Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

283. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, October 22, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Analysis and Proposed Plan for Dealing with Deteriorating Korean Domestic Political Situation

YOU will recall that former Ambassador to Korea, Walter Dowling, was recalled to the Department early last January for consultation in connection with the undemocratic methods used to pass a revised National Security Law and other legislation in the Korea National Assembly on December 24 and the resulting political crisis. In response to Secretary Dulles’ request, Ambassador Dowling submitted an analysis of the situation and proposed plan of action on January 24 [23] (Tab A).¹ Ambassador Dowling pointed out that considerable progress had been achieved in the development of democratic institutions and processes in the Republic of Korea. He continued, however, that the success of the opposition Democratic Party in the May 1958 elections and the declining popularity of the Liberal Party had convinced certain elements of the Liberal Party (known as the “hard faction”) that this Party could only retain political power by authoritarian methods. Furthermore, it appeared that this faction had succeeded in convincing President Rhee that suppressive measures must be taken against the Democratic Party and other opposition elements in order to ensure his re-election in the 1960 Presidential election.

Ambassador Dowling continued that the United States Government was faced with two alternatives, either a passive disinterested role or a positive course of action to influence the situation. Despite the serious risks which the latter entailed, he believed that the United States’ interests in Korea would suffer disastrously if the United States remained passive in the face of the situation. He therefore recommended that certain actions be undertaken to restore normal parliamentary functions and the operation of the political party system and to prevent the eventual use of totalitarian actions to suppress the opposition and cure the free press. Among his specific recommendations were (a) the encouragement of the stationing of American reporters in Seoul, (b) the visiting of the Republic of Korea by prominent members of Congress, (c) formal protests to the Korean Government of various violations of the Republic of Korea-United States financial stabilization agreement, combined with discreet indications that additional aid might be withheld until corrective action was taken, (d) procrastination on negotiations for new P.L. 480 agreement, (e) the withdrawal of our aid program for the Republic of Korea police, (f) other dilatory actions with respect to aid expenditures, and (g) the complete coordination of the actions and statements regarding Korea within the United States Government.

Ambassador Dowling’s courses of action were approved on January 27 by Secretary Dulles but were only incompletely put into operation. On February 16, the chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board forwarded a memorandum² to the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce and other members of the Operations Coordinating Board requesting the coordination of further planning and implementation of United States programs in Korea.

Ensuing events have borne out Ambassador Dowling’s original analysis of the situation and in late August we requested³ Ambassador Dowling to submit a sequel to his January 24 memorandum. In his reply (Tab B)⁴ the Ambassador pointed out that, although President Rhee’s chances of victory in a relatively fair contest are reasonably good, this is almost certainly the last election in which he will participate. Liberal Party leaders are therefore more acutely conscious than ever of the problems of succession and, consequently, are sparing no effort to prevent a repetition of the 1956 defeat of their vice-presidential candidate. Within the past six months, there has been a slow but steady tightening at every level of the Administration’s governmental and political controls. This has been accompanied by plans for an all-out propaganda and organizational campaign in order to reverse the growing popular dissatisfaction with the Administration and particularly to intensify the psychological and material pressures against those sympathetic to the opposition.

Ambassador Dowling has indicated that he believes we still have a chance to bring influence to bear on the domestic political front to prevent flagrant abuses of democratic institutions and processes provided we choose our weapons carefully and employ them firmly but discreetly. Such actions would have the support of the majority of the Korean people and moderate leadership groups even within the Liberal Party and Government. He therefore has recommended (1) the widest possible United States and international news and editorial coverage of the Korean scene, (2) visits by the members of Congress and other prominent figures to impress upon President Rhee and others the dangers inherent in the present situation which may affect the United States ability to continue to actively support the Republic of Korea, (3) emphasis by USIS on the dissemination of information on the basic requirements of free elections and democracy, (4) the re-examination of our aid to the Republic of Korea police, and (5) the widest possible observation of election campaign by Embassy and UNCURK observers.

The Ambassador continued that, in addition to the above, if the decision to apply economic pressure is made, it must necessarily be of the sort which would have a major impact. One possibility he outlined would be to announce a $150–160 million Defense Support Aid Level for FY 1960, with the balance of the Korean allocation held in an undisclosed contingency reserve, and an intimation to the Republic of Korea Government that supplemental aid might be made available after the elections if all goes well. These subsequent proposals are very similar to those made by the Ambassador in his January memorandum.

We believe that the time has come when we must take action in Korea to prevent further deterioration of the political situation. In such a country as the Republic of Korea with our massive military and economic aid, the United States is deeply involved in the situation and development of the country. We have become identified not only throughout Korea but throughout most of the world as the sponsor of the Republic of Korea. Consequently, the failure of democracy in Korea would be considered by many nations as the total failure of the applicability of our system for the nations of Afro-Asia, with the subsequent decline of American influence and prestige within this area. Our immediate objective must therefore be to halt and reverse the trend toward a totalitarian regime in Korea and assure as far as possible that a fair and free election for President will be held in 1960 by bringing the weight of United States influence upon the ROK Government and the pro-Government Liberal Party to the extent that it is not self-defeating. At a minimum, our actions must include nothing which could be construed by President Rhee and the Liberal Party as endorsing their undemocratic actions. As Ambassador Dowling has emphasized, the 1960 elections will undoubtedly be the last in the era dominated by the personality of President Rhee and well may determine the political course that Korea will take when that turning point is reached. The failure of democracy in Korea at this critical juncture can only lead to the disillusionment of the Korean people, not only with democratic principles and practices, but with the United States to whom these people for over the past decade looked for leadership and guidance. In the ensuing vacuum, we fear that only extremist solutions can result.

The courses of action which we propose are based mainly on Ambassador Dowling’s recommendations and on the premise that we must be prepared to carry through any actions initiated and that under no circumstances can there be any impairment of ROK military strength. We submit the following courses of action, therefore, for your approval. (Additional courses of action which might subsequently appear useful should not, of course, be excluded.)

1. As President Rhee and many Korean Government officials are particularly sensitive to press criticism, especially by the American press, we should endeavor to encourage not only the stationing of American reporters in Seoul (there are none there now) but the widest possible news and editorial coverage of the political scene. This might be combined with editorial and perhaps magazine articles in leading periodicals. The presence in Korea of a maximum number of newspapermen, expecially before and during the 1960 elections, should be encouraged. Foreign resources can expose government interference in electoral processes to international opinion, while at the same time, such actions might encourage domestic reporters to provide a more accurate coverage of the situation. We have already initiated an effort for increased journalistic coverage of Korea and hope that progress can be made in the future.

2. Visits to Korea of leading members of Congress and other prominent figures who can and will speak out in support of our policies should be encouraged. As Ambassador Dowling has pointed out, efforts should be made through such visits to impress upon President Rhee and other ranking members of the Liberal Party the concern the American Government and people feel toward the recent political trends, and the possibility that the continuation of such may affect our ability to actively support the ROK not only through economic aid but diplomatically and politically in the United Nations and elsewhere.

3. USIS activities should be directed to give particular emphasis to dissemination of information on the basic requirements of free elections and democratic processes. USIS must continue to attempt to create a fuller understanding of the democratic concepts and practices, both among the top leadership groups and the masses of the Korean people. At the same time, the USIS should emphasize that the United States is behind the Korean people in their efforts for a fuller and better life rather than any particular political or economic segment. We have already begun consultations with USIA on a more effective country plan for FY 1960.

4. The widest possible observations of the 1960 election campaign should be undertaken not only by the Embassy but by UNCURK personnel. The Department should hold high level consultations with Australia and other members of UNCURK concerning the ways that they may assist in ensuring free elections in 1960.

5. A complete review of the ROK police program should be undertaken by USOM officials in Korea in coordination with the Embassy, as well as by the Department and ICA in Washington, with the view to ensuring that any further support given this organization will be confined to combatting Communist subversion. At the same time, President Rhee and the Home Minister should be made aware that the further use of police in election campaigns could result in the cessation of our aid program for the ROK police. Moreover, we should review our aid progress to the Office of Public Information, which has closely become identified with the Government suppression of opposition forces, with the view to supporting only legitimate activities. Already USOM has reduced its assistance to this organization from $474,000 in 1959 to an estimated $167,000 in 1960.

6. Our new Ambassador to Korea, Walter P. McConaughy, should be instructed to intimate to President Rhee that the aid cuts for fiscal year 1960 (from $211 million to $182.5 million) were partly due to the difficulties of arousing enthusiastic support for Korea in Congress because of recent political developments and, if matters continue in such a vein, such future aid cuts as may occur would almost as a matter of course be increased in severity. On the other hand, if the American people and the Congress were convinced that real progress has been made toward democracy and economic viability in Korea, support for Korea would be much easier to engender.

7. Although some economic sanctions might be held in reserve in the event it is necessary to give substance to Ambassador McConaughy’s intimation, we do not believe it advisable or probably necessary at the present time to consider further aid reductions. The threat of withdrawal of future aid, combined with the actual reductions in FY 1960 aid, should exert a wholesome effect on President Rhee and the ROK Government. Further cutting the United States aid level for political reasons is likely in our opinion to create more problems than it would solve. However, if it becomes necessary to exert economic pressure on the Korean Government, the United States refused to permit the use of aid funds for such political purposes as certain irrigation projects and the rice lien program and our strict insistence on ROK adherence to the stabilization agreement would probably be most productive in accomplishing our ends. We may also at some time wish to apply strong pressure to have the ROK Government adopt a more reasonable attitude on revision of the exchange rate.

Recommendation:⁵

That you approve the above courses of action.

0. Source: Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 63 D 168, K14 Political Activities. Secret. Drafted by Klemstine; cleared by Jenkins, Steeves, and Merchant; and sent through Murphy.
1. Not found attached; printed as Document 266.
2. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/2–1859) See Supplement.
3. See footnote 1, Document 282.
4. Not found attached; printed as Document 282.
5. There is no indication on the source text that the Secretary approved the recommendation.