22. National Security Council Report0

NSC 6001



General Considerations

1. The primary importance of the area of South, Central and East Africa is its emerging political significance. There is a growing awareness in the world that Africa is an area which will have an increasingly important influence on the course of world events and that the political alignment of the present and future independent nations of the continent will be deeply affected by the policies which Western European nations and the United States pursue.

2. In contrast to West Africa, the situation in this area is complicated by the presence, in most of the territories concerned, of a well-entrenched white settler minority together with politically less significant Asian or other minorities. Despite spectacular post-war quickening of economic activity in certain areas, most Africans still live the primitive life of the hinterland and the African population generally is poorly prepared for self-government. Nevertheless, African pressure for political equality has now assumed major proportions throughout most of the area.

3. The principal problem affecting U.S. interests in this area is the development of the dependent territories, in an orderly manner and in cooperation with the European metropoles, toward ultimate self-determination. If this transition takes place in a way which preserves the essential ties which bind Western Europe and Africa, areas which are economically complementary, close and mutually advantageous relationships between the Western European powers and Africa can be maintained after the colonial period has passed.

4. The political stability of the area faces severe trials as many of the territories move more rapidly toward self-government and independence, frequently amidst the strains and tensions of multi-racial [Page 80]and rival tribal societies. During the transitional and independence periods, the opportunities for Communist penetration and influence are likely to increase and complicate the already difficult and complex problems of the area and make it more difficult to assure the area’s identification with the West. There are indications that the Communist Bloc is paying more attention to this area and that the Bloc will increase its efforts to identify itself as anti-colonial. Communist influence in Central and East Africa is negligible, and the African leaders who have emerged thus far look primarily to the West for sympathy and support. Should they fail to receive such support, they may be expected to turn for it to the Communist Bloc or other countries not sympathetic to the metropoles or the United States. There is a discernible Communist influence in African and Indian political groups in the Union of South Africa. African students both in Western Europe and in the Soviet Bloc are assiduously cultivated by the Communists and many have been subverted.

5. African leaders seek the understanding and goodwill of the United States. Above all, they want to be accepted and to be treated as equals and with dignity and respect.

6. American economic interests in South, Central and East Africa are relatively modest. In 1958 this area accounted for only 2.2 per cent of U.S. trade (about $650 million). American investment in the area is approximately $450 million but the great bulk of it is in the Union of South Africa where most of the American economic interests lie. The area is a major source of the Free World for such strategic materials as diamonds, cobalt, chromite, manganese, copper and sisal. The United States is heavily dependent on the area for diamonds, cobalt and chromite. The area is also an important producer of many other minerals and agricultural products.

7. In the event of war or loss of Western access to sea and air routes through the Middle East, control of sea and air communications in this area of Africa would be extremely important. Under these circumstances, our primary strategic military interest is to deny the area to Communist control. In the future, moreover, there may be more significant requirements (military and other) for U.S. use of rights and facilities in the area. Installations in this area are already becoming increasingly important to U.S. research and development in, and exploitation of, the fields of outer space, missile weaponry, and world wide communications.

General Objectives

8. Maintenance of the Free World orientation of the area and denial of the area to Communist domination, including:

The minimization of Communist influence therein;
Orderly economic development and political progress toward self-determination by the countries of the area in cooperation with the metropoles and other Free World countries; and
Access to such military rights and facilities and strategic resources as may be required in our national security interests.

Regional Policy Guidance

9. In applying the policy guidance which follows to all parts of this area except the Union of South Africa, be guided by the basic policy of encouraging and, to the extent feasible, relying on Western European nations to influence and support their respective dependent and recently independent areas so long as such encouragement and reliance are consistent with U.S. national interests.

Until an area achieves independence conduct U.S. activities and programs in the area in full recognition of the responsibilities of the metropolitan power involved, and, to the extent feasible:
Consult with the responsible metropolitan power on U.S. activities and programs in or relating to the area; and
Avoid actions in the area or directly relating to the area likely to cause serious misunderstandings between the United States and the metropolitan power involved.
Should a situation arise in a dependent area or in an area having achieved independent status in which reliance on the European power concerned would not be in the U.S. interest, determine the independent U.S. course of action relating to such area by taking into account:
The need for establishing friendly working relationships with the newly emerging state.
The need to incline this state toward the Free World rather than the Communist world.
The effect of our policies on other Free World states having a colonial heritage.
The need for maintaining Free World harmony including friendly relationships and consultations as appropriate with the metropolitan powers.

Nationalism, Colonialism and Regionalism

10. Support the principle of self-determination consistently and in such a way as to assure that evolution toward this objective will be orderly; making clear that self-government and independence impose important responsibilities which the peoples concerned must be prepared to discharge.

11. Encourage those policies and actions of the metropolitan powers which help prepare the dependent peoples for self-determination and responsible self-government or independence. Avoid U.S. identification with those policies of the metropolitan powers and the Union [Page 82]of South Africa which are stagnant or repressive and, to the extent practicable, seek to influence the metropolitan powers and the Union of South Africa to abandon or modify such policies.

12. As appropriate, encourage the formation of federation or other forms of association among newly emerging states of the area which will enhance their political and economic viability.

13. As feasible, support constructive, non-Communist nationalist and reform movements, balancing the nature and degree of such support, however, with consideration of our relations with our NATO allies.

14. Encourage participation of the moderate leaders in regional or Pan-African movements.


15. Seek to correct distorted African views of U.S. race relations, emphasizing, where appropriate, progress made by the United States in the race relations field.

16. Encourage, where practicable, a more liberal approach in areas where extremism is now the order of the day, pointing out on appropriate occasions the likelihood that violence will result from continuation of rigid, repressive racial policies.

17. To the extent feasible, encourage the concept of a system of government and social relations which would be a middle way between the extremes of black nationalism and the inequities and tensions generated by apartheid.

18. Seek to influence any consideration in the UN of racial matters in Africa along constructive lines.

19. Encourage American companies to set an example in practicing non-discrimination in their operations to the maximum extent consistent with local laws, and to train Africans for managerial positions.

Communist Activities

20. Cooperate locally with security organizations to combat Communist subversive activities.

21. As areas become independent, encourage them to avoid or minimize formal Sino-Soviet Bloc representation, to avoid extensive use of Sino-Soviet Bloc technicians, and to limit other Sino-Soviet Bloc economic and cultural contacts. Alert the governments of such nations to the probability that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will attempt to utilize trade and assistance programs as a technique for political subversion. Nonetheless, maintain a flexible posture that would minimize the damage to U.S. prestige in the event that such nations accept diplomatic or economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

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Military and Strategic

22. Keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in the U.S. appraisal of its strategic value to the United States, bearing in mind that the United States may, in the future, require bases or facilities.

23. Discourage the development of an arms race in Africa and of the concept that the United States is prepared to provide military assistance to any nation which desires it. As countries in the area become independent, encourage them to maintain adequately equipped and trained internal security forces. In those cases where external assistance is required for this purpose, encourage the appropriate former metropole to provide such assistance. If this approach fails and if required to achieve U.S. objectives, consider providing U.S. assistance to meet minimum legitimate internal security requirements, including technical training in U.S. military institutions.


24. a. As areas achieve independence encourage them (1) to make the maximum contribution to their own economic development, (2) to eliminate barriers to trade and investment, (3) to take measures capable of attracting maximum amounts of external private capital, and (4) to look essentially to Western Europe, to the Free World international financial institutions, and to private investment to meet their needs for external capital so long as this is consistent with U.S. security interests.

b. Urge the United Kingdom, Belgium and Portugal to increase their economic assistance to their dependent or recently dependent territories of this area and, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on these metropolitan powers, the Free World international financial institutions, organizations such as the Common Market, and private capital to meet the needs of the territories and nations of the area for external capital.

c. Take steps as appropriate to improve the climate for private investment (domestic and foreign).

d. In the event that it does not prove feasible or consistent with U.S. security interests to rely wholly on the sources in paragraph b to meet the external capital needs of a particular territory or nation, be prepared on a case-by-case basis to extend economic development assistance or special economic assistance from the United States to such territory or nation (excluding the Union of South Africa).

e. Seek to avoid the creation of unrealistic African expectations of U.S. assistance.

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25. Be prepared (except in the case of the Union of South Africa) to provide U.S. technical and limited related assistance to advance U.S. interests, and to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P.L. 480 when appropriate.

26. In cases where U.S. assistance is provided:

Attention should be given to those activities which especially (1) complement the efforts already undertaken by the governments of the area concerned; (2) improve, develop, or conserve human resources by programs of education, training, and health; (3) accelerate economic development by the selective application of skills to the resources available, with particular emphasis on the fields of agriculture, light manufacturing and processing industries and public administration; (4) encourage private investment, both domestic and foreign.
Within the categories in a above, accord priority to projects (1) which are of particular interest to the Africans or to which they attach special importance, (2) serve multi-national needs or are otherwise regional in scope.
In the priority area of education and training give special attention to: (1) surveys of the educational requirements of the area; (2) development of appropriate research activities, the establishment and extension of training facilities, and surveys of manpower requirements and availabilities; (3) those programs designed to develop Western-oriented leaders in the area.

27. Encourage U.S. and Free World business to participate more actively in the development of the economies of these countries by expanding trade and investment. Seek the denial or limitation of exports of strategic commodities from these areas to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in accordance with U.S. economic defense policy.

28. Encourage expanded efforts by private American institutions and foundations in the fields of education, training and research on Africa.

Policy Guidance on Individual Countries and Territories Supplemental to the “Regional Policy Guidance” Above2

Union of South Africa

29. Maintain as wide an area of mutual regard and communication as possible in official U.S. relations with the Union Government. At the same time continue to point out to the Union Government that the United States cannot accept the apartheid concept as valid.

30. Encourage and improve communication between the various racial groups in the Union.

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31. In international forums:

Seek to put the racial problem in proper context in order to avoid intemperate or strongly condemnatory resolutions.
Make clear, however, U.S. regret and concern that discriminatory practice in the Union continues to be fortified and sanctified by law, and point out that the United States believes South Africa’s best interests will be served by policies which will give all racial groups grounds for hope that their legitimate aspirations can be attained.

32. Encourage the Union to develop closer and mutually desirable cooperative relations with other African territories and nations.

33. Encourage the Union to respect its obligations in its administration of the Territory of South West Africa in accordance with the terms of the original mandate, and to seek with the United Nations a basis for an agreement which would continue to accord to the Territory an international status.

Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi

34. Encourage friendly relations between the Congo and the independent African countries.

35. Encourage the Belgians to fulfill their obligation as trustee for Ruanda-Urundi by improving economic conditions in that area and preparing it for eventual self-government or independence, preferably with ties to Belgium.

Angola and Mozambique

36. To the extent possible, urge on the Portuguese the long-range benefit to themselves of more enlightened policies in Africa, including liberal trade and investment policies.

37. Without indicating approbation of over-all Portuguese policy in Africa, do not publicly dispute the proposition that Angola and Mozambique are integral parts of Portugal.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

38. Encourage maintenance of the federal system of government and acceptance of the ideal of a multi-racial democracy. Urge on receptive local leaders the propriety and feasibility of the use of federal law in advancing social justice.

39. Impress upon the United Kingdom and Federation Governments the urgent need for accommodating the legitimate aspirations of all inhabitants in the Federation within the federal system of government.

40. Encourage the United Kingdom to recognize the need to advance Africans and to promote economic development in primarily African areas in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, where the United [Page 86]Kingdom maintains ultimate responsibility, in order to regain African confidence in the United Kingdom and to win African consent to the continuation of the Federation.

41. Encourage friendly relations between the Federation and other independent African countries and close association with members of the Commonwealth.



The Union of South Africa

The Union of South Africa is the strongest and most industrialized nation in Africa. Of a total population of 14.4 million there is a permanent European population of slightly over 3 million. South Africa is the world’s largest producer of gold, and ranks as a leading world producer of diamonds, uranium, platinum, chrome, manganese, iron ore, asbestos, antimony and monazite. Until World War I the South African economy was based principally on agricultural production and the mining of diamonds and gold. Since then, and particularly since World War II, there has been rapid development in manufacturing which now accounts for a larger proportion of the national income than either agriculture or mining. With extensive reserves of coal and iron, the Union is the leading steel producer in Africa. This steel production provides the base on which the country’s industrial production, which embraces a wide range of products, is built.
The closing of the Suez Canal in 1956-57 demonstrated the importance of the sea routes around the Cape. The South African ports of Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London, together with the Mozambique ports of Lourenco Marques and Beira which handle the bulk of the cargo traffic for the Union and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland constitute strategic links with the rest of the world. These port installations in Southern Africa, containing repair and supply facilities, are linked technically and materially with the Union’s own industrial capability.
Gold production, which reached a value of $640 million in 1958, has traditionally enabled the Union to import goods and services at an exceedingly high rate, and has imparted to the economy generally a resiliency which, inter alia, has been important in attracting further investment capital. United States economic interests in the [Page 87]Union have increased considerably during recent years. At the present time, approximately one-half of United States private investment in the African continent is in the Union. There are approximately 160 American firms with direct investments in the Union, ranging in activity from processing and distribution to manufacturing and mining. As a result of expanded U.S. economic activities in the Union, two American banks recently established branches there.
The racial problem pervades every aspect of South African life and has severe repercussions on the Union’s foreign relations. The race policy of the Government is based on the concept of continued white supremacy and apartheid, or separation, under which the African is considered to have merely a transient status in the “white” areas of the country (i.e., outside the Reserves and Bantustans4) and thus is restricted in his rights and activities in these “white” areas. While the establishment of Bantustans under the program of positive apartheid may slow the steady drift of the African to the Union’s urban centers, the apartheid program does not have the support of the African population and appears doomed to failure. From an economic standpoint, the program is considered to be prohibitive in cost and, if carried to its doctrinaire conclusion, would be seriously disruptive to the country’s economy.
In view of the intransigence of the Union Government on its apartheid policy, it is unlikely that repeated United Nation’s consideration of this issue contributes to a solution.
The Union Government has refused to come to agreement with the UN regarding the status of the former League of Nations mandated territory of South West Africa. South Africa has argued that it is under no compulsion to place the Territory under the U.N. Trusteeship System since the United Nations is not the successor, in a legal sense, to the League of Nations. This matter has been the subject of considerable heated debate within the United Nations and the matter has been brought before the International Court of Justice. In substance, the latter has ruled that South Africa continues to have international obligations in its administration of South West Africa in accordance with the terms of the original mandate. Continued failure to reach an acceptable solution to this problem poses a further threat to South Africa’s relations with the world community.
South Africa’s military and security forces are organized primarily for internal security, and secondarily for the defense of the Cape Sea route. Internal security is the primary responsibility of the 28,000-man police force. In addition, reserve military organizations are available for quelling serious internal disorders. The Union Government [Page 88]outlawed the Communist Party under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, and has since that time rigorously banned many Communists from public activity, although Communist-line publications have continued to appear. However, the comparative literacy and sophistication of that part of the African population which has had a long contact with European culture makes these Africans highly sensitive to the inequities of their position and much more susceptible to extremist solutions. Organized African groups are a primary Communist target and a certain amount of penetration has taken place in all African political groups. In this situation a continuation of the present racial policies of the Union, by foreclosing moderate, evolutionary solutions, will increase the appeal of Communist and other extreme programs and, over the longer run, the chances of mounting violence between the black and white communities.
While the security forces in the Union appear to have the situation well in hand, there is an increasing possibility that African leadership may succeed in enlisting mass support for an action which could cripple the economy, such as a mass refusal to work or a boycott.
The Union of South Africa came into being on May 31, 1910, after the British Parliament passed the South Africa Act of 1909. This united the four self-governing British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. However, the three contiguous High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland remained under the British Crown, and this has since been a point of antagonism between the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom. By the South Africa Act, the United Kingdom Government may approve transfer of the territories to the Union if and when the Union Parliament requests such transfer. The South African Government, particularly in recent years under the more extreme Afrikaner nationalism, has called for the incorporation of the High Commission Territories into the Union. On the other hand, the United Kingdom Government has maintained a discreet but firm insistence that any changes in the Territories must reflect the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. In August 1959 the British Parliament approved a constitution for Basutoland which provides for a locally elected Legislative Council and autonomy in domestic affairs. A similar development in rule can be expected in Bechuanaland and Swaziland in the future.

Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi

The importance of the Belgian Congo derives from its size (900,000 square miles; 13 million population), its central location, and its substantial natural resources. The economy has undergone considerable development based on the substantial extraction or production [Page 89]of industrial raw materials and coffee, cotton, and palm oil. Exports of all types of goods have been about $450 million annually. There are prospects for extensive private foreign investment of a mutually beneficial nature in the Congo, provided the Belgian Government is willing to modify certain existing restrictions on non-Belgian capital.
The major causes of instability are the growing political agitation for independence and the intense tribal rivalries. The prospect of independence and the uncertainties as to the extent of continuing Belgian control create growing tensions which are breaking out in open conflict. Racial issues have not been a major cause of the instability in the Congo. There has been rioting and tribal fighting throughout the area since the Leopoldville riots in January 1959, just prior to the Belgian Government’s declaration which promised that “Belgium intends to organize a democracy in the Congo which will be capable of exercising the prerogatives of sovereignty and of deciding upon its independence.”5 A specific program has been outlined for establishing political institutions in which the Congolese would have an increasingly larger role to play. No date has been set for granting self-government or complete independence nor has the eventual relationship with Belgium been defined. However, the Congolese have been assured that this decision will be up to them, and it is contemplated that by 1964 Belgian-Congolese relations will be reviewed, at which time the Congo presumably could opt for independence. The presence of over 100,000 whites in the Congo will probably not seriously impede these reforms.
Some 50 political parties have developed in the Congo and several of the larger parties (particularly the ABAKO or Bakongo organization and the most important faction of the MNC or Mouvement National Congolais) have not only announced that they will boycott the provincial elections planned for December of this year, but also have demanded a completely independent Congolese government by not later than 1960. This is only one of the problems faced by the Belgians in dealing with political agitation against the background of divergent tribalism and superstition. For example, the Bakongo tribesmen of the Lower Congo, fearful of domination by the more numerous tribes of the interior, are demanding their own tribal state (including areas in the French Republic of Congo and in Angola) with only vaguely defined ties to a federal government. Tribal riots and clashes may be expected to continue.
The Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, with a total area of only 21,000 square miles, has a rapidly growing population of almost 5 million pressing against the limited resource capabilities of a pastoral [Page 90]type economy. The reins of local power, held by the Watutsi who comprise only 15 percent of the population, are now being sought by the traditionally inferior Bahutu who account for almost 84 percent of the population. In addition to continuing tribal unrest, the economic problems of overpopulation can be expected to plague the area for some time to come. The area, which is administered as an autonomous province with loose ties to the Congo, is definitely unprepared for independence and in need of Belgian assistance to provide some semblance of both economic and political stability. Progress toward self-government will probably be slow.

Angola and Mozambique

Neither Angola nor Mozambique is of direct strategic, political or economic importance to the United States. However, Portuguese ports and rail connections in Angola and Mozambique are vital to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and important to the Union of South Africa and the Belgian Congo. Air routes through and over these provinces are strategically important to the area as well as to several Western nations which are now operating air routes over Angola and Mozambique. Both provinces furnish labor to surrounding areas; the Union and the Rhodesias draw on Mozambique, while Angola supplies part of the work force in the Belgian Congo.
Both provinces are undeveloped, and, while their full potential is as yet unknown, they now produce coffee, cotton, sisal, diamonds, sugar, and copra for export. Moderate quantities of oil have been discovered in Angola; explorations are continuing in Mozambique.
The politically and economically repressive policies of the Portuguese Government have thus far prevented in Angola and Mozambique most of the political unrest and racial tension characteristic of other colonial areas of Africa. However, despite Portuguese efforts to exclude unsettling influences, African political awareness is emerging and is bound to grow. Recent developments are likely to cause growing unrest.
Angola and Mozambique are legally provinces of the metro-pole. For this reason there are sharp limitations on the ability of the United States to influence developments in these territories.
In the northern region of Angola, where a portion of the vigorous Bakongo tribe resides, there is a distinct possibility that political agitation by the Bakongo in the Belgian Congo will have an unsettling effect, despite Portuguese determination to put down any African challenge to their authority.
In the remainder of Angola, there appears to be little possibility of effective African political organization in the near future. Little is known about the actual and potential strength of the underground [Page 91]Angolan Liberation Movement, the only African political organization known to exist in the province. In Mozambique, there have been isolated incidents involving resistance to the Portuguese, but no organized African movement in known to exist.
In the short run, it is believed that internal threats to stability are minimal, but in the long run, especially as neighboring areas (e.g., the Belgian Congo) become African-controlled, the Portuguese can expect an increasing African challenge to rule from Lisbon. Moreover, in both Angola and Mozambique, dissatisfaction of the white settlers with the rigid controls of the Salazar regime might prove to be a source of political unrest. In anticipation of these developments, the Portuguese have strengthened their military forces in both Mozambique and Angola.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

The Federation has large mineral deposits and a small but growing industry.
The Federation makes an important contribution to the strategic military value of this area of Africa as described in paragraph 7 of the General Considerations of the policy paper. The Federal Government has stated its willingness to cooperate with the United Kingdom and the West in the defense of the Middle East and has sent small but well-trained air forces to participate in British exercises in the northeast Africa-Arabian Peninsula area.
The Federation was originally formed to link Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland politically and economically. It was also hoped that the Federation would provide the basis for a middle way between the extremes of black nationalism and the inequities and tensions generated by apartheid to the south. If the Federation can avoid both of these extremes, it will have great importance as a stabilizing factor (and a good example of racial cooperation) throughout Africa. However, in the Federation such a middle way has not yet been achieved.
The trend of events since 1953 has been marked by a growing African belief that Federation simply means continued white domination, despite real gains made by Africans in the economic and social fields. The mass of Africans, especially in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, are increasingly vehement in their demands to govern themselves as they see the advances made by Africans elsewhere on the continent. The response of the European administering authorities and the settlers to African demands has so far been too little and too late.
In this situation, unless efforts now under way achieve some accommodation, there is a strong probability that strikes, boycotts, intimidation of “moderate” Africans, and eventual general violence [Page 92]may occur. The Nyasaland disturbances of February-March, 1959, in which 51 Africans were killed, have so far led only to mass arrests and detentions, and a token reorganization of the Nyasaland Legislative Council. The results of a constitutional conference to be held in October, 1960 will be crucial in determining whether there will be widespread civil strife. At the present time, there are no serious Communist-inspired or inter-tribal, threats to peace.

British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar)

The strategic and military importance of the area lies in its geographic location and the presence there of important British military facilities. It contains port facilities (particularly at Mombasa) needed for the most effective defense of the Red Sea—Arabian Peninsula area. It also contains extensive air transport and telecommunications facilities, which are valuable if alternate routes through the Middle East are denied us. The British have announced that Kenya will be developed as a staging area for a mobile striking force that could be used in the Middle East. In view of Kenya’s geographic position, port facilities, rail lines, and cantonments, it is the logical place for such a staging operation. Although leading African nationalists have opposed military development of Kenya, it is probable that at the present time they are principally concerned at the prospect of having such facilities used to ensure internal security before self-governent is won.
The area produces raw materials (cotton, coffee, tea, sisal, diamonds) in quantities which make East African production a factor of some importance in world trade in those commodities.
The area’s political importance stems from its strategic location. It is a region whose 21 million people are, with notable exceptions, generally backward, poor and fragmented into disparate and contending groups. Without British protection, the area would be a virtual power vacuum under present circumstances.
The greatest threat to peace arises from the determined drive for independence by the Africans and, in Kenya, from racial tension, primarily between Africans and Europeans, although Asians are also involved. As it becomes increasingly clear that Africans will control the government in other East African territories, the pressure on Kenya African leaders to keep pace with African advance elsewhere is growing. Despite a growing realization on the part of many Europeans that African rule in Kenya is inevitable, it is still probable that the Africans will feel compelled to resort to strikes, boycotts, and other measures in order more quickly to achieve their goals. In an atmosphere of high racial tensions, such tactics can easily lead to general violence.
There is strong and widespread African dislike of Asians, who control much of the commerce and industry of East Africa. To the extent that this dislike continues to be expressed in actions such as the 1959 boycott of Asian traders in Uganda, it may be expected to cause a flight of capital, with consequent economic disorganization.
The possibility of inter-tribal conflict is great, especially as British authority is withdrawn. Further, an effort by the Somalis to implement the “Greater Somalia” concept would certainly create difficulties in northern Kenya.
Penetrations by the UAR and the Soviet Union are potential threats to political stability, but the possibility of subversion by both countries, particularly the USSR, may become greater as the East African countries eventually become independent.
  1. Source: Department of State, S/PNSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5920 & NSC 6001. Secret. Enclosure to a note from Lay to the NSC dated January 19. The Financial Appendix is not printed.
  2. Includes the Union of South Africa, South West Africa, and the High Commission territories (Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland), the Belgian Congo, the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and the Trust Territories of Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi. Madagascar will be dealt with in the policy paper on West Africa, inasmuch as the Malgache Republic is a part of the French Community. [Footnote in the source text.]
  3. The General Considerations on which this Policy Guidance is based are contained in the Annex to this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]
  4. Secret.
  5. Bantustans are areas in which Africans enjoy a measure of local self-government. [Footnote in the source text.)
  6. The rioting took place January 4–10, 1959, and the Belgian Government declaration was issued on January 13.