40. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 7, 1959, 11 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Second Meeting on Laos of Representatives of SEATO Diplomatic Missions in Washington, September 7, 1959, 11:00 A.M.
PARTICIPANTS
- See attached list2
The Acting Secretary opened the meeting by recalling that some of those present had suggested a follow-up to last Friday’s meeting. He thought it would be useful to begin by giving out latest information from Laos. He had pointed out on Friday that, while we were pretty certain of intervention from North Vietnam as claimed by Laos, there was a dearth of hard evidence. Since then the U.S. has come to the conclusion that the evidence of North Vietnam intervention is definitive. This evidence includes the use by the rebel forces of mortars and recoilless rifles which clearly come from outside. The operations of the rebel units also give evidence that they are well-trained units. They have used flares to give the signal for starting and stopping mortar fire and to start a well-coordinated infantry attack. Evidence will be presented [Page 108] to the UN today that North Vietnam intervened in Laos and is continuing to supply and support the rebels. There have been strong indications in individual reports that Viet-Minh nationals have participated in rebel operations within Laos but there is no conclusive proof of this. As for the present situation there has not yet been any broad contact between the RLG forces and the rebels since the RLG forces avoided contact by withdrawing to the area of Sam Neua. Some trails in the surrounding area have been cut by the rebels. There have been further incursions the last few days in Phong Saly.
The Acting Secretary expressed the belief that a proposal to send UN observers to Laos is in good shape. It has the concurrence of the UN Secretary General. The Security Council may agree at its meeting today to send a fact-finding mission to Laos. This would be done by organizing a sub-committee to find facts without having authority to make recommendations. Such a sub-committee comes under Article 29 of the UN Charter and, as a procedural matter, is not subject to veto. Mr. Dillon stated that we hope that action on this proposal can be completed today and that this will provide a deterrent to further use of force. He said that at least two members of the Security Council might be suitable for such a mission—Italy and Japan. Both have indicated their willingness to form part of such a sub-committee. The U.S. hopes that a Latin American Government—possibly Argentina—will also agree this afternoon and Tunisia is another possibility.
The Acting Secretary noted that there has been some indication Laos might appeal to SEATO. Such an appeal was almost made but has been held in abeyance. It is ready in draft form in Bangkok. Mr. Dillon said he hoped it will not be necessary for Laos to make this appeal—that the UN approach will be effective. He suggested that it is particularly important for SEATO to be prepared with a united position on the facts if North Vietnam uses this occasion to defy both the UN and SEATO. Some members of SEATO may not be fully advised of the situation because of lack of communications or absence of representation in Laos. Mr. Dillon thought it would be desirable for such members to send persons in whom they have confidence to Laos on an individual basis—not as SEATO fact-finders. He said that he understood that the U.K. has asked Sir Robert Scott to go to Vientiane to make a report on the situation. An additional idea is that SEATO Secretary General Sarasin might visit Vientiane if he felt it desirable. Advantages would be that he could report the facts, give the RLG the feeling that SEATO is showing interest in this problem, and he could also exercise a moderating influence on the RLG. The U.S. believes it desirable for the SEATO Council Representatives to hold meetings in Bangkok as developments warrant. Such meetings need not be publicized and may be informal in nature. He noted that such an informal meeting is scheduled today at which the Secretary General is to report [Page 109] on his talks with the Foreign Minister of Laos. The Acting Secretary suggested that it is better to make Bangkok rather than Washington the focus of continuing talks.
In concluding his presentation Mr. Dillon repeated his hope that any country not sure of the facts would send a representative or representatives in whom it had confidence to Laos. There would be no need to publicize the sending of such representatives.
The Thai Ambassador3 then stated that his government views the situation with grave concern. If Laos asks SEATO for help the Organization should do all it can to help Laos and to defend the Treaty Area countries. Thailand favors a special meeting of the Council Representatives in Bangkok (which the Ambassador noted had been scheduled for today after he received his instructions).4 The Thai Government would support any decision by the Council Representatives to send fact-finding representatives to Laos.
Mr. Shaikh5 said that the Pakistan Government believes that the first order of business is to find out the facts. His government has had no hard evidence of incursions into Laos from outside but he had noted with interest Mr. Dillon’s comments on this point. Pakistan thinks that all other avenues should be fully exploited before SEATO “rushes in”. Pakistan favors the UN fact-finding idea.
Ambassador Romulo stated that he had no instructions from his government but he thinks the UN proposal is proper and would have the support of the Philippines.
Ambassador Beale thought Australia would oppose sending SEATO representatives as a group to Laos but the Ministry of External Affairs may send someone from Bangkok to strengthen its representation in Laos. He said that he was in general agreement with what Mr. Dillon had said.
Ambassador Caccia indicated he also agreed generally with the Acting Secretary. The U.K. believes that the key action now rests with the UN but thinks the Council Representatives should meet as necessary and keep up with the situation. He had no instructions on the suggestion that Mr. Sarasin might visit Vientiane but said that surely the Secretary General will take instructions from “his Council” on this point.
Mr. Winckler6 stated that France does not favor confusing UN action with SEATO. France would prefer not to have communiqués on SEATO meetings on Laos.
[Page 110]Mr. Miller7 of New Zealand indicated general agreement with what had been said. New Zealand believes that Laos has given priority to its appeal to the UN and this should take precedence over any action by SEATO. SEATO should keep the situation under close and continuing attention and member nations should give support to UN action. New Zealand does not think that the necessary evidence of external aggression is available.
The Acting Secretary summed up by stating that he felt the member nations were all pretty much in agreement. He welcomed the statement that Australia is planning to strengthen its representation in Vientiane. He said he did not propose to issue a communiqué but noted that the press will undoubtedly inquire about the meeting. He proposed to respond to press inquiries simply by acknowledging, as agreed last Friday, that SEATO nation representatives had met to discuss the latest developments in Laos. He noted that it had been suggested that the U.S. prepare a paper on the evidence we had of outside aggression. He said this paper would be prepared and made available to the group.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Howard D. Jones, Adviser to the Special Assistant for SEATO Affairs.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Visutr Arthayukti.↩
- An account of this meeting of the Council Representatives is in telegram 611 from Bangkok, September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–759; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- M.S. Shaikh, Chargé of the Pakistani Embassy.↩
- Jean-Claude Winckler, Chargé of the French Embassy.↩
- R.M. Miller, First Secretary of the New Zealand Embassy.↩