Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

467. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 25, 1964—9 p.m.

1939. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 1347; Embtel 1929; Embtel 1940.² The action of General Khanh in forwarding to Huong the complaint of Generals against US Amb makes what was initially personal vendetta of a few thin-skinned Generals major issue between our two govts. In consultation with Alex Johnson, Westmoreland and Throckmorton, I have decided to take action along the following lines:

To set record straight and to smooth military feathers as much as possible, I have asked Throckmorton to see individually four Young Turk Generals with whom I met last Sunday³ (Throckmorton was present) to see what aspects of this meeting are now grievance. Some of reports we get indicate possible language misunderstanding. (For example, it is alleged I implied regret that General Westmoreland “wasted money” to give them dinner since they had not supported US policy.)⁴ Throckmorton is also to kill the canard that I ever asked Khanh to resign and leave country so that “Big” Minh could be installed in his place. I have authorized him to say that I am willing to meet with any one or all four to clear up any misunderstanding but there is no misunderstanding involved in my disapproval of coup and my concern over consequences.

Foregoing action may do some good but real difficulty lies in pressures Khanh is putting on Huong. As reported in Embtel 1929, he is refusing to give on HNC issue and is in fact hardening his position by limiting his agreement on liberation of political prisoners taken by army last Sunday. (Only HNC prisoners to be released and they must be kept in house arrest.) Beyond this hard-nose attitude he has now filed his complaints against me in way which places painful dilemma before Huong. One cannot avoid impression that Khanh wants to force Huong to withdraw in order to get back into power on popular slogan such as “freedom from US vassalage.”

I have not seen text of Khanh’s paper⁵ but will try to get copy from Huong at our next meeting (I am seeking an appointment tomorrow). Rather than utilizing at outset authority contained in Deptel 1347 to press him for immediate rejection, if demand is about as we think it is, I am inclined to recommend to Huong following course of action. He and I would agree to form an ad hoc committee consisting of rep of PriMin (hopefully Vien), rep of General Khanh and rep of US Emb (I would nominate Alex Johnson) to look into complaints of Generals. This course of action would have advantage of relieving PriMin of immediate requirement to choose between offending Generals or us, of gaining time to allow tempers to drop, moderating indignation by requiring formulation of its causes, and offering possibility that issue might be finessed in end as result of correctable misunderstandings. The principal disadvantage is creation of impression putting US Amb on trial and distorted reports which are likely reach public. I am not prepared to recommend this course until I see text of Generals’ bill of particulars but would like to get Dept’s tentative reactions ASAP.

A few comments on Deptel 1347 follow as postscript to foregoing.

Word is already about town, indeed about country, of feud between Generals and Amb. You have noted US adviser reports that Khanh has already carried war to field and is getting petitions signed among officers of divisions demanding withdrawal of Amb (Embtel 1934).⁶ The Emb is preparing so-called white paper enumerating events relating to coup for possible use in rebuttal of Khanh’s allegations. Our advisers in field are being kept informed in order to spike rumors and distortions of fact.

With regard to questions 2a and b, quick answer is that responsible leaders of GVN do not desire to break relations with us and know they cannot win without us. However, they cannot control Generals who for moment seem completely irresponsible. In this recklessness they are undoubtedly urged on by Khanh who needs anti-US campaign to stay alive. Generals who control situation could not care less about internal US problem of retaining popular support for SVN. That is not their department.

With regard to suggestions in pare 4, Huong take on Armed Forces Council personally, unfortunate fact is that Huong has neither moral nor physical stamina to undertake such an assignment. He knows few of Generals personally and is very diffident in their presence. His physical condition is matter of constant concern.

As to pare 6, Ky and other Generals are thoroughly aware of US policy line. It was in conveying that line at now famous Westmoreland dinner on December 8 that I laid groundwork for my falling-out with Generals. As for proper response to bombing of BOQ under current circumstances, I shall make that subject of septel.⁷

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 8:46 a.m.
2. Telegram 1347 is printed as Document 465. Telegram 1929 from Saigon, December 24, reported that Johnson had lunch with Vien who stated that Khanh refused to release the arrested members of the High National Council unless they were kept under house arrest and refused to reinstate the Council. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 VIET S) Telegram 1940 from Saigon, December 25, 9 p.m., reported that Huong had received a communication from Khanh reciting Taylor’s “misdeeds” and asking Huong to investigate them and take appropriate action. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIV, Cables) The text of the communication is published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 433E.
3. See Document 451
4. See footnote 8, Document 448.
5. The communication mentioned in footnote 2 above.
6. Dated December 25, 1 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 VIET S)
7. Infra.