Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, May 4, 1960, 6:27 p.m.

937. Your 1051¹ rptd info Tokyo 351 CINCPAC 230 Dept’s 902² rptd info Tokyo 2510 CINCPAC unn. Dept greatly disturbed by your report (your 1051) that Huh Chung leaving political initiative to thoroughly discredited National Assembly to work out solution crisis. Our concern compounded by National Assembly action as reported your 1050³ rptd Tokyo 350 CINCPAC 229 in approving notions that Constitutional amendment be presented plenary session not later than May 10 and that Acting President Huh Chung not schedule presidential elections until after Constitutional amendment debated and passed. It would appear National Assembly in approving resolution is moving to seize control of situation and in effect is throwing down gauntlet to Huh on issue of presidential and vice presidential elections. As indicated our 902 we believe it of utmost urgency despite risks involved that Huh move immediately and decisively on political plane by announcing date for new presidential and vice presidential elections for full four-year terms in order he regain political initiative before it too late. We unaware any legal or constitutional reasons why Huh could not move to have dates set for elections.

As Embassy points out, present Constitutional amendment schedule runs very close to June 17 Constitutional deadline for announcement presidential elections. (In view unfavorable developments reported your 1051, would appear there is no assurance that National Assembly, with obvious vested interests, will in fact approve Constitutional amendment by June 17 or any other date. Moreover the longer this Assembly continues to exist, the more opportunity is given as you suggest for LP to endeavor reassert itself and possibly set stage for Rhee’s return.) We doubt that the course of action being pursued by National Assembly with apparent acquiescence Huh will satisfy basic grievances Korean people and meet immediate needs situation. Recent demonstrations reported your 1048⁴ rptd CINCPAC 228 in Pusan, Taegu and Seoul calling for 1) immediate dissolution National Assembly, 2) no change in Constitution until after new Assembly elections and 3) holding of new presidential and vice presidential elections, would appear to be outward manifestation of restiveness of people over failure Huh and National Assembly to take basic action required.

Dept agrees that constructive steps such as revamping and streamlining economic programs, police reform, improvement administrative efficiency and elimination corruption, legislative action on such issues as MG ordinances 55 and 88, and amendment National Security and local autonomy laws are highly desirable. If however Huh not prepared to exercise political initiative and in effect yields leadership in present crisis to LP-controlled Assembly, he can scarcely avoid giving impression he is still associated with and instrument of Rhee regime. This in our view could create most serious situation because it would give rise popular feeling of deception and frustration, setting stage for new and more serious demonstrations than heretofore, and which Communists might this time be prepared endeavor manipulate. We therefore believe Huh must move urgently on political plane to forestall repetition on larger scale demonstrations which led to downfall preceding government, and in course of which we might be subjected to very heavy pressure to concur in repressive measures in interest maintenance law and order in order prevent situation Communists might seek exploit.

Dept therefore continues believe Huh should move along lines suggested Deptel 902 and that Huh should also publicly urge that in order meet basic desires of people National Assembly should immediately resign and permit election new National Assembly which would then proceed to decide whether structure government should be changed. We do not believe people prepared accept anything less even though we recognize National Assembly could move to change government structure despite Huh’s statements and desires. We appreciate this would be test of power between National Assembly and Huh since National Assembly presumably could move alter structure of government in manner eliminating direct election president and vice president. If National Assembly should win, completely new situation would obtain and we would be forced reassess situation in light of circumstances then existing.

In light strong recommendations your 1051, however, Dept leaves to Ambassador’s discretion as to how and when best bring these views to Huh’s attention. When matter discussed with Huh, Dept believes Ambassador should emphasize (in accordance Dept’s 902) that we consider it urgently necessary Huh announce soonest firm date for presidential and vice presidential elections for full four-year term and stating elections will be conducted strictly in accordance legal and Constitutional processes. Ambassador should also bring to Huh’s attention Dept’s belief that Huh should seriously question whether incumbent thoroughly discredited National Assembly (which railroaded legislation through which directly contributed to recent upheavals) should be permitted determine structure Korean government and to determine when presidential elections should be held. In Dept’s view this would appear to be point demonstrations reported your 1048 rptd CINCPAC 228 endeavored convey to Huh and National Assembly namely people’s lack of confidence in any action taken by incumbent Assembly.

Dept firmly convinced people most likely will accept nothing less than new presidential and vice presidential elections for full four-year period, immediate resignation National Assembly and immediate establishment of date for new elections National Assemblymen. In this manner new Assembly which presumably would be responsive to people could determine whether it wishes modify present structure Korean government.

We believe our proposed courses of action would be fully in keeping with Huh’s request that we offer our advice freely to him at any time and that he would not consider this intervention. (Your 1013⁵ rptd info Tokyo 337 CINCPAC 216)

FYI. We frankly have our reservations re adoption of cabinet-responsible form of government involving weak executive and question whether Korea is ready for this more sophisticated form of government. However, believe this is matter basically for Korean decision and by new Assembly elected in course fair free elections. End FYI.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–360. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Lane and cleared by Bane and Parsons. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 1051 from Seoul, May 3, the Embassy reported on political developments in Korea in the wake of the fall of the Rhee government. The Embassy noted that the National Assembly had taken the lead in formulating a political solution to the crisis. Huh Chung apparently was prepared to allow the Assembly to take the initiative. Within the Assembly, the Liberal Party was showing signs of reemerging as the majority party, and a minority of Liberal Party Assemblymen were maneuvering to keep open the possibility of the return of Rhee to the Presidency. The Ambassador indicated that he would suggest early elections to Huh Chung. (ibid.) See Supplement.
2. In telegram 902 to Seoul, April 28, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to impress upon Huh Chung the importance of taking action to stabilize the political situation and to restore public confidence in the South Korean Government. A vital first step in that direction, the Department felt, was an announcement fixing a firm date for Presidential and Vice Presidential elections. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–2860) See Supplement.
3. Dated May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.2/5–360)
4. Dated May 3. (Ibid., 795B.00/5-360)
5. Document 312.