Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

418. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy ⁰

Washington, October 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting With Foreign Minister Thanat of Thailand

1. The principal problem on Thanat’s mind is the inadequacy of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Thailand embodied in the SEATO treaty. SEATO is unsatisfactory to the Thais not only because of their experience with British and French unwillingness to undertake military action in Laos but also because of the requirement (not embodied in the treaty but established by practice) for unanimity on SEATO decisions.

2. Thanat is determined that, between now and the next SEATO Council Meeting (April 1962), the defects of SEATO shall be remedied either by action to change the SEATO treaty or voting procedures under it or by a new U.S. bilateral commitment to Thailand.

3. The Secretary of State is anxious not to reopen the treaty. He hopes to solve the problem through some form of heightened U.S. commitment to the defense of Thailand, plus the stationing of some U.S. forces in Thailand.

4. In the State Department’s position paper¹ it is proposed that you state to Thanat that the U.S. will give full effect to its obligations under SEATO in the event of a Communist armed attack on Thailand and that this commitment is not conditioned on the prior unanimous consent of all SEATO members. It also suggests that you might offer to confirm this statement in writing.

5. The paper proposes that the positioning of U.S. forces in Thailand might take one or all of the following forms: (a) sending a U.S. engineer battalion to assist in the construction of a mutually agreed project, such as the Bangkok by-pass; (b) increasing U.S. training assistance to the armed forces and the Border Police; and (c) training U.S. forces with Thai forces in Thailand on a rotational basis.

6. Thanat emphasizes that the stationing of U.S. forces in Thailand presents something of a dilemma. On the one hand, Thailand wants them to have a constructive job to do. He definitely does not want U.S. troops standing about waiting for a war. On the other hand, if they are there under the cover of training or construction forces, they may not be an adequate deterrent to aggression. This can only be resolved by some kind of enhanced U.S. assurance, plus an explanation of the plate glass window concept.

7. You may wish to raise with Thanat this question: If we get a Laos settlement, what can Thailand and the U.S. do to make it work inside Laos and not give way to a Communist take-over? This may be a line of thought to which he should turn his mind.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Thailand Security. Top Secret.
1. The October 1 position paper, prepared for the President’s meeting with Thanat, anticipated specific issues likely to be raised and the Thai and U.S. positions on them. Also included was a biographic sketch of Thanat and a selection of letters and memoranda exchanged between Thailand and the United States. This paper had a covering memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, also October 1, in which Johnson informed the Secretary that while he had hoped to have the President offer the Thais a $150-million line of credit as recommended by the Bowen Mission, ICA opposed it and Johnson was prepared to wait until the legislation creating AID (ICA’s successor organization) was passed. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.9211/10–161)