Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

417. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, August 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Communist Potential in Thailand

The attached paper on Communist subversive potential in Thailand is well worth reading.¹ I would have only two observations with respect to it.

1. I feel that a fundamental explanation of the lack of any significant Communist movement among the Thai (apart from minority groups) is Thailand’s lack of a colonial experience. This lack of a colonial experience had two relevant consequences. In the first place, Communist movements in the under developed areas of Asia have generally derived much of their appeal from their strong anti-colonial posture, derived in part from Leninist theory, in part from Soviet policy.

Second, the modernization process in Thailand has proceeded under indigenous auspices. The tension between Eastern ways and Western ways has been reduced because the accommodation between them has been more genuine and because Western ways have not been identified with an alien ruler. There have been no discontinuities in the society as a result of the sudden removal of alien rule. There has been no need to make a sudden adjustment between inherited Western institutions and the indigenous ways of doing the business of the society. I believe that the tensions produced by an imperially-imposed modernization and that the discontinuities resulting from the sudden removal of alien rule are important sources of weakness which Communism can exploit. It can hold out the hope of modernization without Westernization because it seems to offer an organization based upon the experience of the West with an ideology which rejects the precepts of Western liberalism. It exploits the tensions produced by the modernization process while seeming to offer a refuge from them.

2. The discussion on pages 11 and 12 argues that Sarit (like the other rulers of Thailand who, since 1932, have regularly attained power by a coup) derives his legitimacy only from his control of the instruments of force. Accordingly, so the argument goes, Communist-oriented subversive elements could overthrow the regime and claim equal legitimacy without arousing public opposition. The legitimacy of governments in Thailand is somewhat more complex. It is based fundamentally upon the fact that the government is drawn from and has the support of some significant element of the “circulating elite” that provides Thailand with its governmental, military and intellectual leadership. Thus, any Communist-oriented subversive movement will have to find support within the elite group. Its ability to do so will depend upon whether other factors are pushing Thailand in a Communist direction.

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Thailand, Vol. I, 8/61–9/61 Secret.
1. Not printed. The paper was prepared by Charles N. Spinks of INR/RAS and sent to Roger Hilsman, Director of INR, on August 11. Spinks concluded that Thailand was not likely to fall to armed Communist overthrow. Potential Communist success in Laos would preclude an attempt to subvert Thailand, because of Communist fear of U.S. intervention and worldwide disapproval, especially among the neutralist nations. Spinks concluded that there was no “serious danger” of a Communist challenge to Thailand as the Pathet Lao were challenging the Royal Lao Government. Nevertheless, Spinks did see a potential for a limited armed Communist guerrilla campaign aimed at minority groups and designed to operate within the present order of Thailand. The purpose of the campaign was to undermine the Sarit government and encourage non-Communist opposition. (Ibid.)