Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, November 29, 1961, 7:48 p.m.

577. Re Djakarta’s 975.¹ Dept regrets that intense U.S. efforts over prolonged period help find viable way out of West New Guinea impasse were not successful in NY.² We believe, however, that exercise has been very useful in that positions interested parties have been considerably clarified and exercise has had salutary effect on both parties. Most encouraging is now clear evidence that Dutch wish disengage from WNG at earliest time possible and that Dutch conditions are more flexible than as previously enunciated. On Indonesian side, believe they now more assured that Dutch in fact serious about getting out of WNG. Moreover, UN discussion of issue probably is most effective deterrent available to possible Indonesian use of force.

Dept wishes to consider carefully all implications GA consideration before deciding whether and in what direction further U.S. role should be undertaken. Dutch may be sticky on question bilateral talks now that “moral victory” achieved by them at UN. On other hand, they may be willing to engage in talks provided such bilateral discussions are without preconditions. For time being, however, until Dept has analyzed situation carefully you should avoid giving any precise indication as to what we believe next steps might be.

In discussions with Sukarno, you might keep to following general line:

1. U.S. fully understands respective Indonesian and Dutch positions and has exerted sincere efforts find way out of impasse, continuation of which we believe to be detrimental best interests both countries. Our objective with respect this issue continues, as in the past, to be to help parties concerned find peaceful solution.

2. We regret Indonesia could not, as we did, see Brazzaville res³ as realistic reflection present situation. In fact, in our judgment, Brazzaville res met fully both points made by Sukarno as reported in first para of urtel 968.⁴

3. We believe both sides now have made significant steps toward resolving this issue, and it our hope that UN debate can serve as springboard for further sincere efforts. Although both Brazzaville and Indian res defeated, voting pattern clearly demonstrates wide interests and views of other nations and can be interpreted both as rationale and as mandate for further efforts on part both sides seek solution.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/11–2961. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Lindquist and Sisco; cleared by Emmons, Blue, and Sullivan; and approved by McConaughy. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, and USUN.
1. In telegram 975, November 29, Jones asked for guidance on whether to continue to try to bring Indonesia and the Netherlands together on West New Guinea. Sukarno seemed calm about the issue and asked “where do we go from here?” (Ibid.)
2. On November 24, the U.S.-conceived resolution was sponsored and submitted by 13 African nations to the General Assembly. On November 27, the Assembly voted on the 13-nation resolution, which failed to receive the required two-thirds majority by a vote of 53 (U.S.) to 41 with 9 abstentions. For text of the draft 13-nation resolution (U.N. doc. A/L.368), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 963.
3. Reference is to the 13-nation resolution.
4. Telegram 968, November 28, reported that Sukarno’s points were: “(1) withdrawal of Dutch from administration of territory; (2) complete access by GOI to territory.” The telegram concluded: “Points made by Sukarno represent considerable alteration his original stand which in brief could be said to be either recognition Indonesian sovereignty or, alternatively, Indonesian administration of territory, as minimum GOI could accept.” (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/11–2861)