470. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

1952. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1949.2 Alex Johnson and I called upon PriMin Huong at 1045 immediately after Johnson’s visit to Vien, reported in Embtel 1949. PriMin looked tired and said that he had not slept for two nights for worrying about situation with Generals.

He then gave his version of dinner which he held last night with Khanh and eleven other Generals which coincides with Vien’s story to Johnson. He felt that little had been accomplished and progress was hung up on issue of honor which Generals are raising over my inconsiderate treatment of General Khanh. Huong apparently tried to talk Generals into reasonable frame of mind, arguing that matter of “amour propre” should not be inflated into serious affair between govts. He says that he gave Generals some straight talk on subject of absence of legal status of Armed Forces Council and on need to release HNC prisoners at once before he could talk about other issues such as future status of HNC. He showed concern over danger of publicity arising from these internal troubles.

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I told him that, unfortunately, publicity was inevitable since General Khanh had scattered news of our divergencies widely throughout armed forces. Also press was picking up rumors about Saigon which they were reporting with varying degrees of accuracy.

Since neither Huong nor Generals seemed to have any idea of where to turn, I surfaced proposal of an ad hoc deputies group mentioned in Embtel 19393 and approved by Deptel 1355.4 Huong jumped at idea with visible eagerness and said he would discuss it shortly with Suu and Vien.

We then fell to discussing Khanh’s motives and aspirations, Huong describing latter as being far from clear. He does not think Khanh really wants to take over govt but prefers to manipulate it from wings for time being. But supposing Khanh does move in and take over, he asked, what guarantee can I have of US support? I said that I personally doubted the USG would feel that it could cooperate with military govt headed by Khanh and asked whether this was kind of assurance he would like to have. He replied that he was asking nothing at this time but would discuss matter later with Suu and Vien.

While Huong takes liberation of HNC prisoners most seriously, he apparently is making no issue of other prisoners taken by army in last Sunday’s round-up. He smilingly said that army claimed that it was helping him by locking up some of politicians and student agitators who had been bedeviling his govt. But it was to be noted, he pointed out, there was not member of Buddhist Institute among prisoners, another allusion to his suspicion of some kind of alliance between Khanh and Buddhists.

Reverting to possible request from Huong for some guarantee of protection against military coup, I suggest consideration be given to authorizing me to communicate following to Huong if he requests some assurance (I should also be able to pass orally to other selected individuals, including Generals): “The United States Government would find it impossible to cooperate with any govt headed or controlled by General Khanh.”

You will note in Embtel 1949 that Vien seems to be thinking of broader guarantee to cover any military coup. I do not think we should rule out possibility of having to support military govt (not headed by Khanh) if civilian govt fails. Although this matter of some additional US assurance is not presently before us, I feel reasonably sure that it will arise shortly and would appreciate any preliminary comment from Dept.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor and cleared with Johnson. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 9:21 a.m.
  2. Telegram 1949, December 26, 2 p.m., reported that Johnson had seen Vien at 10 a.m. that day, and that Vien had described the dinner that Huong had given for the Generals along lines similar to that reported in telegram 1952. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXV, Cables)
  3. Document 467.
  4. Supra.