39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand1

537. Acting Secretary this afternoon2 called meeting of heads local SEATO diplomatic missions to review situation Laos, to request they alert governments to our concern over recent developments and solicit views as to how Laotian problem should be handled.3 Résumé based on uncleared notes follows:

Pointed out that although Laotian Government had made sudden and uncoordinated appeal to UN render military assistance, hard facts of direct outside support rebels lacking. While threat to Laos appeared serious, we needed better evidence than now available support Laotian case UN.

Acting Secretary stated U.S. belief it preferable UN be allowed handle Lao appeal and believed Security Council should take action prior any intervention SEATO. Nevertheless SEATO should urgently consider situation Laos and what action it might take if Lao appeal directed to it. As example, SEATO Council Reps Bangkok might recommend sending fact-finders into Laos report developments there. He foresaw possibility also U.S. might receive unilateral approach from Laos for military assistance but stated our preference for acting through regional organizations where possible.

U.K. rep.4 stated his Government’s view that since Laotians had now made appeal U.K. and it appeared Security Council would soon debate question, would be unfortunate if appeal made SEATO as well. Immediate problem is how matter should be handled UN. U.K. considered any thought of sending forces Laos should be deferred until facts of situation there established. Acting Secretary agreed and again stressed importance SEATO not standing idly by and necessity of having facts if called on to act. Hoped reactions SEATO governments could be received by their representatives in Washington in time for further meeting (suggested by Australian)5 September 7 at 11 A.M.,6 after which Acting Secretary believed urgent steps should be taken initiate action through Council Reps Bangkok to establish procedure [Page 107] for SEATO fact-finding mission Laos. FYI. Sending of such mission would of course imply prior Laotian agreement. End FYI. Suggested Council Reps meeting might best be called by Thai or SYG.

In reply to inquiry of French rep, Acting Secretary stated SEATO fact-finding mission would not conflict any UN action and would clearly show degree SEATO concern. FYI. No mention made at meeting of RLG intentions (reported Vientiane’s 536 to Department)7 to request SEATO intervention. End FYI.

Request at your discretion you discuss foregoing urgently with FonOff, pressing them instruct missions here in time for meeting September 7.

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–559. Secret; Priority; Seato. Drafted by Arthur B. Emmons on September 4 and approved by Parsons. Also sent priority to Bangkok, Canberra, Karachi, London, Manila, Paris, and Wellington and repeated to Vientiane, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and New Delhi.
  2. September 4.
  3. A memorandum of this conversation by Emmons is included in the microfiche supplement.
  4. Lord Hood, Minister of the British Embassy.
  5. Ambassador Beale.
  6. See infra.
  7. Dated September 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–459)