Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, September 3, 1959—6 p.m.

518. CINCPAC for POLAD. For Murphy and Parsons. Manila also pass information MLG. Embtel 496,² CX–174.³ Following are initial observations and recommendations required by development latest Communist offensive north northeast Sam Neua province, reported reference telegrams and intervening telegrams.

Observations:

1. After repeated long and searching discussions with Heintges and ARMATT, have concluded, with their complete concurrence, that while FAL should be able to contain and perhaps later throw back and mop up enemy forces which have recently entered country from North Vietnam it obviously will not be able to do so if there are further incursions of the nature and size of the August 30 incursion.

2. It seems certain enough that further incursions into Lao territory by Communist-trained VM units will be too big for FAL to handle. Whatever their exact number, the DRV has the capability to infiltrate additional sizeable units composed of ethnic types, practically indistiguishable from similar tribesmen of Lao nationality, and therefore without incurring too much risk of providing proof of DRV intervention.

3. Thus without any overt abrupt change from present tactics, enemy can soon be in control of sizeable areas Laos cut off from RLG administration. As soon as enough Sam Neua province falls, assume next step would be set up rival “Lao Government” such areas by unjailed NLHX leaders to call on ChiComs or DRV for various kinds support and thus improve propaganda basis by attempting “legalize” intervention, and provide legal sounding group for Communist bloc to support in effort establish de facto return status similar that preceding October 1957.

4. Once this stage reached, in addition harmful psychological effects on RLG and populace as well other governments and peoples SEA and FE, problem reversion to status quo would be infinitely more difficult and expensive operation.

5. Loss of Sam Neua province might not automatically mark loss of major portion FAL mobile striking force. Nevertheless retreat over roadless mountainous terrain by then already occupied or strongly infiltrated by PL units, would presumably not be easy. Problem of emergency evacuation defending forces at Sam Neua airport and of supplying remaining FAL guerrilla operations roaming poor country populated largely by hostile villages, should flag significant possibility that Sam Neua theater may soon present second Dien Bien Phu tragedy, if tide not held. Continued battle for rest of Laos would automatically require foreign troop assistance, better given before than after disaster.

6. Therefore obvious time to attempt halt further outside aggression against RLG is now, and this only possible by forcing decision to halt on Communist leadership outside Laos.

Recommendations:

1. Most urgent consideration should be given to immediate issuance by US Government of warning that by permitting continued incursions of hostile elements into Laos DRV creating a situation which may force a major change in nature and magnitude US aid to Laos. Aspects such as who should issue warning, language to be employed, et cetera, need careful study but it should be made publicly in formal statement. However implemented, I believe (with full agreement country team), that such warning now needs be issued at earliest possible moment. It might be along following lines:

“The United States Government has repeatedly announced that it strongly supports the determination of the Royal Lao Government to resist Communist efforts to undermine the security and stability of Laos.

“The United States announced on August 26 that it would continue to support reasonable approaches to achieve a peaceful solution to the current situation in Laos but that the Communist bloc have posed their threat to Laos in terms that require adequate military and police countermeasures if that nation’s sovereignty is to be preserved.

“Nevertheless, on August 30 another major attack was launched from across the border of North Vietnam against the small Royal Lao army which had finally gathered enough reinforcements to start pushing back the earlier enemy salient which had extended from the North Vietnam border 50 miles into western Sam Neua province. Any further augmentation of the invading force or continued material support thereof will require a major change in the nature and magnitude of the Royal Lao Government’s need for support to resist Communist efforts to undermine the security and stability of Laos. By permitting continued incursions of hostile elements from its territory into Laos the DRV is creating a situation that may force a drastic revision of the heretofore limited nature and scope of United States military aid to Laos.”

2. In a rapidly deteriorating situation, the nature of US actions to [support?] the RLG should be determined both in the light of their immediate deterrent effect upon the DRV and of the extent to which those actions would be likely to command the support or at least acquiescence of our allies.

US action to support RLG whether announced in advance or not, might consist dispatch US military units to guard capitals of Luang Prabang and Vientiane and to Savannakhet in order relieve FAL battalions to engage in fighting interventionists. In addition US planes might be made available transport FAL units from rear to forward areas and carry out logistical support operations. Medical corps assistance, including helicopters, also appears advisable first-stage possibility.

3. (A) Simultaneously with public announcement suggested above recommend we inquire most urgently of French Government what forces it prepared to send. Department will recall Admiral Ortoli mentioned possibility immediate dispatch at least one crack French combat battalion to Laos as regular garrison to support FAL at Seno (Embtels 64 paragraph 3 and 70),⁴ or what support it prepared to give Laos in time to meet this overwhelming threat if RLG requests immediate assistance from France or SEATO or UN pointing out that while Prime Minister Phoui has expressed to me determination to meet the crisis with additional US monetary support already requested, the US Government anticipates that nothing but strongest international action will prevent Communists from taking over Laos and that we believe RLG bound to recognize this within a few days.

I believe we should indicate to French what we are prepared to do under paragraph 2 above if asked by RLG.

(B) Make same inquiry of British and inform them of our approach to French and what we are prepared to do if asked. Consult with them on possible immediate concurrent moves in unilateral military action, SEATO or UN action and in public announcements or diplomatic representation.

(C) Advise RLG of possibilities of actual US troop support if requested and still considered necessary by US.

4. Study and additional consultations should be begun soonest with view of ascertaining, how if at all, proposed course of action can be tied into SEATO framework. Embassy views in separate telegram.

5. Similarly, study and additional consultations should be begun soonest for aiding in development and support for possible RLG appeal to SC and GA action in UN.⁵ This also subject separate telegram.

Conclusion:

Obviously decision to issue warning and be prepared act if it disregarded one of immense gravity and responsibility. In submitting above recommendations, I am impelled deepest personal conviction that unless we draw line now, we will have to draw it later when Laos may be partially or wholly lost along with entire US position and prestige in SE Asia if not all Far East. Like Quemoy or Berlin, I think the time is now come when we have to take our stand.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–359. Secret; Niact. Also sent to CINCPAC and Seoul and repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Colombo, Hong Kong, Karachi, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Phnom Penh, Paris, Rangoon, Saigon, Singapore, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington. Received at 9:44 p.m.
2. In telegram 496, September 1, the Embassy passed to the Department a brief report that the Army Attaché received while in Sam Neua on September 1. This intelligence indicated that all four Lao army posts on the Nam Ma River of Sam Neua Province fell on August 30. (ibid., 751J.00/9–159; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Not found.
4. Telegram 64, dated July 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/7–1059) In telegram 70, July 10, Smith gave an optimistic appraisal of the future of French-Lao-U.S. relations based on discussions with French special representative Admiral Ortoli and Phoui. (ibid.) Both telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement.
5. In telegram 535 from Vientiane, September 4, Smith reported that the Lao Government was appealing to the United Nations for an “emergency force” under Article 1 of the U.N. Charter as well as similar assistance from SEATO. When Smith expressed surprise at the suddenness of the appeal and lack of consultation, Foreign Minister Kamphan Panya confided that these appeals were merely covers for a request to the United States, the most obvious and likely source for help. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–459; included in the microfiche supplement)