211. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
1033. Embtel 1025.1 President was in irritable mood when I arrived at Palace. He had been up entire previous night watching shadow play performance of old Javanese myths, a favorite pastime of his when weighing important decisions. What set him off, however, was report in press of Dutch Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament.
Because of his mood he was difficult to handle, constantly interrupting with emotional outbursts against the Dutch as I made points contained in Deptel 601.2 Nevertheless I managed to cover all the ground in detail, and in the end I was talking to him like a Dutch uncle for first time in my relationship with him and he was taking it.
Upshot was that although he made no commitment as to any specific course of action, by indirection—“I can’t wait too long; there isn’t much time; I can’t hold back my people much longer;” et cetera—he made it clear any military action would be deferred pending promised US initiative which he said he would welcome greatly.
Perhaps most telling point I was able to make was when President was talking about Indonesian youth becoming impatient, “fed up”, as he said, with hearing about peaceful solution which did not come to pass.
“Mr. President,” I said, “I know you pretty well. Here you are in a position where attainment of your objectives by peaceful means is in sight. Almost you could say it is just around the corner. I know that you would never forgive yourself if you sacrificed the lives of your young people while a solution was so close. What would the verdict of history be?”
This argument seemed to strike home, and Sukarno rather than resenting my comments, looked solemn and thoughtful. Then his mood changed again and he returned to the charge against the Dutch.
“I am fed up to here,” he burst out, holding his hands at eye level to make his point. “I can’t stand any more of it.”
Again I argued that it made no sense after being patient for so long to resort to force just at the moment when long sought goal was in sight.
[Page 480]Sukarno dramatically pressed his closed fists against the sides of his head. “I can’t believe it,” he said. “The Dutch won’t do it (relinquish sovereignty in West Irian or transfer administration to Indonesia).”
“You don’t know the Dutch,” Sukarno declared. “The only thing the Dutch understand is the use of force.” The US, Sukarno said, should “go to the Dutch and tell them.”
“That’s just what we are proposing to do,” I replied. “We are proposing to go and sound them out as to the next steps that can be taken. But we cannot do this if you are going to take precipitate action.”
“Time, time, time,” the President retorted excitedly. “I have run out of patience and we are running out of time. My people are impatient. There will be a mass meeting of one million people this week to demand that I give them the order to march on West Irian. What will I tell them? They already think I am getting soft, getting too old for action.”
“You are the best judge of what to say to your own people,” I said, “but as between peace and war to gain your objective, as long as there is a chance of a political solution, your people will choose peace.”
“No,” the President retorted sharply; “they would not; our youth are getting too impatient.”
At this point I asked if I were correct in my feeling that he appreciated the proposed US initiative.
“Yes,” Sukarno said warmly, “I appreciate it very much. If your people will talk to the Dutch I’ll appreciate that deeply, and please thank President Kennedy for his letter.” He went on to ask when he could expect to hear something, and I pointed out that these things take time, and there was no way I could assure him when progress could be reported.
I asked whether he would inform his military leaders at peace-or-war meeting December 11 of President Kennedy’s message and my comments, and he replied that he would, but he soon swung back to his favorite subject.
“Luns, Luns, Luns,” he burst out. “He is full of hate. He’s a scoundrel: The USG is going to have to tell him he’s got to transfer admin to Indonesia.”
I reminded him that he had said in his previous conversation with me that what he wanted was access to the territory and was willing to borrow the hand of the UN to achieve this. I went on to reassert our belief that he should seek to solve the problem not in one bite but in two.
Sukarno nodded and said he would accept that he would go along with a UNadmin, but that when he had said he was willing to borrow the hand of the UN he had meant he was willing to do so for the purpose of transferring admin to Indonesia.
[Page 481]We then discussed the question of self-determination. “You aren’t giving self-determination to Katanga in the Congo, are you?” Sukarno asked. “How about self-determination for Texas? You must understand I can’t accept self-determination for a part of our territory.”
I pointed out that in our past conversation, Sukarno had said he was willing to accept a plebiscite.
“Yes,” he said. “I will accept a plebiscite reaffirming Indonesian sovereignty after we have had admin of the territory for a period.”
I indicated there was considerable doubt as to achieving that, but I couldn’t budge his position. Nevertheless my impression was he was not as tough on this point as he seemed, might be persuaded if settlement were in sight.
When I made the point that the US was unalterably opposed to the use of force and we were convinced that world opinion would be against Indonesia if they resorted to force, Sukarno retorted, “even peaceful India is about to use force in Goa.”
He then said, moodily, “there comes a time when a man must do what he must do. And at that time, he has to disregard everybody else.”
“No Mr. President,” I countered. “Not when he has a reasonable alternative. A young boy will kick or strike out just because he is controlled by his emotions. But a mature man who has acquired wisdom will weigh the alternative.” I thought perhaps I had gone too far at this point but the President nodded, sighed “yes, a man needs wisdom, great wisdom.”
He then noted that George Washington had paid no attention to those who counselled him it was wrong to wage war against the British.
There was a basic difference, I pointed out. We had exhausted all peaceful means; as in the case of his own revolution, we felt only force was left to us. The question he faced was to attain the objective by peaceful means. I was certain, I said, he would not wish to do this. Sukarno nodded, “you are right, of course.” But he was discouraged and did not believe the Dutch would ever agree to any solution which would result in Indonesia acquiring the territory. “You owe it to yourself, your people and the world to give us a chance to try,” I argued. “We have agreed to talk to the Dutch, but we have to have time.”
“Please tell President Kennedy,” Sukarno said finally, “first, I thank him for his letter; second, that I welcome your approaching the Dutch; third, that we do not have much time. We are not asking for the Dutch to acknowledge Indo sovereignty over WNG. But we do insist on Indo administration of the territory.”
[Page 482]I adverted to what Subandrio had said December 8 Embtel 1024 about the desirability of bilateral negotiations.3
“Yes,” the President said. “But the Dutch must come to the conference table without reservations, without pre-conditions, such as self-determination. And they must be willing to see administration turned over to Indo. If through borrowing the hand of the UN, all right.” But he made it clear he was thinking of a short period, a year, after which Indo would be the administrator.
We closed our conversation by my asking him which was his favorite Wajang Kulit (shadow play) character.
Without hesitation, Sukarno replied that the Warrior King was his favorite. He never permitted a Wajang Kulit show at the Palace unless this particular character appeared in it. “He’s the one I am interested in,” Sukarno said.
Comment: This extraordinary interview seems to me highly revealing of the kind of man with whom we are dealing. There is no question that when I first saw Sukarno, he was rarin-tearin ready to go. Javanese mysticism which is an important part of his makeup was clearly ascendant. I am satisfied that President Kennedy’s letter has brought him back to reality for the time being. The important thing is that we press vigorously for settlement while this period of relative calm lasts.
I shall endeavor to see Subandrio again tomorrow, review the matter with him in detail and obtain his impressions of the “war or peace” meeting.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–1161. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, and USUN.↩
- In telegram 1025, December 11, Jones reported that Documents 209 and 210 arrived in time for Jones to take when he drove to Bogor Palace after dinner on the night of December 10. At Bogor, Sukarno, who was then in his pyjamas, received Jones. In Jones’ view, “the message saved the day.” Jones promised a detailed report of the discussion. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–1161)↩
- Document 209.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 209.↩
- Jones saw Subandrio on December 13 to review the question and his discussion with Sukarno. Subandrio stated that Sukarno’s speech would be in its usual rousing style, but would not precipitate action against West Irian. (Telegram 1047 from Djakarta, December 13; Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–1361)↩