205. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy)
to President Kennedy0
Washington, December 1,
1961.
SUBJECT
Attached are papers on the West Irian matter which the Secretary of State
will be raising with you next Tuesday.1 These are worth careful [Page 463] study because most of the specialists in the area
believe that the Secretary’s respect for the Australians and dislike of
Sukarno has led him to take a
position in the UN debate which, if
continued, can only help the Communists. Sukarno, I know, is not your own favorite statesman, but the
real point is that at the moment we seem to be working against the interest
of the Indonesian moderates—our one reliance against eventual Communist
take-over there.
At Tab A is a covering memorandum from Walt
Rostow. At Tab B is a sensible account of the whole affair
from Robert Johnson of the NSC staff. At Tab C are relevant cables and
ticker stories.2
Tab A4
Washington,
November 30,
1961.
Memorandum From the President’s Deputy
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy
As Bob Johnson’s attached account
of the West Irian affair (and the batch of telegrams) indicate, we have
come to the end of one phase and must design another.
After a meeting at the State Department today5 it was agreed that
the Secretary will have a position to present to you next Tuesday. In
the meanwhile, the Department will be reassessing the situation,
including the political situation in both the Netherlands and Indonesia
as it stands after the debate.
So far as Indonesia is concerned, we have had two distinct noises from
Sukarno. One, reported in the
attached telegram No. 975,6 is
relatively [Page 464] pacific and
conciliatory. The other is a speech made to the Indonesian Army Staff
College on November 30 in which Sukarno is reported as saying that the “present moment
is the proper time” to settle the West Irian question and that “he is
going to issue orders soon about the liberation” of the area. There is
no doubt that the Indonesians in New York are furious with us.
The general assessment is that Sukarno’s threat is psychological warfare, although it
will have the effect of stiffening the Dutch and strengthening Luns’ position. On the other hand,
Sukarno may not be able to
control the impulse to seize West Irian if it gathers momentum and there
is no alternative diplomatic path in sight.
The Dutch have been equally unhelpful. Today they have changed the name
of West New Guinea to West Papua and given the place a new flag. This is
likely to infuriate Djakarta.
This diplomatic crisis coincides with two economic facts:
- 1.
- At the moment Indonesia is suffering a grave balance of payments
crisis; and
- 2.
- There is a distinct upsurge of interest and concern with longer
run economic development, centered around one of Sukarno’s possible successors,
Chaerul Saleh, who was
recently in the U.S.
One can conceive of the Russians assessing this moment as an occasion to
make a double-barreled move: to push Sukarno towards war and to urge him to draw down his
more than $500,000,000 in economic aid commitment from the Bloc. If this
is the way things go, Sukarno would
be isolated from the Western community diplomatically, increasingly
dependent on the Bloc, the local Communist Party would be powerfully
strengthened, and the hand of the moderates in Indonesia gravely
weakened.
There is also the possibility of a double-barreled Western move: to press
the Dutch towards a bilateral negotiation with Indonesia and to take
measures to help Indonesia through its short-run crisis while beginning
to work more systematically with those in Indonesia concerned with
economic development.
With respect to the latter, Don
Humphrey is filing his report on the Indonesian economy,
which resulted from the first of your discussions with Sukarno in April. It is a good, sensible,
and not unhopeful, report.
It is the feeling of all of us on your staff that the Western world has
got to consider this problem somewhat less in terms of the pure
diplomacy of West Irian and more in terms of a common interest in
frustrating Communism in Indonesia. The Australians would benefit little
from holding West Irian out of Indonesian hands if all of Indonesia
should go Communist. In our view Communism in Indonesia is not
inevitable. We have important advantages in the Indonesian army; in the
younger [Page 465] Nationalists
symbolized by Saleh; and in the
predominant desire of the Indonesians to remain independent.
On the other hand, there is a powerful and well led Communist Party; and
the Soviets have put up $833,000,000 in military credits, more than
$500,000,000 in economic aid commitments. They understand well that this
is a crucial piece of real estate.
I sense after today’s meeting that the State Department will move towards
increased pressure on the Dutch to talk directly with the Indonesians.
If we go that route, I think it will be important to persuade the
Australians of the wisdom of looking at the problem rather more in terms
of salvaging Indonesia from Communism and rather less in terms of the
classic question of West Irian itself.
I know of no one in the town who does not believe that, soon or late, the
Indonesians will get West Irian. If this is indeed the way it will go,
it may be important for us to work with this trend, using it for the
common benefit, rather than permitting the Communists to continue to
exploit this issue to press Indonesia closer to the Communist Bloc
externally and towards Communism internally.
A final word. We must move fast. In the wake of the UN fiasco both the Dutch and the Indonesians
may do things which will quickly heighten tensions. In fact, as of
today, they have both started down that track.
Tab B7
Washington,
November 30,
1961.
Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National
Security Council Staff to President Kennedy
SUBJECT
Background
At the Round Table Conference of November 1949 at which Indonesia was
granted its independence from The Netherlands, the two sides [Page 466] were unable to agree upon the
future of New Guinea. They agreed that its status should be determined
by negotiations within a year of Indonesian independence. The
Indonesians were under the impression that the Dutch had tabled the
issue as a face-saving device to facilitate ratification of the Round
Table agreement by the Dutch Parliament and that once ratification had
been obtained, the Dutch would yield the territory to Indonesia.
Negotiations in 1950–55 failed to produce agreement. Indonesia bases its
claim to the territory primarily on the grounds that it was part of the
Netherlands East Indies of which the Republic of Indonesia became the
successor state. Indonesia’s claim is essentially that of any
nationalist movement to the territory it identifies, because of past
association, with the nation. The Dutch argue that geologically,
ethnically and culturally the territory is distinct from Indonesia.
Indonesia has consistently sought UN
action on a resolution calling for bilateral talks between Indonesia and
The Netherlands. When it failed in 1957 to get a two-thirds majority,
Sukarno took over all Dutch
assets in Indonesia. When the Dutch sent an aircraft carrier and
military reenforcements to West New Guinea in mid-1960, Indonesia broke
diplomatic negotiations and concluded a $500 million arms deal with the
USSR. This arms aid has been
subsequently increased to over $830 million.
The issue of West New Guinea has been central to Indonesian politics, has
diverted attention from Indonesia’s main task of nation-building, has
been exploited by the Communist Party (which is nearly the largest
outside the Bloc) and has been exploited by Sukarno as a means of frustrating opposition to himself
and his policies. Thus a very heavy price has been paid by the Dutch and
by the West more generally. We are approaching the point where the stake
may be the future orientation of Indonesia itself.
Recent Developments and the Current
Situation
In the past UN votes on Indonesian
resolutions calling for bilateral talks, the U.S. has regularly
abstained. We have taken a somewhat equivocal position with the Dutch on
the question of whether we would be prepared to support them with U.S.
forces in the event of an attack on West New Guinea. As a result of
talks with Luns last spring the
Dutch have, at least, been left in considerable doubt as to whether such
support would be forthcoming.
This Administration, recognizing the great difficulties we should be in
if the Indonesians did attack, has made a more active effort than has
ever been made by the U.S. before to find a solution. Initially we
attempted to float a proposal for a UN
trusteeship under Malaya. When this failed to obtain support, we
switched to a proposal for the establishment of a UN commission to investigate the problem and make
recommendations. We had a series of talks with both the Indonesians and
the [Page 467] Dutch. The result of those
talks was to increase somewhat the apparent flexibility on both sides.
However, neither side ever fully accepted our proposal.
It was never absolutely clear in these negotiations what true Dutch
intentions might be. On the other hand, there were hints that their real
purpose was to find a face-saving way to turn West New Guinea over to
Indonesia. There is a significant body of opinion in The Netherlands
that would favor, or at least accept, such a course. Foreign Minister
Luns, on the other hand, has
seemed intent to devise a formula that would keep West New Guinea out of
Indonesian hands.
When the General Assembly convened this fall the Dutch introduced a
resolution providing for the establishment of an interim UN administration to be followed by a
self-determination plebiscite. This represented progress in the sense
that it clearly provided for Dutch relinquishment of control. The
Indonesians, however, were unwilling to accept more than a facade of
self-determination. We resisted Dutch pressure to support their
resolution, but stated that it represented an advance. We never
indicated to the Dutch officially that we considered self-determination
a meaningless facade when applied to stone-age people almost totally
lacking in contact with the modern world.
Instead of supporting the Dutch proposal we launched a new version of our
proposal for a UN commission to
investigate the problem and make recommendations. The commission was to
examine the possibilities of establishing an interim international
administration. Various changes were made in the resolution to meet
Dutch and Indonesian objections. The Brazzaville powers were finally
persuaded to sponsor it. The Dutch finally went along with this
resolution, but the Indonesians rejected it. The Indians also introduced
a resolution reflecting the long-standing Indonesian position requesting
bilateral talks between the Dutch and the Indonesians. The Brazzaville
(U.S.) resolution was subsequently amended to call for such talks but to
set a deadline of March 1 after which the UN commission would begin its work.
The U.S. decided to give full support to the Brazzaville resolution and
to oppose all others. We were able to persuade the Dutch to withdraw
their resolution, but the Indians would not withdraw theirs. The
Brazzaville resolution was voted first. It was amended to delete a
reference to self-determination, but failed to get the necessary
two-thirds majority. We voted against the Indian resolution and it also
failed to get a two-thirds majority. Thus, the net result of our many
months of activity was not to produce the
solution acceptable to both sides, which we had sought, but to vote
against the Indonesians twice. Our vote on the Indian resolution
represented a complete switch from our previous position of neutrality
on such Indonesian-sponsored requests for bilateral talks.
[Page 468]
The moderate forces in Indonesia, led by General Nasution, pled with us not to align
ourselves with the Dutch on the West New Guinea issue. Nasution has used all of his influence
to restrain preparations for an attack on West New Guinea and to seek a
negotiated solution. Though full reaction has not been obtained from
Djakarta, and Sukarno was taking a
relatively moderate line a few days prior to the vote, the reaction of
the Indonesian delegation in New York (including the moderates in the
delegation) has been bitterly anti-U.S. A news dispatch indicates that
Sukarno has stated that the
“present moment” was the proper time for liberation of West New Guinea.
The Dutch meanwhile have apparently flaunted Indonesian feelings by
further steps to create a West New Guinea government.
Conclusions and
Recommendations
There is only one solution of the West New Guinea issue that will be
permanent and that will remove it from Indonesian politics, and that is
Indonesian control. Indonesian control is inevitable and is even,
recognized to be so by reasonable Dutch such as the Dutch Ambassador to
the U.S.
The Indonesians are going through a foreign exchange crisis. This fact
may restrain them from attacking West New Guinea. On the other hand, it
might drive them only further into Soviet hands for economic aid, while
the Soviets support and encourage an attack upon West New Guinea. In any
event, the pressures upon Nasution are going to mount until they become
irresistible unless there is real hope of progress through negotiations.
An attack could so preoccupy the army as to open new opportunities to
the Communists in Indonesia. The fact that the attack was launched with
Soviet aid and support will also markedly strengthen the Communist
position.
On the other side, Luns may be in
serious trouble in The Netherlands because of the failure of his policy.
Pressures in The Netherlands for a negotiation may mount.
We have exhausted all of the possible variations on UN action for the present. The only hope for
a settlement appears to lie in negotiations. We can improve the
prospects for negotiations if we apply pressure to the Dutch. Luns has insisted that recognition of
the principles of self-determination is a prior condition to any
negotiations. We must apply pressure to get him to agree to eliminate
that condition. It may be that a combination of Luns’ failure and our pressure could
change the situation within the Dutch Government itself in a favorable
direction. In this connection we surely should exploit such capital as
we have developed with the Dutch by lining up with them in the UN.
The position of the Australians is central in the Secretary of State’s
thinking. It was after a conversation with the Australian Ambassador [Page 469] that he decided we should
switch from the role of intermediary to that of active sponsor of a
resolution. The Australians must be made to see that it is in their
long-term interests that this issue is resolved in such a way as not to
risk the loss of Indonesia to Communism. Before they reverse their
present pro-Dutch position on West New Guinea they may need further
assurances from the Indonesians that the latter have no designs on
Australian East New Guinea.
Pressure on the Dutch to undertake really serious negotiations will
probably cause some temporary difficulties in our relations with them.
But our experience in 1948–1949 when we were applying similar pressures
in connection with the negotiations for Indonesian independence, as well
as our other experience with such problems, indicates that the effects
will not be long-lasting.
