419. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • The Situation in Southeast Asia

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary
    • Mr. John M. Steeves, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
  • Thailand
    • Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
    • Ambassador Visutr Arthayukti

[Here follows discussion of events in South Vietnam and Laos.]

The Secretary then passed to the discussion of a rotational SEATO force in Thailand. This was a subject which received considerable investigation both during the preliminary discussion1 and later at lunch. In order to elicit the Foreign Minister’s frank opinion, probing questions were asked and his very honest opinion invited. The Foreign Minister’s response may be summed up as follows:

1.
Thailand has made it very clear that it is not against the stationing of foreign forces in Thailand providing there is a function for them to perform. The stationing of our marine units in Udorn and other American personnel at Thakhli are evidence of the, fact that this arrangement is acceptable to the Thais.
2.
The idea of a “training center’ is not appealing. A composite SEATO group in Thailand would not, in the Foreign Minister’s view, be any assurance to Thailand or offer any earnest with respect to SEATO action.
3.
The crucial point so far as the Foreign Minister is concerned is whether SEATO will act in carrying out its responsibilities, in which case the forces can come from wherever they are. They do not need to be stationed in Thailand in order to carry out a commitment. To be designated in training status would merely encourage certain countries to hold up permission for their utilization in the SEATO force and, therefore, their presence in Thailand is of no particular value.
4.
Domestically Thailand does not look with favor upon the stationing of foreign troops in Thailand who have no definite mission to perform.

During the post-lunch period the discussions came to grips with the deep-seated suspicion which Thailand now has for the SEATO organization. The Foreign Minister expressed himself very forcefully, pointing out that failure to meet its commitments so far as Laos is concerned had convinced Thailand that SEATO was ineffectual and unreliable. In developing his argument he pointed out that France was the member of SEATO that had originally suggested that the Protocol States of old Indo-China be covered by SEATO guarantee, and yet when one of these states was invaded and threatened, France was the very power that made action impossible. Thailand, therefore, could not feel any assurance that the situation would be any different if her own integrity were involved rather than that of Laos. He felt that Thailand had to have a different type of insurance and that she had to have a definite basis for her confidence. This led to a lengthy discussion of the legal interpretation of the basis upon which United States’ responsibility for SEATO action or action outside of SEATO could be exercised. No conclusive agreement was reached, but it was assumed that our interpretation allowed the United States to guarantee assistance to Thailand under its SEATO obligation whether or not the resulting action could be termed SEATO action. The formula which is operative in the OAS was described, whereby treaty action is taken on the vote of a majority of the members, but those responding negatively are not obliged to join in the action. It was during a discussion of these various ways of expressing U.S. assurances that the Foreign Minister remarked that the type of assurance the United States had given to Berlin would be quite sufficient for Thailand.

The question also came up for exploration of a bilateral treaty with Thailand. The Secretary pointed out that our current objections to another treaty were more procedural than they were substantive. Our obligations under SEATO, especially as interpreted to Thailand in private, classified assurances, were undoubtedly all that was needed, but to express this obligation in terms of another treaty was objectionable because of the requirement of negotiation and Senate ratification.

A brief examination took place of the possibility of Asian states themselves joining together in an organization. If they could take this step and then jointly negotiate a security treaty with the United States, this might suffice. The Foreign Minister pointed out that this, although an intriguing idea, was probably impractical inasmuch as some of the states concerned would undoubtedly refrain from being associated with any collective security arrangement.

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During the discussions, the Secretary complimented Thailand’s initiative in organizing the ASA.2 Currently this only involves Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand. The Foreign Minister pointed out that it was a small beginning and before thinking of its expansion, Thailand wanted to see it strengthened and become more effective before promoting its extension to other states.

The conversations were characterized by great cordiality and frankness throughout. There is no doubt that Foreign Minister Khoman has come to Washington fully armed to convey his serious doubts concerning the future and effectiveness of SEATO and his strong desire to have these weaknesses corrected or SEATO replaced by something more satisfactory.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Drafted by Steeves and approved in S on October 10. The time of the meeting is taken from the Secretary’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) After the meeting, Rusk and Thanat retired for lunch on the 8th floor of the Department of State.
  2. Reference is to discussion among Thanat, the Thai Ambassador, McConaughy, Steeves, and other officials from FE, also on October 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 692.00/10–261)
  3. The Association of Southeast Asia was formed on July 31, 1961, by Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaya as a means of promoting mutual assistance and cooperation in economic, social, and technical fields among member nations. See Documents 5 ff.