284. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon0)
SUBJECT
- Korean Military Assistance
Before your departure you asked me to look into the problem of Korean military assistance and the implications of the reduction of the 1960 MAP program for that country.
[Page 595]After discussing this problem within the Department and then with Jack Irwin, I asked Defense, FE, and U/MSC to come up with a coordinated case history which you would be able to use with Budget and the White House. This study has now been drafted,1 is being cleared within the two departments, and should be in final form by the end of the week.
The study, as it stands now, covers the following points:
- 1.
- U.S. policy toward Korea.
- 2.
- Basic factors bearing on U.S. ability to implement policy.
- a.
- Trend in MAP allocations.
- b.
- Force level requirements and modernization.
- c
- Short term effect of reduced military aid to Korea.
- d.
- Risk involved in force reduction.
- e.
- Analysis of possible reduction.
- f.
- Trend in economic aid allocations.
- 3.
- Background.
- a.
- Types of forces.
- b.
- The enemy threat.
- c.
- Certain economic aspects of Korean force maintenance.
- 4.
-
Regional political considerations.
The tentative conclusions set forth in this report are as follows:
- 1.
- An acceptable defense posture in Korea under existing NSC policy requires at least maintenance of the present combined military capability. Such maintenance permits of no significant reduction in existing Korean forces.
- 2.
- A change in the size or composition of forces in Korea or available for its defense that reduced the existing combined military capability would create an unacceptable military risk. A reduction in the capability of any component would have to be compensated for by an increase in the capability of other components.
- 3.
- Modernization of existing forces would require a substantial increase in MAP for Korea.
- 4.
- A continued decline in MAP and local currency resources would make even austere maintenance of the existing forces impracticable and would compel a reconsideration of the distribution of military responsibility or a reconsideration of NSC policy for Korean defense. If local currency availabilities from US aid sources do not increase above FY 1960 planned levels, a choice will exist between a compensating increase in Korean domestic revenues for budgeted expenditures, or reconsideration of the level of the defense expenditures of the Korean Government; this would in turn raise the question of Korean force reductions and the related questions.