Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, May 5, 1960, 8:25 p.m.

949. Department feels strongly that recent events in ROK have raised stakes to US not only in Korea but in whole Free World context. Local situation cannot be allowed deteriorate not only because of importance of Korea per se but also because of bonus gains made regionally and globally in principles for which we stand and in image of US. These gains must be preserved and if possible enlarged. We should be prepared go to considerable lengths to maintain momentum already achieved in Korea with respect to our objectives and to forestall any threatened retrogression.

Huh Chung is known as man of integrity but not as activist.¹ Granted, he taking steps in several important directions, but important as they are they are relatively peripheral–central is announcement of new elections, question of legitimacy of National Assembly, manner of constitutional revision and who are to make it. If Huh Chung will not take steps in these fields right away, Department believes we must find means of increasing his motivation to do so. There is evidence that while he has kept his skirts as clean as possible in his close association with some elements now discredited, he is under great temptation to allow vested interests to try to salvage their position.² We must try to strengthen his resistance to these influences. We question whether the present Assembly is likely, at least short of motivation which doubtless would have to come from us, to resist temptation to salvage what they can of the LP’s damaged position. It is perhaps asking too much for majority to vote for its own demise–again, short of strong motivation.

Somehow Huh Chung must be given clearly to understand that while our stakes are viewed as large in Korea, they are even larger world-wide in relation to Korea, and we have no intention of jeopardizing recent gains made (on the side of heeding popular determination and resulting favorable side-effects) if we can help it. At least in our own minds we must keep actively before us possibility that another explosion, when and if it comes, must require Ne Win-type of interim control, in clear intent to support people’s intent, unless those objectives can be now obtained under more desirable, if more cumbersome, democratic management. Huh Chung should realize in full force that we consider we are on threshold not only of great gains in Korea, in US-ROK and ROK-Japan relations, but that we also look forward to gains in ROK prestige in the world, and in concomitant advance in principles which we consider we are defending in having fought in Korea in first place. We are further mindful that gains already made, and those yet to come, are being watched by an attentive, anxious, large, world-wide audience which is aware that we have rights and indeed obligations fully corollary to our heavy responsibilities in Korea, and that we can overlook none of these. At same time we are extremely mindful of importance of avoiding appearance of intervention or indeed of interfering any more than essential with internal dynamism of Korean national life. As a result, exercise of our great responsibility, deeply involved as we are through economic aid, military support and our military presence, requires extremely sensitive and quick adjustment to daily events but with clear concept in mind of what we now have in train and are already partly responsible for.

Would appreciate your views as to how best we can influence prompt and favorable action regarding the major problems of new elections, constitutional revision, and legitimacy of present National Assembly.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–560. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Jenkins and Parsons, cleared by Bane, Peterson, and Raymond A. Hare in G. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. The telegram originated with and closely follows the text of a May 4 memorandum from Jenkins to Parsons. (Ibid., FE/EA Files: Lot 63 D 168, K1. A2 Political Briefing Papers)
1. In his briefing of the National Security Council on May 5, [text not declassified]. (Memorandum of discussion at the 443d meeting of the National Security Council; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
2. In telegram 958 to Seoul, May 7, the Department of State emphasized this concern. Drawing upon various reports from Seoul, the Department concluded that Huh Chung and his advisers might be endeavoring to maintain the Liberal Party in power and salvage the Rhee regime to the extent possible. The Department was particularly concerned by a report that Rhee was still involved in government affairs and was exerting influence on Huh Chung through an intermediary. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–560) See Supplement.