Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

258. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the President, at Prestwick, Scotland ¹

Washington , September 5, 1959—12:01 a.m.

For delivery to the President 0800 GMT September 5. Developments re Laos.

At meeting this afternoon with CIA, Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff² we all took grave view of recent developments Laos and saw need for prompt action within next few days. Summary of our conclusions follows.

A. Present Situation.

1. Military. Pathet Lao rebels with probable North Vietnamese support pushing forward from positions captured earlier this week along northeast frontier Sam Neua Province toward Sam Neua town. Prospects are that if Pathet Lao operation continued at present and possibly increased level, Sam Neua town may fall within next few days and 50 percent of Lao armed forces, now being concentrated Sam Neua, may be lost. This in turn may result in re-establishment Pathet Lao puppet government with international Communist support.

2. RLG Appeals. Without obtaining, US, UK or French advice Royal Lao Govt (RLG) today³ appealed to UN for UN troops to counter foreign aggression. RLG planned make similar appeal to SEATO (which we have sought to stop for present) and may subsequently make appeal to us for direct military intervention.

3. Lao Morale. Believe morale shaky and susceptible disintegration under enemy pressure without evidence friendly outside support. It therefore essential that we take and encourage our friends to take immediate and effective action on RLG appeals for aid.

4. Foreign Reaction. So far reaction of SEATO members and other interested non-Communist nations not consonant with gravity of situation.

B. Security Council Meeting.

UN Secretary-General has called meeting of Security Council on Laos for 3:00 PM Monday, September 7. We are initiating consultations with the UK, France, Italy and Secretary-General, with view to having Security Council send a three-nation fact-finding mission to Laos under procedure which shall not be subject to Soviet veto.

C. Meeting with Representatives of SEATO Powers.

At 6 PM today I met with representatives other seven SEATO members⁴ to alert them and their governments to increasing seriousness of military situation and to stimulate their thinking on possible SEATO courses of action. Pointed out if Sam Neua fell, and if RLG forces there are overrun, situation could become critical. Stated our preference UN be allowed operate before SEATO act, but Lao may at any time call on SEATO and perhaps even appeal directly to us. Stated re latter that our general policy was action through regional organizations preferable to US unilateral action. Suggested as first step SEATO might send fact finders to Laos in order obtain joint appreciation of actual situation. I said SEATO fact finders would not necessarily conflict with UN observers if latter also sent, reiterating importance SEATO having facts in case it is called on to act quickly. It was also agreed we would meet at 11 AM September 7⁵ by which time hopefully views of respective governments would have been received. Department issued press statement agreed to at meeting merely stating Lao situation reviewed.

D. U.S. Military Preparations.

Defense and JCS consider that it possible that military situation may deteriorate rapidly over next few days. They feel that US military action may be required if Laos is to be saved for free world. If such action decided upon Defense feels it must be in position move very rapidly. Therefore in order back up present diplomatic action and to get into position to move rapidly if this should be necessary Defense desires instruct CINCPAC to alert his forces and take necessary steps to be ready to execute promptly his operation plan if a political decision is made which would require such. Also desires that CINCPAC be authorized:

1. Bring transport aircraft to outloading airfields ready for embarkation of US troops;

2. Load those forces which are to be embarked in amphibious lift in Okinawa; and

3. Sail elements of Seventh Fleet to South China Sea remaining out of sight of land. If queried by newsmen CINCPAC will state his forces conducting routine exercises and will not make further comment.

I am concerned that Communists may be conducting another serious probe of our fortitude and may seriously underrate our will to respect our SEATO obligations. Therefore I feel action desired by Defense would be helpful background to UN action which should be our first hope. Accordingly recommend your urgent approval of above recommendations of Defense.⁶

E. Trilateral Consultations With British and French.

Under Secretary Murphy will undertake formal consultations re Lao situation with British and French here on September 5.⁷ I understand British believe we should discuss facts of situation with Soviets. We propose suggest British take this step themselves citing active US concern over developments Laos.

F. Congressional Briefing.

We plan keep Congressional leaders informed of developments. Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled briefing on Laos September 8.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary’s Records, Laos. Top Secret. There is no number on the source text, but a note on the Department of State copy indicates that this message was cited as DTG 050501Z. This copy also indicates that the telegram was drafted by Jenkins and Askew, cleared with FE and IO, and approved by Dillon. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–559)
2. See supra .
3. The Lao appeal to the United Nations was on September 4, This telegram was drafted on the evening of September 4.
4. See footnote 2, supra .
5. Memorandum of conversation, September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–759; included in the microfiche supplement)
6. According to telegram PRESWHO9, 0051030Z, from Scotland, September 5, Eisenhower approved the actions and preparations specifically endorsing those in section D. The President wanted no public announcement of the preparation and commented that if action was to be taken, it should be done “with great swiftness” before “the physical situation in Laos has gone against the West.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–559; included in the microfiche supplement)
7. Memorandum of conversation, September 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–559; included in the microfiche supplement)