145. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates 0

JCSM–321–60

SUBJECT

  • Possible U.S. Courses of Action Relative to the Contingency of Unilateral Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Intervention in the Republic of the Congo (S)
1.
Officials of the Republic of the Congo have indicated an inclination to invite Soviet military intervention in the present unstable internal security situation in the Republic of the Congo, if the government of Belgium fails immediately to withdraw its military forces from the area. USSR has asserted its readiness to respond favorably to such an invitation. Such action on the part of the Republic of the Congo and the Soviet Union is inconsistent with the Resolution of the Security [Page 347] Council of the United Nations relating to providing U.N. military forces to restore order in the Congo. The Soviet Union voted affirmatively on this resolution.
2.
The introduction of Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces into the Congo may in effect militate against the effectiveness of U.N. forces now being provided to restore order, could give rise to serious conflict with Belgian forces present in the area, and could result in Soviet domination of the Republic of the Congo thereby facilitating the spread of Communism among African states.
3.
There is urgent need for the United States to seize the initiative and create circumstances which tend to forestall a Soviet decision to intervene in the Congo, and, in the event they, nonetheless, should elect to do so, create circumstances which will embarrass them and frustrate their aims.
4.
Soviet military intervention in the Congo poses great practical difficulties for the Soviets. Essentially they are limited to airlifting forces into the area or sealifting them. The former is the most expeditious means but the latter is the most feasible. There are general measures that the United States can undertake to aggravate the Soviet problem and consequences of their action as well as certain specific measures which tend to forestall the possible success of either an airlift or a sealift. Moreover, there are measures that the United States should take in the event of a Soviet attempt to intervene or if actual intervention by them becomes a fact.
5.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:
a.
To forestall or impede the successful introduction of Sino-Soviet Bloc military elements into the Congo the following courses of action should be considered by the United States:
(1)
General:
(a)
Acknowledging the fact that the aggregate troop level of Belgian forces now in the Congo and U.N. forces now present or enroute, is adequate to restore order and that further Belgian reinforcement or the introduction of other non-U.N. sponsored foreign military forces will only further aggravate the situation, recommend the United Nations urgently now declare a blockade to preclude the introduction of further non-U.N. sponsored military forces.
(b)
Foster general and especially U.N. objection to the further introduction of non-U.N. sponsored military forces into the Congo. Cause the United Nations to exhort the Soviet Union to restrain themselves from interference in the Congo situation.
(c)
In order to ease tensions and forestall complication of the task of the U.N. forces recommend the United Nations now declare an arms embargo to the Republic of the Congo for a period to be determined.
(d)
Encourage the United Nations to operate and administer immediately river and harbor facilities and pipeline in the lower Congo using Western technicians. Such action could be vital to prevent Soviet bloc technicians from gaining control of this vital and only entrance to the Congo from the sea.
(2)
To forestall a successful airlift:
(a)
Bring pressure on countries which might be subject to overflight, through the United Nations and directly, to both deny overflight authority and, if feasible, militarily oppose such overflight if undertaken.
(b)
Bring pressure, through the United Nations and directly, on nations along possible air routes to deny air staging facilities and POL support to all elements of a Soviet military airlift.
(c)
Cause the United Nations to close all Congo airports to elements of a Soviet airlift.
(d)
Make representations to the United Nations to cause their military elements in the Congo to plan, organize, and be ready to physically obstruct all suitable landing fields in the Congo from Soviet use by passively blocking runways.
(3)
To forestall a successful sealift:
(a)
Implement the measure cited in subparagraph 5a(1)(a) relative to establishing a U.N. blockade.
(b)
Make representation to the United Nations to plan, organize, and be ready to physically restrict ship passage into the mouth of lower Congo.
6.
In the event that Sino-Soviet Bloc military intervention in the Congo is attempted or becomes a fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the United States should:
a.
Make strong representation in the United Nations against such Sino-Soviet action as being contrary to the previous resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council and further as being unilateral imperialistic interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo.
b.
Unilaterally with the Belgians and within the United Nations and NATO, encourage the Belgians to expedite the withdrawal of all their military forces from the Congo.
c.
In addition to United Nations actions, effective or otherwise, the United States must be prepared at any time to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo. Multilateral action would be preferable but unilateral action may be necessary. In the present Soviet belligerent mood, the USSR could estimate that the United States would not oppose them. We must be prepared to oppose and defeat them. In order to prevent their making such a rash move, they must be made to understand that we will not tolerate a Soviet military takeover of the Congo.
d.
After the Sino-Soviet military forces have intervened in the Congo take action within the United Nations to insist that the Sino-Soviet forces withdraw from the Congo immediately after internal order has been secured; thereafter internal security in the Congo can be maintained as long as necessary by the U.N. forces.
e.
Directly and through the United Nations bring pressure to bear on the Republic of the Congo to recognize that early re-establishment of a viable republic requires restoration of world confidence through whole-hearted cooperation with the United Nations and that the presence of non-United Nations sponsored military forces in the area militates against this objective. Therefore, the Republic of the Congo should request the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arleigh Burke 2
Chief of Naval Operations
  1. Source: Department of State, S/PNSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5920 & 6001. Secret; Special Limited Distribution. Enclosure to a memorandum from Lay to the NSC, dated July 29. The Department of Defense sent a copy to the Secretary of State on July 23. (Ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Congo)
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.