295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
1095. For Ambassador from Parsons. Embtel 1300.2 I am sure you appreciate that comprehensive character reftel made prompt analysis and response quite impossible. While subsequent telegrams back and forth on individual issues have provided you with some of our action and thinking on the many problems you face in Laos, I should like to direct this personal message to reftel.
Complete response your lengthy message even now impossible, therefore treat this as partial and interim reply. Additional telegram treating specific economic and aid questions will follow.3 In addition personal letter being mailed within few days.4 Consideration being given to problems you raise by top level of US agencies concerned and these matters will receive continuing intensive attention. On economic aid front Acting ICA Director Saccio planning spend several days Vientiane to review with you and Tobler all the questions that field.
While those of us who have been intimately associated with peculiar problems which Laos presents can fully appreciate frustrations which develop from inability produce desired results, believe it worth-while observing that lack of complete achievement of goals we have set out to reach is continuing manifestation of complexity over-all problem which Laos presents. We must remember that although conditions in Laos were difficult enough and unique as compared with any other problem we face, situation has become further involved by the actions of the NLHX abetted by communist neighbors in events of this summer and fall which brought whole matter to attention of UN. These added difficulties in Department’s opinion do not mean that all we have planned and set in motion for the eventual stabilization of the situation in Laos had been ill conceived or worthy of abandonment merely because it has not met our full expectations. Criticism of entire military and economic aid program by Tobler to which you gave your support in reftel is in our view sweeping, imprecisely stated and therefore extremely difficult to assess. If Department were to accept this wholesale indictment our entire effort to date, great embarrassment [Page 676] would face us in moving forward on many aspects current programs inaugurated result careful and laborious effort agreed to by many Departments USG.
For various reasons but particularly because of international consequences I cannot accept thesis that we should prepare the ground for informing American people of failure of our mission in Laos. Our stance must be quite the contrary, soliciting domestic support, cooperation and understanding of unique and difficult problems which can not possibly be solved quickly but require instead tenacious and unremitting effort view importance area to US interests.
PEO Training Program. We are just now approving, belatedly, augmentation of PEO personnel from 66 to 106. This has required coordination and interaction, stemming from your recommendations, staff work at CINCPAC, Defense and State. In addition to inter-Departmental USG action general agreement on the concept of the training program was reached in our discussions with French in Paris. Progress reports to date while not glowing had at least been encouraging. To revise totally this program or produce substitute would in our opinion be practical impossibility. Remedial efforts and improvements certainly are required but we cannot accept characterization as “built on quicksand” and “programming for failure” as justifiable estimate.
We are currently involved especially this time of year in devising plans and techniques for the improvement and support of economic aid to Laos. Lack of progress is of course chargeable to Lao lack of experience, non-existence proper institutions, internal insecurity, which have required “crash” approaches. Monetary reform was carefully considered step. Other expert opinion would not label it as failure. If we are to do anything constructive in bringing gradual order out of chaos we cannot write off efforts thus far as worthless and impossible. While Laos program has suffered ill effects of considerable criticism and admitted known deficiencies, it has kept Laos within orbit of free world. This has been accomplished despite the many handicaps including activities ICC, weakness of former neutralist government and venality of certain leaders. Recent crisis, resulting in added public and UN attention, may assist us in accomplishing objectives seemingly impossible in quieter days.
If there has been seeming dichotomy of US policy vis-à-vis Laos, Department of course shares your concern and believes you and your staff should make maximum effort eliminate this impression. To do so believe as stated Deptel 10515 you should act as spokesman for US policy to all factions: King, Phoui, LHL, CDNI and Army. You should confine [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operational relationships [Page 677] with CDNI to appropriate operational measures fully coordinated by you, providing whatever active encouragement they give them within framework of policy.
We have viewed emergence CDNI as political pressure group with favor and welcome inclusion its members in cabinet. We believe CDNI has played highly useful role to date despite fact we would have preferred its taking more measured view on number of issues. We consider emergence CDNI to its present position as indicative political evolution now in progress in Laos. Believe younger CDNI with apparent support of crown is in ascendancy and that while Phoui and older politicians play most important and indispensable part at present CDNI represents vital future asset. To eliminate our support this organization now would result in serious loss of confidence in US among Lao. Although difficulties of handling CDNI fully appreciated believe such difficulties inherent in manipulating any power group.
At same time we also hold that Phoui only Lao political figure at present able to unite all factions under his leadership. While we must recognize he probably not dynamic leader but astute politician we nevertheless believe he could make greater effort speak directly with CDNI to make his views clear before issue is joined on a particular question. For instance we wonder how much confrontation of opinions there has been between him and other members cabinet both LHL and CDNI on constitutional revisions. Yet indications are that subject will be considered very soon in connection with extension of Assembly’s mandate and timing of elections and may be new source of friction. In meantime we get impression he seeking manipulate all elements favorable to him and may even view you in this context.
Friction between younger and older groups appears inevitable. Seems inherent in situation that as younger elements gain greater power such gains will be at expense older men. Therefore US must seek continually reduce this friction to minimum by encouraging all patriotic elements discuss their problems among themselves and work together in greater interest of country. Finally Laos dependent in unique degree on what happens outside Laos, i.e., US support, reactions Geneva powers, UN and bloc activities and every internal act has its external consequence fateful for Laos. This is fact which should be starting point calculations all who wield power in Laos if they are true patriots.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–359. Top Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Chapman and Steeves; cleared with Anderson, Usher, Saccio, Bell, and Dillon; and approved by Parsons.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 288.↩
- Not found.↩
- Document 298.↩
- Document 292.↩