Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, May 10, 1960, 4:47 p.m.

966. Embtels 1086,¹ 1089.² We would agree there is much more to be gained in terms our own position and that of ROK internationally if instead responding our intervention, Korean people able work out own solution recent political crisis. Our recommendation Deptel 937³ was predicted in considerable part on earlier impression gained Washington that majority Korean public opinion desired early opportunity elect new leadership Korea by means free, fair elections. If, as you indicate, in Embtel 1086, it appears majority Korean public and students favor amendment Constitution to provide for Cabinet system and are willing this be done by present Assembly, and that there is little sentiment ROK in favor immediate Presidential elections, we would agree we should not attempt run counter feelings majority Korean people.⁴

We recognize Huh considers current effort present Assembly amend Constitution in direction Cabinet system to be followed by resignation Assembly and new elections to be much more suited requirements present situation. However, we troubled by implications Huh’s statements (Embtel 1089) that if free, fair elections are held for new Assembly, leftist elements likely to be elected who could gain control ROKG. We disturbed by degree to which Huh apparently has these convictions, since, if true, this first indication we have had leftist elements ROK sufficiently strong gain control ROKG in event free, fair elections held; and we would of course wish to have all information Embassy has to support this indication. This leads us wonder whether Huh will increasingly take position with us that in US and over-all Free World security interests it necessary preserve to extent possible status quo Korea and that free, fair elections be postponed as long possible in order prevent leftist or progressive elements taking over. We would hope that Huh’s real motivation does not stem from a vested viewpoint since if Korean people should conclude Huh and his advisers seeking frustrate popular will, constitutionally expressed, then more violent second stage of revolution could well materialize.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–760. Confidential. Drafted by Bane and cleared by Steeves and Parsons.
1. Document 317.
2. In telegram 1089 from Seoul, May 7, McConaughy reported that Huh Chung anticipated that leftist and Communist elements would do well in the forthcoming elections for the National Assembly. In that case, Huh felt there might be a sizable group in the next Assembly who could be expected to express anti-American sentiment, demand the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, and put forward suggestions for negotiations between the two Korean Governments. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–760) See Supplement.
3. Document 315.
4. In telegram 1108 from Seoul, May 11, the Embassy reported that a constitutional amendment had been introduced into the National Assembly that morning that would establish a cabinet system of government, an essentially figurehead president, a powerful prime minister, a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.21/5–1160)