281. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State0
197. Deptels 1711 and 1722 and Embtel 186.3 If MAP and DS aid levels indicated reftels are most that can be expected for support military and economic programs here during coming year, I think conclusion is inescapable that further reduction ROK forces has become matter urgent necessity. Not only amount several serious deficiencies anticipated MAP for 1960, as detailed below, but anticipated local currency support for military program falls short of what both ROK and US military authorities consider minimum required. Overly optimistic tax and counterpart estimates contained in ROKG 1960 budget make it problematical whether defense budget now before National Assembly, which already deficient in certain critical areas, can be fully supported. In light growing counterpart shortage, Country Team has already agreed no new economic project requiring counterpart financing can be undertaken during CY 1961 and allocation for military budget support 1960 must be reduced from 53 to 50 billion hwan. Even this reduced figure for military budget support is now questionable in light deeper cut in DS program than CT had assumed in estimating counterpart availabilities.
In view these circumstances, I believe that, rather than try to hold on to force level which appears to be larger than our combined resources can maintain adequately and which almost certainly will have to be reduced sooner or later, we should be using available resources to develop and maintain somewhat smaller force with increased fire-power. I recommend, therefore, that Washington agencies, as matter of urgency, [Page 583] reach some conclusion on question of force level we are willing and able to support in Korea over next several years and that our MAP resources for 1960 and beyond be devoted to that end. We cannot afford to postpone this decision any longer.
Political and psychological reaction to program outlined Deptel 172 is certain to be one of profound disappointment. ROK military leaders (Embtel 161)4 have already expressed concern over “lagging” US interest in defense of Korea and are worried about possibility deterioration and stagnation ROK forces. This concern will be reenforced by indicated cutback in MAP and counterpart support. We cannot expect ROK forces to maintain high morale, state of alertness and training standards if cutback in MAP and counterpart support requires maintenance forces at bare subistence level or less.
Military leaders are likely be particularly disappointed and discouraged by lack of progress in force improvement and modernization which will add to their fear of “being left behind” and forgotten. Official government reaction undoubtedly will be critical and we can expect statements in government controlled press to effect defenses this critical area being weakened in face Communist buildup and US being taken in by Russia’s pretensions of peaceful goals. I do not expect, however, that adverse reaction will have any serious effect on our basic relationships. On positive side, reduced MAP will have sobering effect on ROKG and military and may result in intensification efforts to improve control procedures over MAP equipment and supplies.
If US decides that further reduction ROK forces is necessary, reaction on part ROK military leader and government would be one of strong opposition. As Dept aware, President Rhee is insistent on need maintain present level forces. Although number of military and government leaders are increasingly aware of problems outlined above, and are tending to look to modernization of smaller force as answer, we must expect them fully to support Rhee’s position. If, therefore, US decides force reduction is advisable, we can expect long and frustrating negotiations to ensue. On other hand if ROKs become convinced that alternatives are between austere maintenance of present force–with possibility of gradual deterioration–and modernization of somewhat smaller force, their reluctant choice will almost certainly be latter alternative. In working toward this objective, I think MAP should be designed to meet maintenance and training requirements of force level which U.S. Government thinks is appropriate for Korea and that we inform ROKG of this and offer to provide certain modern arms and equipment [Page 584] only if and when ROK actually begins to reduce forces to that level. Military member CI assesses impact tentative FY 1960 MAP, outlined Deptel 172, as follows:
“Reduction of FY 60 Military Assistance Program to approximately 129 million dollars severely retards scheduled development of ROK self-defense capability. Resultant delay in force improvement and modernization will extend period of continuing U.S. military aid if our objective of strong, responsive and modern ROK military structure is to be accomplished. ROK military services are now adequately organized and trained to initiate planned force improvement and modernization.
“Comment upon impact of specific reductions by category follows:
“Nine naval vessels deleted from program include cargo and personnel transport; one destroyer escort; and five mine sweep craft. Effect on ROK naval modernization is evident.
“In category of tanks, other vehicles and weapons, only limited anti-tank defense improvement is provided by replacement 106mm recoilless rifle. Over 500 tanks were eliminated. As regards ammunition, planned expenditure limited mainly to major antitank weapons and practice bombs.
“Most critical impact is in area air defense. Though 25 Sidewinder launching systems and their accompanying missiles remain in program, very important surface to air missile systems have been eliminated, along with thirteen F86 fighter aircraft. Existing air defense capability is woefully weak in face of strong North Korean Air Force capability and threat.
“In view limited FY 60 MAP funds, deviation from present tentative program is required to maintain balanced military development. It is imperative that surface to air missile capability be provided to protect existing combat potential. Necessity of modifying present ROK personnel policy to encourage career NCO’s and technicians, long in-training requirement for SAM equipment, construction lead time and related land procurement, all require immediate beginning as regards afore-mentioned balance. Consequently reclama for deleted SAM capability has been submitted through military channels even though its approval and funding would require deletion practically all other force improvement. In view limited FY 60 MAP funds for Korea, it is important that necessary human subsistence required for ROK force ration supplements be furnished from outside the 129 million dollar tentative MAP ceiling.”
End PROVMAAG-K comments.
Deficiencies indicated above are considered high priority and, to extent possible, CT considers it in U.S. interest to restore deleted items to program, with exception, on my part, re SAM capability and other major [Page 585] force modernization. My personal recommendation would be that missiles, as well as all force modernization, should be withheld pending agreement with ROK on force levels.
To sum up, my view is that if U.S. is unable provide more adequately for maintenance and force improvement of present 630,000 man force than is indicated by reftels and therefore decides to support smaller and more modernized force, MAP should at once be adjusted to reflect this decision by reducing funds for force maintenance and training and increasing funds for force improvement and modernization along lines suggested above. Such a shift of emphasis, however, would not reduce total program requirements, and I feel strongly that MAP must be maintained at sufficient levels to provide requisite force improvements and modernization.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5–MSP/9–1559. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections.↩
- In telegram 171 to Seoul, September 5, the Department of State indicated that the Department of Defense had submitted for advance review a tentative MAP for FY 1960. The program was based upon congressional authorization of $1.4 billion, and the Department noted that Congress was unlikely to authorize the full amount. The Embassy was asked to comment on the specific implications of the program for Korea, as outlined in the next numbered telegram. (Ibid., 790.5–MSP/9–559) See Supplement.↩
- In telegram 172 to Seoul, September 5, the Department of State outlined the implications for Korea of the projected FY 1960 MAP. The telegram broke down projected totals for MAP by category, noted that Defense had indicated that the program envisaged no modernization, and concluded that maintenance of existing Korean force levels and equipment would be possible only on an “austere” basis. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5–MSP/9–559) See Supplement.↩
- In telegram 186 from Seoul, September 12, the Korean Country Team provided an interim reply to telegrams 171 and 172 to Seoul. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5–MSP/9–1259) See Supplement.↩
- Dated September 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 102.202/9–559) See Supplement.↩