Office of the Historian

305. Memorandum for the Files by the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) and the Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs (Chapman)1

Washington, December 18, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • SEA Recommendations on Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 6 of Vientiane’s Telegram 1300, Nov. 8, 19592

We carefully studied the above-noted paragraphs and concluded as of mid-December that no further action by the Department was necessary with respect to these paragraphs. The following points were considered:

1.
Ambassador stated we should ensure that no impression of dichotomy in US policy continued. Our 1051 of November 13,3 as well as instructions conveyed through other channels, stated our agreement with this and made recommendations on methods of dissipating any such impression.
2.
The Embassy recommended that we make it unmistakably clear to Phoui and the CDNI that the US government had no intention of supporting an unconstitutional authoritarian government established under CDNI control by coup or Royal decree. The above-noted communications authorized the Ambassador to make clear the US Government position on this point and the Ambassador in a series of telegrams reported in some detail on the manner in which he had acted on this authorization by discussions with leading RLG political and military figures. We learned that the Prime Minister obtained the King’s approval of an all LHL Cabinet. While the possibilities existed that dissatisfaction of the Army, the CDNI and the King with this Cabinet could inspire a coup, it seemed clear that these elements knew that the US would be strongly opposed to it. Under the circumstances it did not appear that we needed to address any further instructions to the Ambassador on this point, unless future developments indicate some additional scope where US action in the rapidly changing Lao political situation became necessary.
3.
The Ambassador recommended that we make it clear to Phoui and the CDNI that the apparent failure of the CDNI to cooperate in implementing Phoui’s reform program raised serious doubt as to the probity, wisdom and sincerity of CDNI aims. We thought this not entirely justified and did not consider that we should authorize the Ambassador to make such a statement at that juncture.
4.
The Ambassador stated that the CDNI must be persuaded really to try to make the conservative front government work and that only if we could obtain without further delay their cooperation in trying to make the government work effectively until an election could safely be held could we justify continued insistence that the CDNI remain in the government. We recommended an approach whereby the Ambassador could endeavor to ensure such cooperation by the CDNI. Events which led up to the formation of an all LHL Cabinet apparently overtook that recommendation on which the Ambassador presumably did not have an appropriate opportunity to act.
5.
The Ambassador recommended that the CDNI must be made to realize that under no circumstances would the US accept or support any government established by them through the use of force. We repeatedly emphasized (in our telegrams Nos. 1051, 1095, 991)4 the importance of unity and constitutionality. It should be clear from this that the US would be strongly opposed to the concept of establishing a government through the use of force.
6.
The Ambassador recommended that we authorize the Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to make Phoui recognize he must assume stronger leadership and instill discipline in his government. We gave such authorization in several messages including those referred to in paragraph 5 above. It seemed fairly clear moreover that Phoui had been doing his best in this respect.
7.
Ambassador stated that only a confident Phoui fully supported by us and other friendly powers could prevent Laos from falling. The confident Phoui seemed to have emerged and as a matter of fact, we seemed to face the problem of whether Phoui might not have become too confident of his power and ability to overcome all domestic opposition.
8.

Conclusion:

In so far as we have considered it advisable, we supported recommendations made by the Ambassador in paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 6 of 1300. Events were moving so rapidly in Laos that no further action based specifically on 1300 seemed necessary or desirable.

  • DA
  • CC
  1. Source: Department of State, EA (Laos) Files: Lot 68 D 77, Laos 1959. Top Secret.↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 288.↩
  3. Document 292.↩
  4. Documents 295 and 285.↩