Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

317. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, May 7, 1960, 5 p.m.

1086. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 937,¹ Embetl 1051.² I have considered carefully Dept’s assessment and comments on current Korean political situation set forth in Deptel 937. Although I appreciate cogency many points advanced therein, I believe it useful provide for Dept’s consideration further elucidation Embassy’s assessments as well as certain additional factual information bearing on this problem.

1. In Embassy view, central factor this situation is reaction Korean public to present efforts National Assembly amend constitution and to performance “interim” government FonMin Huh Chung. Subsequent preparation Embtel 1051, Embassy has taken every available opportunity contact political leaders both parties and those in position make reliable judgments attitudes public opinion and students in effort determine political acceptability formula being followed by Assembly (see penultimate para Embtel 1051). It is our best judgment that majority Korean public and students favor amendment constitution to provide for cabinet system and are willing this be done by present Assembly. Further, there now appears be little sentiment in favor immediate presidential and vice-presidential elections. Embassy officer who just returned from week’s field trip to Taegu–Taejun area reports sentiment outside Seoul also virtually unanimously in favor constitutional amendment, with no evidence strong opposition to present Assembly undertaking this task and little demand for new presidential elections. This also judgment US correspondents with whom Embassy officers have discussed situation during past several days; number these correspondents also have made particular effort sound out student opinions. Similar attitude evident majority Korean press, with even Chosun Ilbo recently moderating its opposition to present assembly and, like Tonga Ilbo and Kyonghyang Sinmun, focusing its editorial attention on criticism certain appointments Huh administration and demands for prompt and vigorous prosecution those responsible March 15 election fraud and elimination corruption from government (Embtel 1069).³ In this connection, should be noted that only one of 13 specialists who testified at May 5 public hearing on constitutional amendment challenged “right” present Assembly to undertake amendment (see Embtel 1080).⁴

2. Embassy believes this attitude based on following considerations:

A) Appeal of establishment cabinet system as symbol new order government and safeguard against revival “one-man rule”; B) willingness allow Assembly reasonable time to pass amendment; and C) knowledge that Assembly is committed to resign and to hold new elections immediately after passage amendment. Re second point, number Korean observers have expressed view new government must be installed no later that August 15.

3. All evidence available to Embassy, therefore, indicates that at moment demands expressed recent demonstrations Pusan, Taegu, and Seoul (Embtel 1048)⁵ are representative only minority opinion students and general public. Moreover, it possible–although Embassy as yet has no firm evidence this point–these demonstrations inspired by partisan groups whose interests would be best served by immediate dissolution Assembly and new presidential elections and that they not largely unorganized and spontaneous movements characteristic those April 19 and 26. Dept’s attention also called to fact that thus far only Tongguk, of universities which played major role April 19 and 26, has indicated and support this movement. Embassy officer who recently visited Taegu reports that recent demonstrations there appear have been chiefly expression competitive ardor among students (see Embtel 1081).⁶

4. Embassy fully aware, however, possibility such movement could gain sufficient momentum to bring about shift public opinion against present efforts Assembly and Huh government. It our assessment, however, that odds are against such development provided: A) Assembly able adhere reasonably close to schedule for constitutional amendment and resigns promptly after passage and B) in 30-day interval between introduction and final action on amendment both Assembly and Huh government move ahead expeditiously with legislative and administrative reform measures.

5. Embtel 1051 may not have made sufficiently clear fact that, although he leaving initiative this matter to Assembly, Huh favors constitutional amendment followed by resignation Assembly. This was his recommendation for solution crisis when Rhee sought his advice after April 19 (Embtel 945).⁷ At least one his advisers, moreover, has stated Huh strongly opposed immediate presidential elections and dissolution Assembly and thus, effect Assembly action reported Embtel 1050⁸ was in no sense “throwing down of gauntlet to Huh on issue presidential and vice-presidential elections.” In fact, wording of resolution clearly implied Huh had been consulted by “representatives of Assembly” in advance and had concurred. Relation Huh and Assembly that of movement along parallel, not conflicting, lines to restore confidence government. Huh, therefore, undoubtedly would be most reluctant engage in “test of power” suggested para 4 Deptel 937.

6. Whatever position Huh takes this issue, he cannot avoid criticism and suspicion on basis his previous association with Rhee regime. To this extent his background is an inescapable political liability. Criticism some his appointments as failing show sufficient energy clean out old order already noted. (Deptel 942⁹ just received; detailed Embassy comments this point will be subject separate message.) It understandable that Huh and his advisers would maneuver to avoid transfer power to opposition. At same time Embassy convinced Huh determined insure fair elections and orderly transfer government to whatever group succeeds obtaining majority in new Assembly. There no reason believe, moreover, that any such maneuvers would be directed to frustration constitutional amendment or delay resignation Assembly. At most, objective likely be to assist reconstruction Liberal Party on basis those elements which can be salvaged from recent debacle.

7. In this respect Huh’s approach in line with that “reformist” group Liberal Assemblymen now in control party. Although has been some partisan maneuvering over details draft, these Liberals appear aware importance meeting May 10 deadline and have shown no signs to date of attempting evade commitment Assembly resignation. DP, moreover, continues support present formula. In press statement May 4, Chang Myon declared that “now that National Assembly has reconfirmed its resolution to revise constitution prior its dissolution, DP will abide by that resolution.” Chang also stated “DP has never decided to dissolve National Assembly prior to constitutional amendment.” Embassy believes, therefore, it likely Assembly will approve draft reasonably close to May 10 target date. Fact that when Assembly, after 30-day interval, formally considers draft it must approve or reject without amendment reduce possibility protracted debate, and it by no means impossible Assembly can come close June 17 deadline noted Embtel 1051. In any event, pressure will be on Assembly to act promptly, and any serious lapse into partisan wrangling will run risk strong public protest, a prospect which few Assemblymen seem prepared ignore.

8. Basis most recent development, therefore, Embassy believes there are reasonable prospects constitutional amendment-Assembly resignation formula will reassure public that government moving to make fundamental changes to meet their demands. If appropriate legislative and administrative reforms also undertaken–and steps already being taken this direction–this formula will be accepted as going long way to meet basic grievances which expressed protest movements during April.

9. I well aware this reasonably favorable picture could alter suddenly, in which case there probably would be no alternative to an immediate call for new presidential elections, as well as resignation of Assembly and new elections. Fact that Huh has left initiative constitutional amendment to Assembly leaves him free take such position should it prove necessary. At such time, we must, of course, move quickly and firmly bring Huh to this decision.

10. At present juncture, however, I continue be of opinion that efforts on our part to bring Huh to call immediate presidential elections and/or urge resignation Assembly are not appropriate to current situation. There is much more to be gained in terms our own position that of ROK internationally if instead responding our intervention, Korean people able work out own solution to recent political crisis and put down foundation for new republic which was brought into being chiefly through their own efforts.

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–760. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.
1. Document 315.
2. See footnote 1, Document 315.
3. Telegram 1069 from Seoul, May 5, transmitted a report on two conversations between McConaughy and Huh Chung. Huh was concerned about political developments that he felt might endanger his efforts to restore stability and promote security. He noted the rise of several political groups that claimed to have U.S. support, and added that a leader of an established political party claimed that the United States was supporting him as head of the next government of South Korea. Huh stressed that he was not personally concerned with who took over the next government but was concerned about the effect on the country of continuing political instability. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–560)
4. Dated May 6. (Ibid., 795B.21/5–660)
5. See footnote 4, Document 315.
6. Dated May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–660)
7. Telegram 945 from Seoul, April 23, reported on the advice that Rhee was receiving from a variety of political leaders. (Ibid., 795B.00/4–2360)
8. See footnote 3, Document 315.
9. Telegram 942 to Seoul, May 5, questioned the wisdom of a number of existing and potential South Korean diplomatic appointments in light of the political backgrounds of the individuals involved. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.95B4/5–560)