252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
387. Ambassador from Murphy and Parsons. Current U.S. countermeasures to help RLG preserve territorial integrity of Laos envisage that the Communists are probably probing and that the appropriate degree of response would be that which contains and discourages [Page 583] probing thrusts without broadening dimensions of military struggle. We have furthermore had to take into account attitudes of interested free world countries like UK, France and India, and have reckoned that a too prominent injection of U.S. into the Lao scene might have provocative aspects which might stir things up diplomatically and militarily.
However, latest fragmentary reports from Sam Neua sector2 denote a degree of undeniable DRV supported intervention that implies existence of a new situation possibly justifying abandonment of current ground rules and even intervention by friendly non RLG forces.
You will of course appreciate that it is therefore a matter of utmost importance that major effort be made to assemble and analyze facts relating to recent coordinated Communist drive across Nam Ma river, the number of forces involved and whence they might have come, verification of reports of howitzers and other Communist equipment implicating Hanoi. Also have any POW’s been taken and interrogated? Are any shell fragments obtainable for analysis?
Trust report above matters obtainable from RLG government itself (not just from Phoumi). What we need of course are facts and hard evidence, not opinions. Also appreciate your continuing independent evaluation of RLG supplied facts and evidence and of holding capabilities RLG forces.
Another subject: In your opinion, would RLG consult us before appealing to SEATO? It is imperative that they do in order to avoid possible premature or unnecessary broadening of conflict.
As you no doubt realize, we may be faced with very serious decisions in next few days repercussions of which involve U.S. interests elsewhere and indeed interests of many other countries. We cannot make these decisions on basis information made available to press and attachés together by General Ouan. If in fact no hard intelligence can be procured, we must at least have the considered evaluation and reaction of the Royal Government including most especially the Prime Minister and Crown Prince if possible. These together with your considered judgment will be of great value to us in determining whether Lao crisis has reached proportions of major Communist aggression against free world country. A reaction appropriate to that situation is obviously of far greater moment than steps thus far taken in hopes of meeting and deterring limited probes. We rely on your discretion to [Page 584] maintain necessary contact with RLG in such a way as not to stimulate any unwarranted or irresponsible demands upon us in attempt exploit our evident concern.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–359. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Green, cleared by Parsons, and approved by Murphy.↩
- Apparent reference to messages from the U.S. Army Attaché in Laos to the Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, CX–171, DTG 011300Z September and CX–172, DTG 011500Z September, both September 1. (Both ibid., 751J.00/9–159)↩