277. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
I met with Dr. Subandrio on July 20, 1962.1 I opened the conversation by telling him I understood the negotiations were very close to a successful termination; that some points had recently been raised by the Indonesians but I strongly hoped that nothing would be done to prevent a peaceful solution of the West New Guinea problem. I said it seemed to me that the Indonesians had gained almost everything that they had wanted; that tremendous progress had been made since I last saw him in Djakarta; that they were going to gain control of West New Guinea and that the points and differences between them and the Dutch were now very, very minor.
I said that what concerned me were reports that not only did they want to gain their point from the Dutch but that they want to rub the nose of the Dutch in the dirt at the same time. Subandrio said this was not true at all. He said they were anxious to reach a peaceful settlement and restore amicable relations with the Dutch.
He said the one problem was the 2,000 or 3,000 Indonesian paratroopers who had landed in West New Guinea. He said that the Indonesians could not abandon them. The point seemed to be, although he did not say it, that the area which these paratroopers presently controlled should be turned over to the Indonesians at an early date while the rest of the territory could wait for a longer period under United Nations control.
I said that this seemed to be a relatively minor point; that they certainly could provide for the feeding and survival of these paratroopers and if appropriate, assist in their withdrawal and that certainly no one was attempting to force them to abandon the paratroopers. I said I felt that this did not really make a great deal of sense.
I made the point that when I went to Holland I was asked again and again if the Indonesians really wished to have a peaceful solution to the West New Guinea problem. I told them repeatedly that based on my conversations with Sukarno, Subandrio and others that I was sure that they [Page 609] were interested in resolving this whole matter without armed conflict. However, I said that in the last few days since I had heard these points raised by the Indonesians, I had no doubts as to whether I was correct or not. Further, because I had always been completely frank with him, that I was going to tell him that the friends that the Indonesians had at the State Department were for the first time raising questions whether Sukarno and others felt it would help their prestige and worldwide position if they gained control of West New Guinea by war rather than through peaceful means. Subandrio protested this conclusion.
He said that they were all very anxious for a peaceful solution; that a peaceful solution was required so that they could develop their country economically. Further, if they became involved in an armed conflict it meant the use of Russian personnel and weapons and they knew that such a conflict could not be restricted just to the local scene. Further, he said he believed that the prestige of Sukarno and the other Indonesian leaders would go down in world opinion if they could not resolve this matter peacefully. He said he was very anxious to work out a peaceful solution.
I made the point that they obviously had friends in the Communist bloc; that if this matter was resolved peacefully they would also have close friends in the Western bloc including the United States. Over the period of the next decade, as they were developing their country, this could be very helpful. The alternative was to alienate a large part of the world and where they were so close to a peaceful solution it seemed to be senseless.
Afterwards, I called Subandrio aside and thanked him for the other matter which has been of interest to us.2 He once again repeated to me that they were very anxious to have a peaceful solution over West New Guinea and that he was optimistic on the result.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. II, 7/62–8/62. Drafted and initialed by Robert Kennedy who sent a copy to Bell.↩
- In a July 20 memorandum with no recipient, but perhaps meant for Bundy or the President, Komer reported that Robert Kennedy told him that this talk went “pretty well.” Komer then summarized Robert Kennedy’s memorandum. (Ibid., West New Guinea, General, 7/11/62–7/20/62)↩
- Reference is to the release of Allen L. Pope, which took place on August 22.↩