126. Memorandum of Discussion at the 451st Meeting of the National Security Council0

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting. Secretary of State Herter presided at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows Allen Dulles’ briefing on unrelated subjects.] Mr. Dulles then referred to a message he had just received indicating that Khrushchev had sent a message to the Congo leaders stating that the hand of the aggressors had been raised over the African people and that if the aggressors continued in their present actions, the Soviet Government would find it necessary to consider more serious countermeasures.1 Mr. Dulles stated that the action of the Congo in [Page 310] breaking relations with Belgium may create new problems.2 After a day of relative calm, there had been further outbreaks the day before in the Congo. Much, he said, depended on the speed with which the UN presence could be established in the Congo.

There was some discussion of when the first UN units were to arrive and it was indicated by General Twining that they would arrive that afternoon. In this connection, Mr. Herter noted that there had been competition between Ghana and Tunisia3 over whose units would be the first into the Congo.

Mr. Dulles, resuming his briefing, pointed out that the Belgians had promised to withdraw their troops progressively to bases within the Congo as the UN troops arrived. Lumumba was unwilling to accept this kind of Belgian withdrawal. Another problem in the Congo was the failure of many Congolese recently to receive their salaries from the Belgian firms for which they worked. In addition, there were spotty but serious food shortages in the Congo, especially in the Leopoldville area.

The Lumumba Government continued to be characterized by ineptitude. Lumumba was especially anti-Western; his Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, was not. In a message to the UN Lumumba and Kasavubu had stated that the Congo had requested UN assistance, not to re-establish order, but to protect the Congo against Belgium. Other messages had disavowed the request by the Foreign Minister for U.S. aid. An envoy from Katanga, which had seceded from the Congo,4 was on his way to the UN to present Katanga’s case. The secession of Katanga had placed the Belgians in a difficult position. The Belgian Government had recognized the Congo and was opposed to its fragmentation. However, it also wants to protect its large investment in Katanga which contains the largest Belgian investments.

[Here follows the conclusion of Dulles’ briefing.]

2. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba [Here follow references to NSC papers and actions concerning Cuba.]

3. U.S. Policy Toward the Congo (NSC 6001)5

4. The Recent RB–47 Incident in the Barents Sea

Secretary Herter stated that the Belgian Government was split on the question of independence for Katanga. Seven Cabinet Ministers favor Katanga’s secession. The provincial governor in Katanga, who is [Page 311] pro-Belgian, is on his way to the UN. In actuality, the Belgians would like secession as a means of better preserving their investment in this richest of the Congo provinces, but they were still maintaining an official position that the integrity of the Congo must be preserved. The Belgian Consul in Elisabethville had been working strongly for secession. Secretary Herter felt that it was understating the matter to say that Lumumba was anti-West.

Secretary Herter then went on to point out that an interesting aspect of UN action on the Congo had gone largely unnoticed because it occurred too late to appear in the morning newspapers. The Russians had offered three amendments to the Tunisian resolution on the Congo. The first had called for immediate withdrawal of the Belgians. It had been defeated. The Secretary-General favored a phased withdrawal of the Belgian forces despite the unfortunate statement of Mr. Bunche that the UN Resolution called for immediate withdrawal.6 In this connection, Mr. Dulles pointed out that “withdrawal” was being used in two different senses—from the country and to barracks within the Congo. Secretary Herter then went on to state that additional Soviet amendments providing that nothing but African troops should be used and condemning the Belgians had also been defeated. On the whole, the Belgians were reasonably satisfied with the UN action. Secretary Herter noted that there was a divided situation in the Congo Government. Lumumba had moved to Stanleyville but the Cabinet was still in Leopoldville. Whether the Cabinet would move to Stanleyville was not clear. The rest of the Cabinet, Secretary Herter indicated, was more reasonable than Lumumba. In answer to an inquiry by Secretary Anderson, Mr. Amory indicated that Lumumba was 34 years old. Secretary Herter noted that Lumumba had assumed the position of Minister of Defense. The Secretary indicated his amazement at the speed with which the U.S. lift for the UN force had been organized. Secretary Douglas confirmed that the first aircraft would arrive in the Congo that afternoon. Secretary Herter inquired how many planes were involved in the lift. Secretary Douglas replied that almost fifty had been committed and about the same number would be used for re-support. In this connection, General Twining pointed out that in order to handle the turn-around of U.S. aircraft, we would need to get one officer and 25 men into Brazzaville. He said that he [Page 312] was afraid that if we did not get our own people into the area, the lift operation might bog down. Secretary Herter thought there would not be too much trouble about arranging this. He went on to point out that communications up the Congo River had been disrupted because Matadi was held by the rebels. [2 lines of source text not declassified] General Twining also noted that special communications equipment had been requested by the U.S. Embassy and had been sent in by the military.

Secretary Anderson inquired as to what we would do if the independence of Katanga became an issue—for example, could UN forces be used in Katanga? Secretary Herter acknowledged that this would pose a difficult problem. He pointed out that Lumumba had attempted to go to Elisabethville but that the provincial governor had kept him out and that instead he had gone to Luluaburg. Mr. Stans inquired as to the possibility of uniting Kivu with Katanga. Secretary Herter noted that in the Katanga there was a split situation. Some of the people were pro-Belgian and some were anti-Belgian.

Mr. Gray suggested that the present situation raised a question as to existing policy. Although that policy contains an escape clause, it provides in general that the U.S. should reply upon the former metro-pole.7 Mr. Gray also noted that a Discussion Paper on Africa had been circulated to the Council8 and concluded by stating that no policy review appeared to be required now. Secretary Herter agreed that it would be foolish to undertake a review at this time.

[Here follows discussion concerning Cuba and the RB–47 incident.]

The National Security Council:

[Here follows numbered paragraph 2.]

3. Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Congo.9

[Here follows numbered paragraph 4.]

[Here follow agenda items 5–7.]

Robert H. Johnson
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson on July 18.
  2. Khrushchev’s message of July 15 was sent in response to a July 14 message from Kasavubu and Lumumba stating that Soviet help might be required if the Western nations failed to stop their aggression. For texts of both messages, see Congo 1960, vol. II, pp. 555–556; extracts from Khrushchev’s message are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 530.
  3. On July 14.
  4. Telegrams 52 from Accra and 59 from Tunis, both dated July 14, reported requests from the Ghanaian and Tunisian Governments for U.S. aircraft to transport their troops to the Congo. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7–1460)
  5. On July 11.
  6. Document 22.
  7. Telegram 83 from USUN, July 14, reported that Lodge had discussed with Hammarskjöld the news report imputing to Bunche the statement that the withdrawal of Belgian troops was a precondition for the introduction of U.N. forces. Hammarskjöld “said in his conception Belgian withdrawal and arrival of UN forces not simply matter of the first action making possible the other—but two events are related; to be sure, withdrawal should take place as UN troops provided alternative to Belgian troops, thus making their withdrawal possible. Relationship between them was “subtle one for historical and political reasons”. He would interpret resolution as a totality.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1460)
  8. Reference is to NSC 6001.
  9. On July 12; see footnote 4, Document 33.
  10. Paragraph 3 constituted NSC Action No. 2262. There is no paragraph 1. Paragraphs 2 and 4 constituted NSC Actions No. 2261 and 2263, concerning Cuba and the RB–47 incident, respectively. All were approved by the President on July 19. (Department of State, S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)