Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, November 13, 1959—8:12 p.m.

1051. 1. Given clear and present danger to independence of Laos, Department considers it imperative to maintain stability of government, unity of patriotic elements, continuity of national purpose and direction. Whatever causes instability, division, diversion from overriding security problem directly threatens survival of country. Compared to need of re-establishing security and government’s authority throughout country, all else is of small moment. If CDNI and LHL fall to quarreling at this juncture, world will note that patriotic elements have lost sense of national urgency so widely proclaimed during past weeks and little sympathize when victor of quarrel emerges to find countryside lost to rebels.

2. In order to maintain stability, unity and continuity, Department believes national interests of Laos dictate that:

a) Elections be deferred until at least December 1960. Security conditions appear to preclude a campaign this spring and such a campaign would divide CDNI and LHL and dangerously absorb energies of RLG at time when they should be devoted to re-establishing peace and security and gaining loyalty of all villagers.

b) A National Congress be convened to vote year extension of Assembly. Value of formal parliamentary framework even though emptied of substance by special powers resides in fact it does provide political institution to carry out political processes in orderly fashion. Abandonment this framework would lead to confused situation in which groups and individuals would be impelled to jockey for positions. Discord and disunity among patriotic elements would be result.

(c) Congress might also vote amendments to present constitution aimed at giving government greater stability by strengthening Executive and reducing Assembly’s powers. Department fully recognizes need for stability as did Phoui when he requested special powers, although it not clear how far Phoui considers shift of power should be carried out. CDNI furthermore has evidently deep-seated understandable feeling on subject though it should realize term “guided democracy” carries serious political implications in eyes of world. Department most interested know what precisely Phoui and CDNI have in mind but hopes that while agreeing on principle they not find constitutional change another issue to divide them. In any case Department believes objective can be better achieved by amending present constitution than writing entirely new text which Department understands is being considered. Scrapping constitutions sets dangerous precedent for future.

(d) RLG should continue comprise present groups LHL, CDNI, Army though changes individual members might be effected to strengthen cabinet. We maintain our confidence in Phoui but consider he must exercise his leadership with greater force and clarity, notably by taking CDNI more into his confidence, discussing issues with them and making effort overcome lack of communication between individuals and groups which has plagued Lao political scene. FYI: Your conversations with Phoui give rise to impression here of man who is tired, depressed by number of problems confronting him and using US channels to achieve his purposes. While we consider his health of great importance to enable him carry on his burdens of office and therefore sympathize with present fatigue, we also consider he should be made to face necessity of working directly with CDNI in order promote Lao unity under his leadership. End FYI.

3. You should impart all of above to Phoui, CDNI and if possible to King in manner you consider most effective.² In this connection believe you should seek develop even closer personal contacts with CDNI, LHL and King. In order avoid impression of dichotomy in US policy it essential Ambassador act as US spokesman to all factions.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-135’9. Secret. Drafted by Chapman; cleared with Usher, Anderson, and Steeves; and approved by Parsons. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Smith’s discussion with Phoui as instructed is reported in telegram 1383 from Vientiane, November 19. Phoui promised to lay the groundwork for a policy in Laos in accordance with the Department’s suggestions. (ibid., 751J.00/11–1959) In telegram 1416 from Vientiane, November 20, Smith reported a discussion with Phoumi in which he made the same points. While agreeing with the need for stability and continuity in Laos, Phoumi believed that Phoui’s present government was ineffectual and suggested formation of a new government with Phoui as its head. (ibid., 751J.00/11–2059) In telegram 1382 from Vientiane, November 18, Smith reported a discussion with Khamphan Panya in which he made the points as instructed. Khamphan Panya responded that the fault lay not with the CDNI, but the LHL. Smith concluded that the Foreign Minister intended to follow a policy aimed at securing for the CDNI complete political control of Laos. (ibid., 75 1J.00/11–1859) These telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement.