Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

156. Memorandum of Discussion at the 454th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. U.S. Policy Toward the Congo (NSC 6001;¹NSC Actions Nos. 2262 and 2270;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 29, 1960³)

Mr. Gray noted that Ambassador Timberlake was present for a discussion of this subject. He said he would like to pose one question before asking Secretary Herter to present Ambassador Timberlake. The question was—What action would the U.S. take if the USSR sought to intervene militarily in the Congo? Secretary Herter thought that the answer to this question was contained in the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Memorandum for NSC dated July 29, 1960) General Twining asked whether the Secretary of State agreed with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as contained in this report. Secretary Herter said he generally agreed with the JCS views although these views were vague in places and would have to be made more specific before they could form the basis for concrete action. Mr. Gray then read what he called the key section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff study, i.e. paragraph 6-c, page 4:

“In addition to United Nations actions, effective or otherwise, the United States must be prepared at any time to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo. Multilateral action would be preferable but unilateral action may be necessary. In the present Soviet belligerent mood, the USSR could estimate that the United States would not oppose them. We must be prepared to oppose and defeat them. In order to prevent their making such a rash move, they must be made to understand that we will not tolerate a Soviet military takeover of the Congo.”

Secretary Herter said he assumed that if the Soviets intervened in the Congo they would do so in opposition to the UN force. The President said if the Soviets intervened in such circumstances, we would all be in the fight.

Mr. Gray then called upon Secretary Herter who said that Ambassador Timberlake had gone to the Congo on July 1 and since that time had had the most active job of any U.S. ambassador.

Ambassador Timberlake said the situation in the Congo had resulted from the fact that the basic assumptions about the Government of the Congo had not been realized. It had been assumed that Belgians would remain as advisers to the new republic but they did not do so. It had been assumed that the Force Publique would remain loyal to the government but instead the Belgian officers of the Force Publique were dismissed so that a former native sergeant became the commanding general of the Force. The problem now is to attempt to find substitutes for Belgian administrators and technicians who are no longer in the Congo. No one, literally no one, in the Congo knows how to run a government department. The level of education is of course very low. If the problems of the Congo are to be solved, the UN has undertaken the largest job in history. One of the difficulties is the fact that the Congo covers a great deal of territory and has very poor communications facilities. Lumumba is not anxious to see the UN succeed in the Congo. The President asked how many UN troops had arrived on the scene. Ambassador Timberlake replied 11,000 UN troops were now in the Congo. The President thought this force should be large enough to maintain order. Ambassador Timberlake agreed but noted that some time would be required for the restoration of order. The UN troops were presently engaged in a “mop up” operation; they were attempting to get the Congolese troops to behave properly. The President said that when sergeants get to be generals, they are being promoted even faster than he was.

General Twining believed that the Commander of the UN force was in an extremely difficult position since he could receive his directives only from the Secretary-General of the UN. Secretary Dillon agreed that the UN Commander was in a difficult position and said it would not be easy for him to decide at times whether to carry out the wishes of the Congo Government or of the UN. Secretary Douglas asked whether there was a clear policy as to the disposition of the Force Publique. Ambassador Timberlake replied that an effort was being made to bring as many Force Publique troops as possible back into service. It was thought that about 60 per cent of the Force could be rehabilitated. The President thought perhaps the UN should have a training mission in the Congo for the purpose of rehabilitating the Force Publique. Ambassador Timberlake agreed but pointed out that relations between the Government of the Congo and the UN were far from clear. The UN had been invited in by the Government of the Congo and presumably could be invited out.

Mr. Gray referred to Basic National Security Policy which provided that economic development aid, as distinct from technical assistance, would not be provided through the UN. He asked whether economic development assistance to the Congo was contemplated. Secretary Herter said no economic development aid was contemplated at the present time. We were planning only technical assistance. Secretary Dillon added that we intend to give budgetary assistance through the UN in order that the Congo could pay the technicians which it badly needs. Secretary Dillon said that the adequacy of this year’s Contingency Funds had been raised and he would like to talk to the President about this question after the meeting.

Mr. Allen,⁴ noting that the Soviets had announced the dispatch of a second shipload of assistance to the Congo, asked whether this was another occasion when the Soviets would render a small amount of aid, say 100 trucks, but would receive the greatest amount of publicity. He hoped that U.S. aid going to the Congo via the UN would be identifiable as U.S. aid in some way. The President said we might paint our vehicles red, white and blue. Secretary Herter said that so far our airlift had been our big contribution. Ambassador Timberlake said the Soviet assistance so far had been mostly in the form of food, which had been added to the UN food pool. He added that the food problem in the Congo was easing so that it was not now considered critical in the short-range.

At this point the President left the meeting.

General Twining said he was concerned about the possibility that the Soviets would introduce a great many technicians into the Congo. Ambassador Timberlake said there were not many Soviet technicians there at the time he left.

Secretary Dillon wished to make two further remarks about the Congo. First, we have suggested to the UN that it should make an agreement with the Congo giving it the exclusive right to furnish all necessary technicians. The UN had agreed to try this plan and we had agreed to provide all our technicians through the UN. Second, a group working in the State Department had spotted all the key places in the Government of the Congo in which we would prefer not to have Soviet technicians placed. We will try to have our own technicians in these positions or at least prevent their being filled by Soviet technicians. [1 line of source text not declassified]

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 29, 1960), and in the light of an oral briefing by Ambassador Timberlake.

b. Concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in addition to United Nations actions, the United States must be prepared at any time to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo.

4. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

Mr. Dulles said he would like to discuss the Congo briefly before Ambassador Timberlake left the meeting. He noted that the UN force now in the Congo was not a well integrated and dependable force. For example, the Guinea troops had been told that they were going to the Congo for the purpose of shooting Belgians. They were also told that the UN effort in the Congo was an example of multilateral colonialism. In response to a question, Mr. Dulles said it was the Government of Guinea which had told the Guinean troops they were to shoot Belgians in the Congo. Secretary Dillon thought this episode was probably the result of the large number of communists in the Government of Guinea.

Mr. Dulles asked Ambassador Timberlake whether unemployment would not be a serious problem in the Congo. Ambassador Timberlake said it would. At this point Ambassador Timberlake left the meeting.

Mr. Dulles reported that the Government of the Union of South Africa was consulting the Portuguese and perhaps Southern Rhodesia in an effort to build up a buffer belt across the southern part of Africa. If the Union could build strong points in Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique, it could create a cordon sanitaire against events such as those taking place in the Congo. The Portuguese, however, are not particularly enthusiastic about this scheme because they are reluctant to cooperate with South Africa.

Secretary Herter said he had heard that there was a great deal of dissension in the Congolese delegation to the UN, dissension which had been triggered by an interview with Lumumba published by TASS. Secretary Dillon said a TASS correspondent presented Lumumba with three written questions. Lumumba went into the next room and scribbled the answers in about three minutes. TASS, however, published a report much longer than Lumumba could have written out in three minutes.⁶ Obviously, TASS had considerably embellished Lumumba’s answers. The main point of Lumumba’s answers was that only the USSR had properly met the desires of the Government of the Congo in the present situation.

Mr. Gray asked about the cost of the operation in the Congo and wondered whether we would have to ask Congress for more funds in order to pay our share of the UN operation. Mr. Dillon said he expected to take this matter up with the President later.⁷

[Here follows the remainder of Dulles’ briefing.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on August 4.
1. Document 22.
2. See footnote 9, Document 126, and footnote 7, Document 140.
3. See source note, Document 145.
4. George V. Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.
5. Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 2276, approved by the President on August 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
6. The interview took place on July 28. A translation of the TASS report was attached to an August 1 memorandum from Penfield to Dillon. (Ibid., Central Files, 770G.00/8–160)
7. See Document 157.