Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

282. Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, September 28, 1959.

G–28. Ref: Deptel 133.¹ Principal features ROK domestic political scene and general direction political trends remain essentially as outlined in my memorandum January 23, 1959.² “Hard” faction continues exert dominant influence within LP and circles close President Rhee despite return of still-ailing Speaker Yi Ki-pung to more active political role. Although there has been a closing of Liberal ranks under Speaker’s aegis, this does not appear have reduced “hard” faction influence.

Within past six months there has been slow but steady tightening at every level of Administration’s governmental and political controls. This accompanied by plans for all-out progaganda and organizational campaign calculated reverse growing popular dissatisfaction with Administration and particularly to intensify psychological and material pressures against those sympathetic to Opposition. By initiating such political action program well in advance 1960 elections, LP apparently plans reduce necessity for overt use coercive measures and/or manipulation of ballot in order give impression “fair elections.” Manner in which LP won overwhelming victories recent re-elections Yangsan and Posong, indicates LP may be able deliver, in-coming presidential campaign, huge rural majorities to offset normal Democratic advantages in urban areas.

Although LP, therefore, appears be testing new approach to winning 1960 elections, I find no evidence that either LP or Administration prepared forego resort force and coercive measures if necessary achieve political objectives. Government’s determined action keep Kyonghyang closed, even after initial court decision provided avenue graceful retreat from original action, and manner in which CHO Pong-am death sentence executed clearly revealed iron fist which government prepared raise against Opposition. Similar moves, designed suppress Opposition political activities and expression views critical of government, undoubtedly will be made under guise combatting increased threat communist subversion. Even in period before formal presidential campaign, LP and Administration may find it necessary repeat heavy-handed tactics employed in December 1958 crisis. Situation likely to be exacerbated by Democrats who, convinced they will not be given fair opportunity win majority support at polls in 1960, are virtually certain follow policy unrelieved obstructionism in National Assembly while attempting mount campaign popular agitation designed discredit government and LP. Within National Assembly, such situation may well prompt Administration to attempt place severe legal and extra-legal restraints upon Opposition freedom of action. Moreover, should legislative deadlock of past session be repeated–which first weeks of new Assembly appear indicate–danger of extra-constitutional action by Administration will be even more acutely present.

Current deadlock in present session Assembly over election Vice Speaker once more points up fact developments since last December have virtually eliminated process give-and-take between two major parties which essential effective operation democratic government. It is, of course, still possible consequences this situation could be ameliorated by realignment moderate forces within both parties into single party, a development which I believe also would offer best hope for future democratic government Korea and orderly transfer power following death Rhee. Overtures this direction made from both sides during recent months and centering in possibility constitutional amendment (see EmDespatch No. 39, July 23, 1959)³ have not been promising, however, and as 1960 campaign approaches and lines harden this possibility becomes even more remote. Split in Democratic ranks might be conducive such development; but if Democrats emerge united from October nominating convention, I believe such realignment before 1960 elections very unlikely.

I believe, therefore, that in period up to and through 1960 elections we must be prepared for further political crises in which LP will not hesitate resort again to undemocratic tactics override opposition its policies and in order to maintain itself in power. While Rhee’s chances victory in relatively fair contest are reasonably good, obviously greater difficulty electing Yi Ki-pung, or any candidate chosen replace him, will prompt LP and Administration rely on extensive interference in campaign and subversion ballot. This almost certainly Rhee’s last election, and with LP leaders more acutely conscious than ever of problems inheritance political power following his death, they will spare no effort prevent repetition 1956 defeat their VP candidate.

My views on US role under those circumstances, consequences our inaction, and risks involved in attempting influence ROK domestic political situation continue be those outlined in my memorandum of January 23. Our recent prodding ROK, mentioned reftel, has evoked customary defensive reaction from government. But I do not feel this situation has limited our capacity for bringing influence to bear on domestic front provided we choose our weapons carefully and employ them firmly but discreetly. Moreover, unlike situations involving ROK-Japanese repatriation dispute, UN membership, SOFA, where leaders ROK public opinion in general support government position, exercise our influence in effort prevent flagrant abuse democratic institutions–provided we move positively–will have support majority Korean people and moderate leadership groups, even within LP and government.

I would recommend, therefore, following courses of action, again within context indicated my earlier memorandum: 1) encourage widest possible US and international news and editorial coverage as soon as possible and certainly immediately before and during 1960 elections, including presence in Korea maximum number newsmen at election times; 2) visits to Korea by leading members Congress and other prominent public figures, who can be depended upon to speak out in support our policies. Effort should be made through such visits impress Rhee with concern American Government and people re recent political trends Korea and real possibility such concern may affect ability US continue active support ROK. Particularly, it should be made clear to President Rhee that continued undemocratic actions certain to evoke widespread criticism in UN which US will not be in position to restrain; 3) USIS activities should give particular emphasis to dissemination information basic requirements free elections and responsibilities individual citizens. Where possible this should be facilitated by visits of US lecturers and experts, and to extent possible private Korean groups should be encouraged to participate in a program of citizenship education; 4) we should continue cautious attitude on aid to ROK police and consideration should be given possibility temporary increase carefully selected US police advisors who can determine whether police being used for partisan purposes. It should be made clear to ROK that use police for such purposes would result in cancellation projected police aid program; 5) widest possible observation campaign and balloting by Embassy and UNCURK observers. I would also suggest, Department might consider consultations with other members “sixteen nations,” particularly UK and Australia, concerning ways they may assist in this or make any other contribution free elections 1960; 6) if, in addition to above, we decide to apply economic pressure, it must be of sort which would have major impact. One possibility would be to announce $150 or $160 million DS aid level FY 60 with balance Korean allocation held in contingency reserve. We could explain publicly reserve is for possible use meet emergency requirements elsewhere. At some time we would inform Government that US public and congressional concern over recent political deterioration ROK has made it impossible Executive Branch maintain program level but that, if all goes well, supplemental amount might be made available towards end FY (viz after May elections). This kind of pressure might not work, but I think it would be worth economic risks involved. It is most effective way I know to demonstrate our deep concern over recent trends.

At close my tour here,⁴ I am impressed with foundation laid down during past decade from which Korea can move toward effective and stable democratic government. Koreans display a degree of political consciousness the more remarkable against a background prolonged Japanese occupation and Korea’s own political and cultural traditions. We must also not forget that there is significantly large group, including many those who will furnish Korea’s future leaders, who are intellectually and emotionally committed to success democratic experiment Korea. These favorable factors, however, highly vulnerable to disillusionment born of frustration with failure government be more responsive popular desires and tolerant opposition views. As I suggested in my memorandum, such disillusionment could offer fertile field for exploitation by extremists of left and right.

In this context, 1960 elections take on especial significance. These elections will undoubtedly be last in era dominated by personality President Rhee and may well determine political course Korea will take when that turning point reached. If, therefore, they are characterized by flagrant abuse democratic institutions, there is real danger that many those now committed development democratic government will conclude it a futile cause.

Little time remains, however, in which we can effectively bring our influence to bear on this situation. We must either decide now what we intend to do and move forward promptly or risk by default a development which in longer pull can only run counter our national interests.

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/9–2859. Secret.
1. In telegram 133 to Seoul, August 24, for Dowling from Parsons, Assistant Secretary Parsons asked Dowling to prepare an assessment of the domestic political situation in Korea before leaving his post as Ambassador. Parsons also asked for Dowling’s recommendations on specific courses of action that might be adopted in anticipation of the 1960 elections in Korea. (Ibid., 795B.00/8–2459) See Supplement.
2. Document 266.
3. The correct date of the despatch is August 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/8–1159) See Supplement.
4. Dowling left Korea October 2, and was replaced as Ambassador by Walter P. McConaughy, who was appointed October 5, arrived in Korea December 10, and presented his credentials December 17.