Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

266. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Korea (Dowling) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)⁰

Washington, January 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

• United States Role in the Current Political Crisis in Korea

1. Analysis of the Situation.

The results of the 1958 elections and other reports indicate a growing popular dissatisfaction with and opposition to the Republic of Korea Government and the dominant Liberal Party. The political opposition has been growing in strength. Faced with a presidential election in 1960 the Liberal Party has turned to undemocratic tactics to cope with the situation and to maintain itself in power. As a result, the future course of events in the Republic of Korea will have a serious impact on the achievement of United States (and United Nations) objectives in the Republic of Korea.

Considerable progress has been achieved in the development of democratic institutions and processes. This has been due in great part to the moderate leadership of the Liberal Party since 1954 by Assembly Speaker and Party Chairman Yi Ki-pung. This moderate leadership sought to bring about improvements in government and economic conditions which would regain popular support for the Liberal Party. Despite some evidence of modest successes in this regard, the moderate elements have now been pushed aside by the tough faction of the Liberal Party who seem determined to retain political power through any means, including undemocratic and authoritarian tactics as evidenced by the recent passage of amendments to the National Security Law, ostensibly directed against Communist subversion and infiltration but in reality designed for use against the opposition and the free press in connection with the presidential election of 1960. The growing influence over party affairs by this hard faction has become possible as a result of Speaker Yi’s declining health, which has led to his increasing withdrawal from active guidance of the Party, and the electoral setback suffered by the Party under moderate leadership. For the moment, at least, this hard faction has President Rhee’s support, and moderate elements can not be expected to oppose the Party’s moves towards authoritarian rule so long as they seem to be succeeding. If, however, it can be made plain that the United States will resist any departure from democratic methods, then there is a reasonable hope that the moderate elements will reassert themselves.

The Korean people have developed a remarkable degree of political consciousness. Their experience with representative government since 1948 has demonstrated to them that political power can be determined by the ballot (they have had six national elections). In this political sophistication lies an important difference between Korea and other countries, such as Pakistan or Burma. The Koreans, despite serious adversities, have been developing a democratic system of government; and the current crisis arises not from the failure of democracy in Korea but rather from its growing success.

In this situation the mood of the Korean people is no longer such that it will passively accept and submit to undemocratic and authoritarian measures of political control. They now have in the freedom of the press, in the Democratic Party and in the elections provided by their Constitution, the channels through which they can express their views, their criticism of the Government and their opposition to the Liberal Party. A large segment of the Korean population looks to 1960 as an opportunity to elect a government (through the presidency) more responsive to the popular will. Attempts, therefore, to stifle freedom of the press, to curtail opposition political activity, or to tamper with the Constitution, will very likely lead to a strong popular reaction, including violent actions, against those responsible for these measures.

2. Probable Tactics of the Liberal Party’s Tough Faction.

From my talks with President Rhee, I have concluded that the tough faction of the Liberal Party has convinced him that the Democratic Party is Communist-infiltrated. Although the Democratic Party leaders are noted for their anti-Communist vigor, it was probably not difficult to persuade President Rhee to the contrary, since his is inclined to suspect any opposition to him as being Communist-inspired. It must be expected, too, that the tough faction can gain President Rhee’s consent to suppression of the opposition. The ruthless tactics employed by them in pushing through the National Security Act amendment were probably intended to provoke the Democratic Party into extra parliamentary, violent action, and were thus a first step in laying a basis for subsequent moves against them.

My supposition is that the Liberal Party leaders propose to eliminate the opposition from the National Assembly and thereafter amend the Constitution to provide for indirect election of the President in 1960. If this be so, then in the process they will have to curb the press, which will undoubtedly go all out in their exposure of the Liberal Party strategy.

These tactics are roughly analogous to those employed in 1952, which succeeded, due largely perhaps to preoccupation with the war, which served to excuse strong measures.

3. The United States Role.

In the eyes of the Koreans, the United States has a definite role to play in this situation. A feeling is widespread that, if the United States is really concerned for the welfare of Korea, its influence should be used for the promotion of the political good, as well as for the development of economic and military strength. And there is no doubt in the minds of the Koreans as to our power to influence the Republic of Korea Government.

The United States Government is faced with two alternatives: (a) a passive disinterested role or (b) a positive course of action to influence the situation.

It is possible that in the short run a passive United States role is unlikely to have seriously adverse repercussions. President Rhee and the hard elements of the Liberal Party can probably keep the situation under control through strong police methods, although popular unrest will undoubtedly increase.

However, in the longer run, a passive United States role in the face of undemocratic actions by the Liberal Party would have serious consequences in terms of United States interests in Korea. When President Rhee is no longer on the scene (he is now 84 years old), the Liberal Party will probably be unable for long to maintain control even by the continued use of forceful measures. Conditions in Korea would therefore deteriorate further, and it would become more difficult to cope with them as time passes.

Some of the specific consequences of United States inaction are outlined below:

(a) The use of undemocratic and authoritarian measures to ensure retention of power by the Liberal Party, and the resulting unfavorable publicity, will affect adversely the ability of the United States to support the Republic of Korea internationally and specifically in the United Nations.

(b) It will also create problems domestically with respect to our efforts to obtain the necessary appropriations for the continuation of United States aid programs in Korea, which are essential if United States objectives are to be achieved.

(c) Within Korea, too, a passive role would have disadvantageous results in terms of United States objectives and interests:

(1) President Rhee and the hard elements of the Liberal Party would be convinced that regardless of actions they might take domestically, the United States will have no choice but to support them. President Rhee has nurtured the impression that if he takes a strong position, then the United States will back down.

(2) The moderate and democratic-minded elements in Korea, opposed to the present course of the Government, will lose confidence in the United States. This could lead to a decline in United States influence with any successor government, regardless of whether or not there is a move to the left.

It must be recognized, of course, that serious risks would also be involved, with respect to the achievement of United States objectives, if the United States adopts a positive course of action in the current situation. President Rhee and the Liberal Party will strongly resist United States efforts to influence the situation. “Spontaneous” protest demonstrations may be organized, on the basis of United States “interference[”] in Korean internal affairs (tentative efforts to push this line in recent weeks have resulted only in support of the United States position by the Korean press). President Rhee would likely attempt to exert his influence in the Congress and with the American public to gain support for his actions and oppose the United States Government (specifically the Department of State). There is also the likelihood that he would “go after” me and the Embassy at Seoul, alleging that he was merely moving against his Communist foes, and that the United States was obstructing him.

4. A Suggested Course of Action.

The problem before us is two-fold: (1) to restore normal parliamentary functions and the operation of the political party system; and (2) to prevent the eventual use of authoritarian actions to suppress the opposition and curb the free press, which would in time lead to such deterioration of the situation as to endanger the achievement of United States objectives in Korea.

There are indications that the United States attitude already evinced is being effective, the first move towards a compromise between the Liberals and Democrats which would restore parliamentary functions having been taken shortly after my recall for consultation and the appearance of critical editorials in the American press. Should this compromise move not succeed, or should the Liberal Party now accept a compromise and subsequently embark upon repressive measures, I would recommend the following course of actions, to be pursued ad seriatim. Needless to say, should democratic processes be restored at any stage of the suggested course, our pressures should be relaxed and positive actions taken to demonstrate our satisfaction.

I have endeavored to set out below those actions which I believe would be effective but which would avoid weakening the effectiveness and combat readiness of the Republic of Korea armed forces. We should not, of course, exclude additional actions which might subsequently appear useful, the criteria for decision always being that we are prepared to carry through actions which we begin, and that there be no impairment of ROK military strength.

a. Since President Rhee is particularly sensitive to the attitude of the American press, we should encourage the stationing of a few American reporters in Seoul as soon as possible. A wide representation of the United States press, not only in Seoul but throughout the provinces, should be arranged to cover the 1960 electoral campaign. Even if democratic processes have been restored prior to that period, the tough faction of the Liberal Party will undoubtedly be tempted to revert to a hard line and engage in election irregularities. The presence of American newsmen would be an especially effective restraint.

b. Pertinent members of Congress, such as Congressman Judd and Congressman Zablocki, should be encouraged to visit the Republic of Korea in the near future for the purpose of surveying the situation firsthand in order psychologically to influence President Rhee and the hard elements of the Liberal Party. Their presence likewise would serve to encourage the moderate elements of the Liberal Party, as well as the Korean populace as a whole. (I understand Dr. Judd has already volunteered that he might find it possible to visit Korea at some early date.)

c. We should protest formally to the Republic of Korea Government the various violations of the ROK-United States Financial Stabilization Agreement¹ and the failure generally of the ROK Government to proceed to the enactment of sounder economic policies which we have been urging upon them. In this context, we should indicate discreetly that additional aid actions, such as DLF loans, will be withheld until corrective action is taken.

d. The ROK has now formally requested negotiation of a new PL 480 agreement for FY–1959. We should hold up action as long as may be necessary to achieve our objective. The ROK is in no urgent need of PL 480 surplus foods, in view of the good harvest in Korea this crop year, but a program is vital for the generation of counterpart funds to cover the ROK budget. It is possible, however, for the ROK to borrow funds to tide them over while awaiting such a program.

e. Further action should be withheld on our small aid program for the ROK police, in connection with which we should tell President Rhee frankly that we are doing this since it is apparent that the police are being used for partisan purposes, to the neglect of their anti-Communist functions. We should, however, inform President Rhee and the ROK Government that we will continue to do everything possible to assist them in combatting Communism legitimately.

f. Other dilatory actions with respect to aid expenditures and other matters should be decided on an ad hoc basis and action should be withheld by all United States agencies concerned until we have achieved our objectives. An illustrative step would be to withhold release of counterpart funds for local projects and for support of the military budget. (General Decker withheld counterpart funds for the military budget for some months in 1958 in order to attain agreement on budgetary levels; he found this action effective when other persuasions had failed.)

g. We should bring forcibly to the attention of President Rhee and the ROK Government the disclosures made in the recent GAO report,² which condemns the ROK Army general inefficiencies and diversions of United States-supplied materials, and urge strong corrective actions be taken. The point should be made that scandals such as these impair our ability to continue to obtain aid for Korea, and that political excesses will only compound our difficulties, creating the impression of a generally unhealthy situation in Korea.

h. As an over-all consideration, complete coordination of action and statements regarding Korea must be effected within the United States Government. (For example, the recent unilateral action on the part of the Atomic Energy Commission in announcing that it was granting $350,000 to the Republic of Korea in connection with its atomic energy program was anything but helpful. Specific attention should be given to avoiding any action or public statement which President Rhee and the Liberal Party might construe and use publicly as supporting their position.)

5. Conclusion.

The alternatives before us are not happy ones. To oppose the Liberal Party is to risk President Rhee’s violent displeasure, with the consequences which may flow therefrom. But to adopt a passive role will mean that we must face a constantly deteriorating situation leading almost certainly to civil turmoil–a situation which the Communists will be quick to exploit.

Moreover, if we move positively, we shall have the support, for what it may be worth, of a majority of the Korean people. And while President Rhee is not wholly predictable, he has a wide streak of political realism. He has, for instance, been careful not to become personally involved as yet in the Liberal Party actions against the opposition, thus leaving a comfortable avenue for retreat. I believe there is reasonable hope that if we move firmly but discreetly, avoiding polemics against him or the ROK Government, we can eventually persuade him to a safer and wiser course than that upon which the Liberal Party now seems determined to launch him.³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1–2459. Secret.
1. Apparent reference to the Agreed Minute of Understanding signed on November 17, 1954.
2. See Footnote 2, Document 265.
3. Robertson sent this memorandum to the Secretary on January 24 under cover of a memorandum in which he recommended Dowling’s analysis as “thoughtful and thought-provoking.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1–2459) Dulles returned a note to Robertson on January 27 that reads: “Time has not permitted me to study Mr. Dowling’s memorandum in full. I have, however, glanced at the courses of action which he suggests. These appear to me to be within the limits of established policy. I suggest therefore that you put them into effect, subject to the agreement of the other interested officers such as Mr. Macomber, Mr. Berding and Mr. Dillon for those aspects of concern to them. As regards the cooperation of other Departments, you might consider using the OCB mechanism to achieve the desirable degree of coordination.” Dulles added the handwritten observation: “It seems a bit on the ‘tough’ side.” (ibid.) See Supplement. In response to Dulles’ suggestion, Herter circulated a memorandum on February 16 to the members of the OCB and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce in which he outlined the political problems in Korea as requiring the attention of the Board and the close coordination of the interested agencies in Korea. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/2–1859) See Supplement.