplomatic moves may help psychologically, and if so, they should be undertaken, although nothing concrete is likely to follow from them.

d. If additional deployments are undertaken, it may be necessary to go back to Congress to get a Resolution of support.

9. Senator Sam Ervin

a. We ought to bomb North Vietnam out of existence because they are initiating the aggression. We can’t afford to retreat further in the world.

b. He would put more troops in South Vietnam if they are needed.

c. It might be advisable to go back to Congress for further support.

d. He believes it would be wise to give North Vietnam a warning or a chance to negotiate (e.g., through a pause) before expanding the bombing.

10. Representative Leslie Arends

a. If we need more men in South Vietnam we should send them, although he hates to think about it.

b. He believes we should expand the bombing in North Vietnam and he is certain we should do this if we send in more troops.

c. He would favor a request for a Congressional Resolution of support.

d. He does not favor diplomatic moves now. He doubts the values of negotiation because we can’t trust the other side. However, we should continue to probe peace offers when they come.

e. He believes we should stay in Vietnam. We are doing what needs to be done. He will continue to support us.

11. Senator Thomas Kuchel

a. He believes we should and must expand our forces in South Vietnam.

b. The people in California want us to get on with the war and would favor expanding the bombing.

c. The people would like to see the problem moved to the conference table, but they believe the initial move must come from Hanoi.

d. He does not feel qualified to advise on whether we should initiate a pause or move to the UN.

e. He does not believe additional Congressional action is required.

Robert S. McNamara⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch at noon on December 10. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum
2. Rusk met with Sparkman from 12:05 to 12:33 p.m. on December 8, with Church from 3:30 to 4:06 p.m. also on December 8, and with Javits from 8:45 to 9:20 a.m. on December 9. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book)
3. December 11.
4. No classification marking. A typewritten note at the end of the source text reads: “Dictated but not read.”
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.