Office of the Historian

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, December 19, 1959—7:12 p.m.

1274. As we read your recent messages such as CDNI Communiqué (your 1674)2 and attempt to assess significance of recent political developments, especially recent formation of LHL Cabinet by Phoui certain questions come to mind. We would appreciate your response3 within 24 hours of receipt of this message giving us your best personal judgment re following questions and possible actions regard thereto. Because of delicacy of sitaution Dept leaves to your discretion whether consult your own immediate Embassy Staff but requests you to give no hint this evaluation is in progress either in your country team discussions or most particularly in contacts with any Lao:

1.
Is it not likely that CDNI and FAL (perhaps abetted by King) either as individuals or groupings may not take recent action lying down but may soon retaliate with political maneuver or some form of coup tactic?
2.
If this assumption sound, do you think King may be party to plan? How do you explain his calm acquiesence to new Cabinet composed largely of Deputies he despises (your 1578)4 unless he had plan to remove it in near future perhaps in accordance his and CDNI interpretation of Constitution?
3.
Do you think Phoui himself may have loaded dice by setting up obvious weak shell of Cabinet to invite Royal intervention after December 25 either with his own future participation or without?
4.
In view fact CDNI and FAL contain elements of future strength we cannot and should not disregard, do you believe our best role may be to stand discreetly aloof and let nature take course in order preserve our influence and freedom of action?
5.
Alternatively do you feel some strong appeal should be made to King to ensure he will not condone action such as violence to eradicate NLHX prisoners which would gravely damage Laos international position and might provoke Sino-Soviet bloc reaction?
6.
Would it be in our interest and consonant with para 1, Embtel [Deptel] 10515 if King were to resolve impasse by orderly Royal intervention under constitution resulting in government more or less representative all anti-Communist groups?
7.

If appeal to Crown deemed advisable what could we do to strengthen your hand and make U.S. position clear and acceptable? Following choices might apply:

a.
Special written message from Washington to King for you to deliver without prior consultation with anyone.
b.
Special emissary to Laos to lend force of new approach accompanied with appropriate drama.
c.
Bring you home or outside Laos to some rendezvous to receive special orders.

Realize this tough order to fulfill but would appreciate your prompt reply.

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1959. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Parsons and Steeves, cleared with SEA and Dillon, and approved by Parsons.↩
  2. In telegram 1674, December 17, the Embassy transmitted a translation of a CDNI communiqué which presented legal and constitutional reasons that the mandate of the present legislature would expire on December 25, that the convocation of the special National Assembly on December 17 was illegal, and that the power to form a new government should revert to the King after December 25. (ibid., 751J.00/12–1759; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  3. Infra.↩
  4. See Document 301.↩
  5. Document 292.↩