Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

257. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 4, 1959, 4:30 p.m.¹

Washington, September 4, 1959, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Department of State–CIA–Department of Defense–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting on Laos, 4:30 p.m., September 4, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• The Acting Secretary
  • S—Mr. Scranton
  • U—Mr. Brewster
  • M—Mr. Murphy
  • M—Mr. Isham
  • NEA—Mr. Jones
  • NEA—Mr. Ludlow
  • IO—Mr. Wilcox
  • UNP—Mr. Sisco
  • FE—Mr. Parsons
  • FE—Mr. Green
  • FE—Mr. Jenkins
  • FE (SEATO)—Mr. Emmons
  • SEA—Mr. Anderson
  • SEA—Mr. Chapman
  • SEA—Mr. Askew
  • H—Mr. Macomber
  • INR—Mr. Cumming
  • INR—Mr. Armstrong
• OSD/ISA
  • Mr. Knight
  • Adm. O’Donnell
  • Col. Bingham
• JCS
  • Admiral Burke
  • Col. Rowney
  • Col. Butler
  • Cdr. Busik
  • Lt. Inman
• CIA
  • Gen. Cabell

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

Mr. Murphy opened the meeting by saying he thought it advisable for those assembled to agree on certain lines of action with respect to the deteriorating situation in Laos. He said there was to be a meeting at six of the SEATO ambassadors in Washington² to acquaint them with the situation in Laos and to stimulate a Thai request for an emergency meeting of SEATO with the thought that SEATO might send a team or teams of fact-finders to Laos. We hoped for some publicity with respect to SEATO action for impact on public opinion and especially on area opinion. The Australians particularly seemed apathetic in regard to SEATO action, and clearly indicated that they preferred UN action. The UK attitude was similar, as was presumably that of New Zealand.³ The thought was that SEATO fact-finders could be sent without conflicting with UN action. If SEATO was to be more than a paper tiger, it must show activity. It was not clear whether the Lao had yet made an appeal to SEATO.

Mr. Parsons said that a cable had been sent in an attempt to forestall the Lao appeal to SEATO.⁴ The Lao had, however, seen fit to appeal to the UN today without consultation with the U.S., the UK, or France. We felt that at the present a satisfactory presentation of the Lao appeal could not be made to the Security Council because we did not have hard facts on Vietminh participation in the fighting.

Mr. Wilcox said that Cordier had telephoned the SYG in Sao Paulo. The SYG hopes to return on Saturday, September 5. He probably will want to call a meeting of the Security Council under his own authority. He is sensitive about criticism in the press that he left New York in a time of crisis.

Mr. Murphy observed that a recent message had reported the Lao foreign minister as frankly saying that Lao appeals to the UN and to SEATO would be used as a cover for the real Lao objective of requesting U.S. intervention.⁵ Before this remark, there was some discussion of physical proof of Vietnamese intervention with a statement by Mr. Murphy that no information had been received sufficient to make a clear case for the Lao contention. He therefore felt that the Lao appeal to the UN may be premature but that we must do the best we can. He indicated his preference for an Asian-inspired SEATO approach which would be more in line with our policy of using regional organizations where possible; in this context he referred to the Guatemala situation.

(At this point the Acting Secretary came in.)

Mr. Murphy noted that Ambassador Smith at Vientiane had recommended that the U.S. dispatch troops to guard the centers of government in Laos, planes for transporting the Lao armed forces, and medical facilities and personnel with helicopters.⁶ Mr. Murphy mentioned that this is the first recommendation for U.S. military intervention of this type.

Mr. Dillon said that the President preferred not to return on Sunday and was now scheduled to return Tuesday morning.⁷

Mr. Dillon said it was important to keep Congressional leaders informed. They were greatly interested in the situation.

Mr. Wilcox said he believed UN observers would be preferable to SEATO observers because the latter would not carry as much weight in New York as the former, Mr. Dillon said it was important to have SEATO observers, or rather fact-finders, in that they could stimulate SEATO interest and action through their findings. He saw no conflict between SEATO and UN action of this sort. It was partly a question of SEATO’s being able to act quicker.

Mr. Murphy questioned whether there could be early UN action even if the Security Council met on Sunday in view of the likely Soviet veto. Mr. Sisco said IO thought they had a formula whereby the Soviet veto could be overridden. He said that under Article 29 of the Charter a subsidiary organ of the Security Council could be created which would not be subject to the veto. Mr. Sisco said that if the military situation were really serious then SEATO should act, but if it is a question of observers, he felt the UN could act as rapidly as SEATO and have more world opinion support. Mr. Sisco then explained the mechanics of creating the subsidiary organ under Article 29, where the veto does not apply.

Mr. Murphy said we should be careful to call the SEATO team “fact-finders” and to steer away from the term “observers.” He thought the combined impact of UN observers and SEATO fact-finders might be useful.

Admiral Burke expressed the opinion that the Lao military situation may deteriorate very rapidly and questioned whether SEATO would be ready to act quickly with armed forces. Mr. Murphy then referred to the forthcoming emergency meeting of SEATO Council representatives, but did not know how far SEATO would be prepared to go. Admiral Burke reiterated his belief that someone may have to move in fast. The Thai, he continued, might be the best candidates for this action.

Mr. Murphy observed that if outside forces were put in now, the red Chinese or at least North Vietnam would probably enter Laos in force. Timing was important.

Mr. Green asked whether CINCPAC could not be authorized to take certain moves now. Admiral Burke replied that CINCPAC had as yet taken no action, but in a reply to a question from Mr. Murphy, stated that CINCPAC could put into effect its Operations Plan within four days. Mr. Green stated there might be some advantage in certain limited moves on the part of CINCPAC, and Admiral Burke agreed. In reply to a question from Mr. Dillon, Admiral Burke suggested such moves should consist of: 1) Augmentation of U.S. training operations in Laos; 2) establishment of a regular MAAG in Laos; and 3) assembling forces and transport facilities in Okinawa in readiness to move rapidly. The fleet was already on the alert, but had not moved yet. Elements of the Seventh Fleet could be sent to the South China Sea. It was observed that the airfield at Seno was barely able to take C–130’s. Mr. Murphy observed that some of these moves on the part of CINCPAC might be advantageous, and Mr. Dillon agreed but believed the moves should not be too strong and should not include actual loading of troops.

Mr. Wilcox thought that if we rattled sabres now it might adversely affect UN opinion just when the Security Council was considering the situation. Mr. Murphy acknowledged this, but said that some were not taking this situation seriously and some overt preparations would seem to be in order.

Admiral Burke said that most C–130’s were in Japan but some were in Okinawa. He cautioned that if our own troops were sent to Laos, they would have to have large-scale logistical support fast. This would mean a great many drops, and it is a long way to Laos. The only thing our troops could do initially would be to hold the major government centers and let the Lao troops move out. SEATO and U.S. plans contemplate first holding the seats of government and then moving out. They do not at present contemplate holding Sam Neua, but if forces arrived in time they could, of course, go there.

Mr. Parsons cautioned that if Sam Neua is allowed to fall we would be back to the business of having two governments in Laos—one of them Communist.

Mr. Murphy raised the question of what we could do in Vietnam. Ambassador Durbrow had thrown cold water on the idea of using South Vietnam troops under circumstances existing a few days ago.⁸ Mr. Parsons mentioned that the intervention of GVN forces in Laos would be a most incendiary step, and the role of the GVN should be treated with much greater caution than that of the Thai government. Mr. Green then said that short of sending South Vietnamese troops into Laos the GVN might conduct amphibious exercises in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese are particularly sensitive about the vulnerability of their coast.

(A briefing on the military situation in Laos was given at this point, in which it was pointed out that a co-ordinated attack on four Lao posts had caused them to fall within six hours. The Lao said at the time that there were five enemy battalions involved, but our army attaché thought there were but three, which would mean some 1500 men. As of September 3 there were two columns moving on Sam Neua. This briefing was based primarily on US ARMA Vientiane reports CX 173 and 174.)⁹

Doubt was expressed as to whether the Lao could handle the situation if any more enemy troops were introduced. It was reported that the Lao were airlifting two battalions to Sam Neua, but there was a real question as to whether they could hold the city. General Cabell then stated that in the event of P-L assault and if the FAL succeeds in moving more personnel into the area as now proposed, it would mean the commitment of about 50% of the effective strength of FAL, leaving the rest of the country with extremely thin military cover. Mr. Murphy then referred to the absence of prisoners and other evidence of North Vietnam intervention and stated that such an assault should at least produce some hard evidence to support the Lao case. Admiral Burke, however, felt that if the FAL were defeated in Sam Neua there might very well be no opportunity to obtain further evidence.

In response to a question, [1 line of source text not declassified] but they had seven Lao radio teams, one in one of the towns overrun.

General Cabell observed the great lengths to which the Communists have gone to hide their intervention. Admiral Burke said that even if there were no Vietminh intervention, it might be that Laos could still be lost through pro-Communist insurgency. Mr. Murphy said if it were really a civil war it would be quite different from the way we are looking at it. General Cabell said the results, however, might be the same. Mr. Dillon said that SEATO can act in case of Communist subversion, which is another point in favor of considering SEATO.

Mr. Knight then asked how fast we could expect SEATO to move in the fact-finders, and Mr. Murphy said he thought it would be possible for SEATO fact-finders from Thailand to arrive on the scene within twenty-four hours. Mr. Dillon asserted that the main thing to do is to get a clear assessment of the situation and to bring the Australians, British, and others into agreement to take action.

General Cabell observed that morale in Laos was low and that the Lao seemed to be on the verge of panic. Now that they had appealed to the UN it was important that there be early visible action in order to prevent a collapse of Lao resistance.

Admiral Burke asked whether there was anything we could do to get away from the restrictions against uniforms for U.S. personnel in Laos. Mr. Parsons felt that if we did it would simply confirm the case the other side would be making in the UN. Mr. Knight in response to a question from Mr. Murphy said that the need to wear civilian clothes was a handicap in the training responsibilities.

It was noted that 28 additional personnel were being sent out to help in communications. Eighteen Seabees were also being sent, and the Seabees who have been there on TDY will be returning.

Admiral Burke observed that it was possible we might have to move over the weekend. It may be a question of CINCPAC having to execute its plan or witnessing the fall of Laos. He said the JCS and Defense would like to bring C–130’s to the loading fields, to load transports, and to move ships down. Nothing would be said publicly about these moves being connected with Laos. Mr. Dillon asked that these plans be put on paper so that we could have a look at them and approve them. (Such a paper was later received and approved in State.¹⁰ A Niact telegram was sent to the President requesting his approval of the proposed actions.)¹¹

Mr. Knight mentioned the problem of money. Actions taken or already contemplated would cost about $8,000,000. Mr. Murphy said we had thought it was $4,000,000 plus $1,000,000 allocated to CINCPAC.

Colonel Bingham stated that the augmentation program for the FAL and Auto-Defense was originally estimated at 3.8 million dollars, but that the $8,000,000 figure included other contemplated emergency actions.

Mr. Knight thought that in order to take the actions we needed to take now we should have available around $10,000,000. Mr. Dillon said he could not guarantee that the MAP could all come out of the contingency fund. He said, however, that we are faced with one of those situations where one must go ahead and do what must be done and then find the funding means.

Mr. Wilcox said that IO had just heard from New York that the SYG would call a meeting of the Security Council for Sunday or Monday, whichever we desired.¹² It was agreed we would prefer Monday at 3 p.m. Mr. Sisco said the British felt we should be talking with the Russians about the UN action. Mr. Murphy said it would be preferable for the British to talk with the Russians. They could better get across the idea that the Americans were agitated. Mr. Wilcox said that mention might be made of the Khrushchev visit. Mr. Dillon thought the level was important; it probably should not be done in New York.

Mr. Knight wondered whether the time had not come for us to release our people from some of the restrictions agreed upon in Paris concerning the training program. Mr. Parsons said particularly if we gain concrete indication of foreign intervention in Laos we might well take another look at this and talk with the French Embassy about it.

The meeting adjourned at 5:45 p.m.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–459. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jenkins and Askew.
2. Memorandum of a meeting, September 4, 6 p.m. (ibid., included in the microfiche supplement) See also Documents 39 and 40.
3. Presumably reported in telegram 313 from USUN, September 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–459)
4. Document 252.
5. See footnote 5, Document 253.
6. Document 253.
7. Eisenhower was vacationing in Scotland after completion of his trip to Bonn, London, and Paris.
8. In telegram 711 from Saigon, September 3, Ambassador Durbrow reported a conversation among himself, MAAG Chief Williams, and President Diem in which Diem showed the two Americans a formal request from Defense Minister Phoumi for South Vietnamese troop intervention and matériel support in Laos. Durbrow and Williams discouraged Diem from providing assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–359; included in the microfiche supplement) The Department of State concurred with Durbrow’s and Williams’ discouragement of South Vietnamese assistance to Laos. (Telegram 435 to Saigon, September 3; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–359)
9. Neither found, but see footnote 2, Document 253.
10. The paper was in the form of a memorandum from Burke to Irwin, September 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–459)
11. Infra.
12. Reported in telegram 315 from USUN, September 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–459)