Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

465. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 24, 1964—1:43 p.m.

1347. Delivery to Ambassador or Deputy Ambassador in discretion of duty officer. With reference to Ky conversation with Embassy officer reported separate channel,² our first reactions are as follows:

1. If Huong should in fact be presented with demand to declare you PNG, you should at earliest opportunity advise him that you have been acting with full support of USG and that any acceptance of such demand or hesitation in rejecting it would make it virtually impossible for USG to continue support GVN effort. You should point out that existence of demand bound to become known to many including US press and that atmosphere alone would become terribly bad if he hesitated even for tactical reasons. If required you may inform him you are giving this advice on direct orders of President.

2. If Huong nonetheless insists he must proceed with PNG action, you should tell him this is matter of gravest importance on which two governments should be in fullest consultation. You should stress that no such step should be discussed publicly by him and should say that in order understand what GVN has in mind you must pose following questions:

a. Does GVN desire to break relations between USG and GVN? If so, how do Huang and military leaders estimate their capability if they repudiate US support? Do they have in mind that they can win without US presence and help, or do they have in mind accepting consequences of weakening of effort?

b. If GVN does not desire to break relationship, how does GVN think American people could possibly be brought to support continued US effort in SVN in face PNG action trusted ambassador who has complete confidence and indeed affection American people?³

3. At same time we detect in Ky’s account of Khanh’s position the continuing possibility bulk of generals including Young Turks can still be brought around to reasonable solution that would include restoration of HNC, possibly reconstituted, on the one hand, and on the other hand willingness by Huong to work out problem of senior generals on some basis. In process of working this out we would hope and expect Huong and military would in end unite on dumping Khanh as their own decision.

4. To move toward such solution, Huong himself could offer to meet with military council and could use all available contacts to generals other than Khanh to soften their attitudes and get dispute off anti-US and anti-Taylor aspect and on to necessity reasonable solution in interests national unity. Once PNG issue disposed of firmly, urgency would be reduced, and Huong could afford a little time to bring all hands around and emerge with personal credit for decisions and solution, which clearly vital if he is to remain.

5. At same time, suggest you use all available MACV counterpart contacts to generals. Line stated your 1895⁴ is good starting point to extent not already used, and should be extended to explaining in quiet way that of course USG could never accept PNG demand but that other issues can be worked out among Vietnamese and this must be done. Westmoreland’s frequent past contacts with Ky may be particularly useful for this sort of approach and his absence last weekend may be special asset. Seems to us that for you personally to participate in any talks with generals would at this moment be unwise for many reasons above all necessity that solution come from Huong.

6. We not clear here whether Ky and other generals aware of policy line you conveyed on your return from Washington. If not, this might now be used with them to offset any impression of negativism on our part as reflected in Ky’s remarks. They could also be told that if government were in stable condition such VC actions as bombing of BOQ⁵ (which we should assume to be VC in absence other indications) could have been considered as “unusual actions” within meaning your instructions⁶ and appropriate action taken, but that this impossible under current conditions or in face any pressures to revise carefully considered USG policies. Under present conditions American public might even doubt VC responsibility. Same point would apply to any possible future decision to initiate second phase. In other words, without offering anything beyond terms of your instructions you could use these to their fullest to bring them around. Even listening to any grievances in this broad policy area should be constructive, although of course stress should be placed on essential stability and national unity. We recognize risk discussions this area might be taken as implied commitment to take decisions for which we are not ready, but believe this outweighed by necessity have frank discussions.

7. We have not even crossed bridges of what to do if Huong should accept PNG demand or if generals continue implacable on issue of HNC or its equivalent or against any reasonable solution. Obviously this would pose gravest possible questions.

8. As to possible disclosure by generals of contents your talks with Khanh and four generals, we have reviewed record these talks. Believe line we should take both here and in Saigon, preferably on background basis, is that you stressed that action of military undermined basis civilian duly constituted government, however unintentionally, and must be corrected if government to meet South Vietnamese desires and need for national unity. If claim is made that you insulted Khanh, response should be that action and manner in which it was taken necessarily raised question of confidence and necessary frank relationships with those responsible, unless and until it corrected, but that issue is one of principle and of objectives of Vietnamese themselves, not personalities.

9. You should of course avoid such actions as background briefing on increased infiltration until situation clarifies. We are proceeding with Barrel Roll mission tonight.

10. Since above drafted, we have received your 1928 and also MACV 240448Z.⁷ Former correctly handles problem in pare 8 above but could be amplified later as required. Latter raises question whether tactics proposed pares 3–6 above as likely to succeed as we had supposed, but we still believe this is line we must follow. Naturally, MACV contacts could shoot down idea of Big Minh’s return and also indicate that Dalat generals could be handled. Key question is whether military would stick to position they entitled intervene whenever they do not like what government does, and believe you have been following best line to counter this.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared with McGeorge Bundy and Secretary Rusk. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 206F.
2. Presumably the cable described in footnote 3, supra.

3. At this point in the source text, the following paragraph was deleted before transmission:

   “c. If Huong still persists, you should as last resort insist that if there is any implication of deadline in demand for PNG action, Huong must insist such deadline be removed to permit fullest consultation.”

   At 12:10 p.m., December 24, Rusk had talked with McGeorge Bundy who told him that the President agreed to paragraphs 2a and 2b, but did not want 2c sent to Taylor. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

4. Document 457.
5. At 6 p.m. on December 24, a bomb exploded in the Brink Hotel in Saigon, which was being used as a bachelor officers’ quarters by the United States, killing 2 and injuring 50.
6. Document 435.
7. Telegram 1928, December 24, received in the Department of State at 9:14 a.m., reported on Zorthian’s briefing of the foreign press in Saigon that day, during which he stated that Taylor had not asked, requested, or ordered Khanh to give up his post or take a trip. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Telegram 240448Z, also December 24, received in the Department of Defense at 4:48 a.m., reported that MACV contacts with Vietnamese officers showed they did not regard the illegality of their actions as important, that the army was the final authority in Vietnam, that there was no alternative to Khanh, and that the four Generals who talked to Taylor on December 20 (see Document 451) were still smarting from that encounter. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 12056)