Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 25, 1964—4:56 p.m.

1355. State-Defense message. Embtels 1939, 1940, and 1941, and two messages by separate channel.²

1. If document by generals is along lines reported by Ky in separate channel and does not include deadline element, press conference, or PNG request stated or inescapably implied, believe that proposal for ad hoc deputies group in your 1939 makes excellent sense. You have properly flagged point that this might be distorted to appear group had you personally on trial, but believe this negated by fact that reps would all be deputies. We do feel that terms of reference should be discussion all possible sources of misunderstanding and not merely “complaints of generals.” We also feel that idea of such group should not appear to be something Washington has put you up to, thus implying lack of confidence in you, but that you could personally present it as reasonable action with some real hope that Khanh and Ky, in moods reflected separate channel messages, would not take advantage. We believe our statements here have made amply clear our full support for you, but we can add more if you wish. Obviously such notions as sending out Washington mediator are nonsense.

2. If PNG or other extreme points do appear in document, or are being publicized by generals as what they really after, then you authorized go as far as you like along lines Deptel 1347³ both to Huong and Vien and through other contacts with Khanh and generals. We must shoot this down hard but also get issue away from personalities on both sides and on to finding reasonable solution.

3. If ad hoc group does meet, most important steps toward solution appear to be restoration HNC or establishment some equivalent group as act of GVN, preferably Suu. Real importance such group is not so much constitutional legitimacy (which blurred in any event) but rather to serve as forum for sentiment and instrument of unity. These elements may call for substantial reconstitution and possible enlargement. Generals must also make clear in some form they accept government in full control. Rather than seeking adamantly to get generals to accept as doctrine that they never have right to intervene, believe we should focus on point that military role must be related to national unity and cannot be exercised as it was in this instance, to undermine power of government. Maximum flattery for past role of military in creating HNC structure may be useful to preserve face here. Beyond these points we can afford to be very flexible, and of course solution should appear to be Vietnamese and should be stated in strongest terms of national unity and resolve.

4. We note and accept your other comments on Deptel 1347. As for your “white paper” on recent events, we believe you should have record fully organized but that we should not be considering publication except in most extreme circumstances. Believe backgrounds have made point that Khanh himself talked to you about his leaving.

5. As to your 1941 on using BOQ bombing as occasion for reprisal, we recognize this might give lift and needed distraction in Saigon and would also be useful signal to Hanoi to lay off any more such incidents. On other hand, Hanoi would hardly read into it any strong or continuing signal in view of overall confusion in Saigon, and Hanoi might well share what would certainly be strong reaction in US opinion and internationally that we were trying to shoot our way out of an internal political crisis. Under present circumstances of Saigon disunity, it would be hard for American people to understand action to extend war. Moreover, unless evidence crystal clear, there might be some suspicion at least internationally that BOQ bombing was not in fact done by VC. For these reasons, we are not convinced reprisal action desirable as of now, but we are prepared to make quick decision if you make recommendation with different assessment of above factors or with other factors not covered above. FYI. In event of reprisal we believe target should be Vit Thu Lu barracks short distance across border, using US aircraft. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared with Rusk, Vance, and McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
2. Telegrams 1939 and 1941 are printed as Documents 467 and 468. Regarding telegram 1940, see footnote 2, Document 467. One of the two messages was CIA telegram 2503225Z which reflected the moderation shown by Khanh and summarized in telegram 1355. (Declassified Documents, 1979, 312B) The other message has not been identified.
3. Document 465.