Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, November 5, 1959—1:53 p.m.

991. Suddenness of Phoui’s departure deprived Department of opportunity for full and frank discussion with him and his party, for which careful preparation had been made. Parsons had intended to present to Phoui and Khampan Panya together a rather full exposition of our concept of those factors which vitally bear on posture we believe Laos should in its own best interest try to maintain.

You should seek early opportunity to talk to Phoui preferably in presence of Khamphan Panya (because of suspicion which seems to exist between them) and tell him that Department had asked you to outline in considerable detail some of subjects which would have been discussed with him here had not circumstances prevented. Such a session with him now appears of even greater importance in view of proposed early visit of Secretary General UN. This will be an occasion when Phoui will have full opportunity to set forth to very important ears many of the principles basic to the posture of Laos at this critical juncture.

The fundamental starting point in our concept is Laos’ primary needs for peace, security, stability and unity. Factors which contribute to the achievement of these goals may be divided into external and internal, but all due attention to them is, in our opinion, very important if Laos is to receive that measure of sympathy and support from its friends, of whom we believe we head the list, and to parry the thrusts from others in the international family who may not be always sympathetic with the problems which the leaders of Laos face.

External

1. The United Nations should continue to provide a mechanism whereby world opinion favorable to the cause of Laos can be quickly marshaled. We believe that actions this past summer, and the extraordinary steps which the UN has taken favorable to the interests of Laos, should engender confidence in the UN and the SYG, and urge RLG to provide an atmosphere making it as easy as possible for the UN to continue to provide this vital assistance.

2. SEATO had made manifest its readiness to intervene if necessary. Evidence of this support, however, should remain in the background, not allowing SEATO support in any way to embarrass current efforts of UN representatives. Phoui is, of course, fully aware of the continuing strong support of the US to the RLG, both directly and through the medium of these two organizations, resulting in maximum support for Lao interests. It is imperative that any contemplated resort to SEATO be coordinated in advance, especially with the US, if risk of unexpected or unfavorable developments from Lao viewpoint is to be avoided. We would like firm assurances on this.

3. It is highly important that Laos maintain the sympathy and support of Asian countries, such as India, as well as friendly signatories of the Geneva Agreement. Laos should therefore make it known from time to time that its policy is one bespeaking neutrality. Statements can be recast along lines Feb. 17 [11], 1959 Declaration.² While Laos has been correct in our opinion in maintaining its position on the Geneva Agreement, it is important in its actions not to appear to violate the spirit of that accord. Phoui’s statement in Paris seems to have been very appropriate.

4. The United States is prepared to continue giving Laos aid subject of course to Congressional limitations and bearing in mind the likelihood there will be a decline in our worldwide aid programs. Lao needs and requirements are large. Therefore in view of the increasing limitations imposed on United States aid, RLG should seek aid from other friendly powers and from the UN. It should also be mindful of factors bearing on US Congressional and popular attitudes toward aid.

5. While showing appropriate determination to protect their country and using their full resources vigorously to repel any intrusion, Lao should continually make it crystal clear that they have no ambition but to live at peace avoiding provocation and anything that could be interpreted by their neighbors as inflammatory.

Internal

6. Internal unity must be the watchword. Political stability can only be assured by close, loyal cooperation among anti-Communist elements represented by the RLP, CDNI and the Army. We have been most encouraged by the unity displayed during the crisis and hope it will be maintained at all costs. Bickering over nonessentials or allowing unimportant issues to bring about political division or actions by any elements not motivated by dedication to national survival could have very damaging effect on Laos’ position abroad and ability its friends to help.

7. We recognize that strong leadership must take firm stands and utilize some extraordinary means during times of crisis to maintain security. However the maintenance of constitutional and parliamentary principles must not be cavalierly ignored but should continue to be honored. The abandonment of these principles could open the way to an uncharted future which might encourage an adventurous course of government by decree, with no limitations on its power.

8. This may be an appropriate point at which to discuss the trials of the dissident leaders. While RLG are certainly right in taking measures to prevent disloyal sabotage from within, actions of this nature need to be carefully timed so as not to react unfavorably on cause of Laos in the outside world and, when such action is taken, should be done with utmost regard for proper procedures of law and rights of the accused. We have been disturbed for instance by reports that the defense counsel has not had proper opportunity to interview their clients. In taking strong action of this nature on what would seem to be purely domestic issues, repercussions in outside world can not be ignored.

9. Minorities within Laos, as recent events have proved, live in crucial areas and special efforts should be put forward to orient them toward RLG, taking measures to attract their loyalty, if the nation is to be preserved. Attitudes and action, not intentions or vague planning, are key to progress in this field.

10. Training of FAL should proceed as rapidly as possible in order to render these forces capable of countering purely internal subversion and forcing Vietminh dissidents to the surface and abandoning their intervention.

Conclusion

You may in your discretion tell Phoui privately that we continue to have full confidence in him. He raised the question at the airport as to whether or not he might resign in view of King’s death. We see no constitutional reason why he should do so and, in view of great contribution he has made and is making, we believe he should hold on to helm. We are naturally concerned about Phoui’s health and would like to be helpful in every possible way. (FYI. We are obtaining medical record from Walter Reed and plan to consult Dr. DeVault about it. End FYI. Meanwhile give us your assessment of local American doctor’s qualifications for being helpful to Prime Minister.)

Above outline sets forth in rudimentary form much of what we would have liked to say to Phoui here and which we hope you will have opportunity to express. It is to be recognized that this kind of counsel is a little unusual in ordinary international usage, but we believe it may be justified in view of what is at stake, considering conditions in Laos and the special relations which exist between us.

No objection to outlining this concept to King Savang if you so desire.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–559. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Steeves and Chapman and approved by SEA (Usher and Anderson), Wilcox, and Parsons. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Bangkok, London, Paris, and USUN.
2. See footnote 2, Document 213.