22. National Security Council Report0
NSC 6001
January 19, 1960.
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH, CENTRAL, AND
EAST AFRICA1
General Considerations
1. The primary importance of the area of South, Central and East Africa is
its emerging political significance. There is a growing awareness in the
world that Africa is an area which will have an increasingly important
influence on the course of world events and that the political alignment of
the present and future independent nations of the continent will be deeply
affected by the policies which Western European nations and the United
States pursue.
2. In contrast to West Africa, the situation in this area is complicated by
the presence, in most of the territories concerned, of a well-entrenched
white settler minority together with politically less significant Asian or
other minorities. Despite spectacular post-war quickening of economic
activity in certain areas, most Africans still live the primitive life of
the hinterland and the African population generally is poorly prepared for
self-government. Nevertheless, African pressure for political equality has
now assumed major proportions throughout most of the area.
3. The principal problem affecting U.S. interests in this area is the
development of the dependent territories, in an orderly manner and in
cooperation with the European metropoles, toward ultimate
self-determination. If this transition takes place in a way which preserves
the essential ties which bind Western Europe and Africa, areas which are
economically complementary, close and mutually advantageous relationships
between the Western European powers and Africa can be maintained after the
colonial period has passed.
4. The political stability of the area faces severe trials as many of the
territories move more rapidly toward self-government and independence,
frequently amidst the strains and tensions of multi-racial
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and rival tribal societies. During the
transitional and independence periods, the opportunities for Communist
penetration and influence are likely to increase and complicate the already
difficult and complex problems of the area and make it more difficult to
assure the area’s identification with the West. There are indications that
the Communist Bloc is paying more attention to this area and that the Bloc
will increase its efforts to identify itself as anti-colonial. Communist
influence in Central and East Africa is negligible, and the African leaders
who have emerged thus far look primarily to the West for sympathy and
support. Should they fail to receive such support, they may be expected to
turn for it to the Communist Bloc or other countries not sympathetic to the
metropoles or the United States. There is a discernible Communist influence
in African and Indian political groups in the Union of South Africa. African
students both in Western Europe and in the Soviet Bloc are assiduously
cultivated by the Communists and many have been subverted.
5. African leaders seek the understanding and goodwill of the United States.
Above all, they want to be accepted and to be treated as equals and with
dignity and respect.
6. American economic interests in South, Central and East Africa are
relatively modest. In 1958 this area accounted for only 2.2 per cent of U.S.
trade (about $650 million). American investment in the area is approximately
$450 million but the great bulk of it is in the Union of South Africa where
most of the American economic interests lie. The area is a major source of
the Free World for such strategic materials as diamonds, cobalt, chromite,
manganese, copper and sisal. The United States is heavily dependent on the
area for diamonds, cobalt and chromite. The area is also an important
producer of many other minerals and agricultural products.
7. In the event of war or loss of Western access to sea and air routes
through the Middle East, control of sea and air communications in this area
of Africa would be extremely important. Under these circumstances, our
primary strategic military interest is to deny the area to Communist
control. In the future, moreover, there may be more significant requirements
(military and other) for U.S. use of rights and facilities in the area.
Installations in this area are already becoming increasingly important to
U.S. research and development in, and exploitation of, the fields of outer
space, missile weaponry, and world wide communications.
General Objectives
8. Maintenance of the Free World orientation of the area and denial of the
area to Communist domination, including:
- a.
- The minimization of Communist influence therein;
- b.
- Orderly economic development and political progress toward
self-determination by the countries of the area in cooperation with
the metropoles and other Free World countries; and
- c.
- Access to such military rights and facilities and strategic
resources as may be required in our national security
interests.
Regional Policy Guidance
9. In applying the policy guidance which follows to all parts of this area
except the Union of South Africa, be guided by the basic policy of
encouraging and, to the extent feasible, relying on Western European nations
to influence and support their respective dependent and recently independent
areas so long as such encouragement and reliance are consistent with U.S.
national interests.
- a.
- Until an area achieves independence conduct U.S. activities and
programs in the area in full recognition of the responsibilities of the
metropolitan power involved, and, to the extent feasible:
- (1)
- Consult with the responsible metropolitan power on U.S.
activities and programs in or relating to the area; and
- (2)
- Avoid actions in the area or directly relating to the area
likely to cause serious misunderstandings between the United
States and the metropolitan power involved.
- b.
- Should a situation arise in a dependent area or in an area having
achieved independent status in which reliance on the European power
concerned would not be in the U.S. interest, determine the independent
U.S. course of action relating to such area by taking into account:
- (1)
- The need for establishing friendly working relationships with
the newly emerging state.
- (2)
- The need to incline this state toward the Free World rather
than the Communist world.
- (3)
- The effect of our policies on other Free World states having a
colonial heritage.
- (4)
- The need for maintaining Free World harmony including friendly
relationships and consultations as appropriate with the
metropolitan powers.
Nationalism, Colonialism and
Regionalism
10. Support the principle of self-determination consistently and in such a
way as to assure that evolution toward this objective will be orderly;
making clear that self-government and independence impose important
responsibilities which the peoples concerned must be prepared to
discharge.
11. Encourage those policies and actions of the metropolitan powers which
help prepare the dependent peoples for self-determination and responsible
self-government or independence. Avoid U.S. identification with those
policies of the metropolitan powers and the Union
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of South Africa which are stagnant or repressive and,
to the extent practicable, seek to influence the metropolitan powers and the
Union of South Africa to abandon or modify such policies.
12. As appropriate, encourage the formation of federation or other forms of
association among newly emerging states of the area which will enhance their
political and economic viability.
13. As feasible, support constructive, non-Communist nationalist and reform
movements, balancing the nature and degree of such support, however, with
consideration of our relations with our NATO allies.
14. Encourage participation of the moderate leaders in regional or
Pan-African movements.
Racialism
15. Seek to correct distorted African views of U.S. race relations,
emphasizing, where appropriate, progress made by the United States in the
race relations field.
16. Encourage, where practicable, a more liberal approach in areas where
extremism is now the order of the day, pointing out on appropriate occasions
the likelihood that violence will result from continuation of rigid,
repressive racial policies.
17. To the extent feasible, encourage the concept of a system of government
and social relations which would be a middle way between the extremes of
black nationalism and the inequities and tensions generated by
apartheid.
18. Seek to influence any consideration in the UN of racial matters in Africa along constructive lines.
19. Encourage American companies to set an example in practicing
non-discrimination in their operations to the maximum extent consistent with
local laws, and to train Africans for managerial positions.
Communist Activities
20. Cooperate locally with security organizations to combat Communist
subversive activities.
21. As areas become independent, encourage them to avoid or minimize formal
Sino-Soviet Bloc representation, to avoid extensive use of Sino-Soviet Bloc
technicians, and to limit other Sino-Soviet Bloc economic and cultural
contacts. Alert the governments of such nations to the probability that the
Sino-Soviet Bloc will attempt to utilize trade and assistance programs as a
technique for political subversion. Nonetheless, maintain a flexible posture
that would minimize the damage to U.S. prestige in the event that such
nations accept diplomatic or economic relations with the Sino-Soviet
Bloc.
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Military and Strategic
22. Keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in the U.S.
appraisal of its strategic value to the United States, bearing in mind that
the United States may, in the future, require bases or facilities.
23. Discourage the development of an arms race in Africa and of the concept
that the United States is prepared to provide military assistance to any
nation which desires it. As countries in the area become independent,
encourage them to maintain adequately equipped and trained internal security
forces. In those cases where external assistance is required for this
purpose, encourage the appropriate former metropole to provide such
assistance. If this approach fails and if required to achieve U.S.
objectives, consider providing U.S. assistance to meet minimum legitimate
internal security requirements, including technical training in U.S.
military institutions.
Economic
24. a. As areas achieve independence encourage them (1) to make the maximum
contribution to their own economic development, (2) to eliminate barriers to
trade and investment, (3) to take measures capable of attracting maximum
amounts of external private capital, and (4) to look essentially to Western
Europe, to the Free World international financial institutions, and to
private investment to meet their needs for external capital so long as this
is consistent with U.S. security interests.
b. Urge the United Kingdom, Belgium and Portugal to increase their economic
assistance to their dependent or recently dependent territories of this area
and, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on these metropolitan powers, the
Free World international financial institutions, organizations such as the
Common Market, and private capital to meet the needs of the territories and
nations of the area for external capital.
c. Take steps as appropriate to improve the climate for private investment
(domestic and foreign).
d. In the event that it does not prove feasible or consistent with U.S.
security interests to rely wholly on the sources in paragraph b to meet the
external capital needs of a particular territory or nation, be prepared on a
case-by-case basis to extend economic development assistance or special
economic assistance from the United States to such territory or nation
(excluding the Union of South Africa).
e. Seek to avoid the creation of unrealistic African expectations of U.S.
assistance.
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25. Be prepared (except in the case of the Union of South Africa) to provide
U.S. technical and limited related assistance to advance U.S. interests, and
to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P.L. 480 when appropriate.
26. In cases where U.S. assistance is provided:
- a.
- Attention should be given to those activities which especially (1)
complement the efforts already undertaken by the governments of the
area concerned; (2) improve, develop, or conserve human resources by
programs of education, training, and health; (3) accelerate economic
development by the selective application of skills to the resources
available, with particular emphasis on the fields of agriculture,
light manufacturing and processing industries and public
administration; (4) encourage private investment, both domestic and
foreign.
- b.
- Within the categories in a above, accord priority to projects (1)
which are of particular interest to the Africans or to which they
attach special importance, (2) serve multi-national needs or are
otherwise regional in scope.
- c.
- In the priority area of education and training give special
attention to: (1) surveys of the educational requirements of the
area; (2) development of appropriate research activities, the
establishment and extension of training facilities, and surveys of
manpower requirements and availabilities; (3) those programs
designed to develop Western-oriented leaders in the area.
27. Encourage U.S. and Free World business to participate more actively in
the development of the economies of these countries by expanding trade and
investment. Seek the denial or limitation of exports of strategic
commodities from these areas to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in accordance with U.S.
economic defense policy.
28. Encourage expanded efforts by private American institutions and
foundations in the fields of education, training and research on Africa.
Policy Guidance on Individual Countries and Territories
Supplemental to the “Regional Policy Guidance” Above2
Union of South Africa
29. Maintain as wide an area of mutual regard and communication as possible
in official U.S. relations with the Union Government. At the same time
continue to point out to the Union Government that the United States cannot
accept the apartheid concept as valid.
30. Encourage and improve communication between the various racial groups in
the Union.
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31. In international forums:
- a.
- Seek to put the racial problem in proper context in order to avoid
intemperate or strongly condemnatory resolutions.
- b.
- Make clear, however, U.S. regret and concern that discriminatory
practice in the Union continues to be fortified and sanctified by
law, and point out that the United States believes South Africa’s
best interests will be served by policies which will give all racial
groups grounds for hope that their legitimate aspirations can be
attained.
32. Encourage the Union to develop closer and mutually desirable cooperative
relations with other African territories and nations.
33. Encourage the Union to respect its obligations in its administration of
the Territory of South West Africa in accordance with the terms of the
original mandate, and to seek with the United Nations a basis for an
agreement which would continue to accord to the Territory an international
status.
Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi
34. Encourage friendly relations between the Congo and the independent
African countries.
35. Encourage the Belgians to fulfill their obligation as trustee for
Ruanda-Urundi by improving economic conditions in that area and preparing it
for eventual self-government or independence, preferably with ties to
Belgium.
Angola and Mozambique
36. To the extent possible, urge on the Portuguese the long-range benefit to
themselves of more enlightened policies in Africa, including liberal trade
and investment policies.
37. Without indicating approbation of over-all Portuguese policy in Africa,
do not publicly dispute the proposition that Angola and Mozambique are
integral parts of Portugal.
Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland
38. Encourage maintenance of the federal system of government and acceptance
of the ideal of a multi-racial democracy. Urge on receptive local leaders
the propriety and feasibility of the use of federal law in advancing social
justice.
39. Impress upon the United Kingdom and Federation Governments the urgent
need for accommodating the legitimate aspirations of all inhabitants in the
Federation within the federal system of government.
40. Encourage the United Kingdom to recognize the need to advance Africans
and to promote economic development in primarily African areas in Nyasaland
and Northern Rhodesia, where the United
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Kingdom maintains ultimate responsibility, in order to
regain African confidence in the United Kingdom and to win African consent
to the continuation of the Federation.
41. Encourage friendly relations between the Federation and other independent
African countries and close association with members of the
Commonwealth.
Annex
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND
TERRITORIES OF SOUTH, CENTRAL AND EAST AFRICA3
The Union of South Africa
- 1.
- The Union of South Africa is the strongest and most industrialized
nation in Africa. Of a total population of 14.4 million there is a
permanent European population of slightly over 3 million. South
Africa is the world’s largest producer of gold, and ranks as a
leading world producer of diamonds, uranium, platinum, chrome,
manganese, iron ore, asbestos, antimony and monazite. Until World
War I the South African economy was based principally on
agricultural production and the mining of diamonds and gold. Since
then, and particularly since World War II, there has been rapid
development in manufacturing which now accounts for a larger
proportion of the national income than either agriculture or mining.
With extensive reserves of coal and iron, the Union is the leading
steel producer in Africa. This steel production provides the base on
which the country’s industrial production, which embraces a wide
range of products, is built.
- 2.
- The closing of the Suez Canal in 1956-57 demonstrated the
importance of the sea routes around the Cape. The South African
ports of Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London, together
with the Mozambique ports of Lourenco Marques and Beira which handle
the bulk of the cargo traffic for the Union and the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland constitute strategic links with the rest of
the world. These port installations in Southern Africa, containing
repair and supply facilities, are linked technically and materially
with the Union’s own industrial capability.
- 3.
- Gold production, which reached a value of $640 million in 1958,
has traditionally enabled the Union to import goods and services at
an exceedingly high rate, and has imparted to the economy generally
a resiliency which, inter alia, has been important in attracting
further investment capital. United States economic interests in the
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Union have increased
considerably during recent years. At the present time, approximately
one-half of United States private investment in the African
continent is in the Union. There are approximately 160 American
firms with direct investments in the Union, ranging in activity from
processing and distribution to manufacturing and mining. As a result
of expanded U.S. economic activities in the Union, two American
banks recently established branches there.
- 4.
- The racial problem pervades every aspect of South African life and
has severe repercussions on the Union’s foreign relations. The race
policy of the Government is based on the concept of continued white
supremacy and apartheid, or separation, under which the African is
considered to have merely a transient status in the “white” areas of
the country (i.e., outside the Reserves and Bantustans4) and thus is restricted in his rights and
activities in these “white” areas. While the establishment of
Bantustans under the program of positive apartheid may slow the
steady drift of the African to the Union’s urban centers, the
apartheid program does not have the support of the African
population and appears doomed to failure. From an economic
standpoint, the program is considered to be prohibitive in cost and,
if carried to its doctrinaire conclusion, would be seriously
disruptive to the country’s economy.
- 5.
- In view of the intransigence of the Union Government on its
apartheid policy, it is unlikely that repeated United Nation’s
consideration of this issue contributes to a solution.
- 6.
- The Union Government has refused to come to agreement with the
UN regarding the status of the
former League of Nations mandated territory of South West Africa.
South Africa has argued that it is under no compulsion to place the
Territory under the U.N. Trusteeship System since the United Nations
is not the successor, in a legal sense, to the League of Nations.
This matter has been the subject of considerable heated debate
within the United Nations and the matter has been brought before the
International Court of Justice. In substance, the latter has ruled
that South Africa continues to have international obligations in its
administration of South West Africa in accordance with the terms of
the original mandate. Continued failure to reach an acceptable
solution to this problem poses a further threat to South Africa’s
relations with the world community.
- 7.
- South Africa’s military and security forces are organized
primarily for internal security, and secondarily for the defense of
the Cape Sea route. Internal security is the primary responsibility
of the 28,000-man police force. In addition, reserve military
organizations are available for quelling serious internal disorders.
The Union Government
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outlawed the Communist Party under the Suppression of Communism Act
of 1950, and has since that time rigorously banned many Communists
from public activity, although Communist-line publications have
continued to appear. However, the comparative literacy and
sophistication of that part of the African population which has had
a long contact with European culture makes these Africans highly
sensitive to the inequities of their position and much more
susceptible to extremist solutions. Organized African groups are a
primary Communist target and a certain amount of penetration has
taken place in all African political groups. In this situation a
continuation of the present racial policies of the Union, by
foreclosing moderate, evolutionary solutions, will increase the
appeal of Communist and other extreme programs and, over the longer
run, the chances of mounting violence between the black and white
communities.
- 8.
- While the security forces in the Union appear to have the
situation well in hand, there is an increasing possibility that
African leadership may succeed in enlisting mass support for an
action which could cripple the economy, such as a mass refusal to
work or a boycott.
- 9.
- The Union of South Africa came into being on May 31, 1910, after
the British Parliament passed the South Africa Act of 1909. This
united the four self-governing British colonies of the Cape of Good
Hope, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. However, the
three contiguous High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland,
Basutoland and Swaziland remained under the British Crown, and this
has since been a point of antagonism between the Union of South
Africa and the United Kingdom. By the South Africa Act, the United
Kingdom Government may approve transfer of the territories to the
Union if and when the Union Parliament requests such transfer. The
South African Government, particularly in recent years under the
more extreme Afrikaner nationalism, has called for the incorporation
of the High Commission Territories into the Union. On the other
hand, the United Kingdom Government has maintained a discreet but
firm insistence that any changes in the Territories must reflect the
wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. In August 1959 the British
Parliament approved a constitution for Basutoland which provides for
a locally elected Legislative Council and autonomy in domestic
affairs. A similar development in rule can be expected in
Bechuanaland and Swaziland in the future.
Belgian Congo and
Ruanda-Urundi
- 10.
- The importance of the Belgian Congo derives from its size (900,000
square miles; 13 million population), its central location, and its
substantial natural resources. The economy has undergone
considerable development based on the substantial extraction or
production
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of industrial raw
materials and coffee, cotton, and palm oil. Exports of all types of
goods have been about $450 million annually. There are prospects for
extensive private foreign investment of a mutually beneficial nature
in the Congo, provided the Belgian Government is willing to modify
certain existing restrictions on non-Belgian capital.
- 11.
- The major causes of instability are the growing political
agitation for independence and the intense tribal rivalries. The
prospect of independence and the uncertainties as to the extent of
continuing Belgian control create growing tensions which are
breaking out in open conflict. Racial issues have not been a major
cause of the instability in the Congo. There has been rioting and
tribal fighting throughout the area since the Leopoldville riots in
January 1959, just prior to the Belgian Government’s declaration
which promised that “Belgium intends to organize a democracy in the
Congo which will be capable of exercising the prerogatives of
sovereignty and of deciding upon its independence.”5 A specific program has been outlined for establishing
political institutions in which the Congolese would have an
increasingly larger role to play. No date has been set for granting
self-government or complete independence nor has the eventual
relationship with Belgium been defined. However, the Congolese have
been assured that this decision will be up to them, and it is
contemplated that by 1964 Belgian-Congolese relations will be
reviewed, at which time the Congo presumably could opt for
independence. The presence of over 100,000 whites in the Congo will
probably not seriously impede these reforms.
- 12.
- Some 50 political parties have developed in the Congo and several
of the larger parties (particularly the ABAKO or Bakongo organization and the most important
faction of the MNC or Mouvement
National Congolais) have not only announced that they will boycott
the provincial elections planned for December of this year, but also
have demanded a completely independent Congolese government by not
later than 1960. This is only one of the problems faced by the
Belgians in dealing with political agitation against the background
of divergent tribalism and superstition. For example, the Bakongo
tribesmen of the Lower Congo, fearful of domination by the more
numerous tribes of the interior, are demanding their own tribal
state (including areas in the French Republic of Congo and in
Angola) with only vaguely defined ties to a federal government.
Tribal riots and clashes may be expected to continue.
- 13.
- The Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, with a total area of only
21,000 square miles, has a rapidly growing population of almost 5
million pressing against the limited resource capabilities of a
pastoral
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type economy. The
reins of local power, held by the Watutsi who comprise only 15
percent of the population, are now being sought by the traditionally
inferior Bahutu who account for almost 84 percent of the population.
In addition to continuing tribal unrest, the economic problems of
overpopulation can be expected to plague the area for some time to
come. The area, which is administered as an autonomous province with
loose ties to the Congo, is definitely unprepared for independence
and in need of Belgian assistance to provide some semblance of both
economic and political stability. Progress toward self-government
will probably be slow.
Angola and Mozambique
- 14.
- Neither Angola nor Mozambique is of direct strategic, political or
economic importance to the United States. However, Portuguese ports
and rail connections in Angola and Mozambique are vital to the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and important to the Union of
South Africa and the Belgian Congo. Air routes through and over
these provinces are strategically important to the area as well as
to several Western nations which are now operating air routes over
Angola and Mozambique. Both provinces furnish labor to surrounding
areas; the Union and the Rhodesias draw on Mozambique, while Angola
supplies part of the work force in the Belgian Congo.
- 15.
- Both provinces are undeveloped, and, while their full potential is
as yet unknown, they now produce coffee, cotton, sisal, diamonds,
sugar, and copra for export. Moderate quantities of oil have been
discovered in Angola; explorations are continuing in
Mozambique.
- 16.
- The politically and economically repressive policies of the
Portuguese Government have thus far prevented in Angola and
Mozambique most of the political unrest and racial tension
characteristic of other colonial areas of Africa. However, despite
Portuguese efforts to exclude unsettling influences, African
political awareness is emerging and is bound to grow. Recent
developments are likely to cause growing unrest.
- 17.
- Angola and Mozambique are legally provinces of the metro-pole. For
this reason there are sharp limitations on the ability of the United
States to influence developments in these territories.
- 18.
- In the northern region of Angola, where a portion of the vigorous
Bakongo tribe resides, there is a distinct possibility that
political agitation by the Bakongo in the Belgian Congo will have an
unsettling effect, despite Portuguese determination to put down any
African challenge to their authority.
- 19.
- In the remainder of Angola, there appears to be little possibility
of effective African political organization in the near future.
Little is known about the actual and potential strength of the
underground
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Angolan
Liberation Movement, the only African political organization known
to exist in the province. In Mozambique, there have been isolated
incidents involving resistance to the Portuguese, but no organized
African movement in known to exist.
- 20.
- In the short run, it is believed that internal threats to
stability are minimal, but in the long run, especially as
neighboring areas (e.g., the Belgian Congo) become
African-controlled, the Portuguese can expect an increasing African
challenge to rule from Lisbon. Moreover, in both Angola and
Mozambique, dissatisfaction of the white settlers with the rigid
controls of the Salazar regime might prove to be a source of
political unrest. In anticipation of these developments, the
Portuguese have strengthened their military forces in both
Mozambique and Angola.
Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland
- 21.
- The Federation has large mineral deposits and a small but growing
industry.
- 22.
- The Federation makes an important contribution to the strategic
military value of this area of Africa as described in paragraph 7 of
the General Considerations of the policy paper. The Federal
Government has stated its willingness to cooperate with the United
Kingdom and the West in the defense of the Middle East and has sent
small but well-trained air forces to participate in British
exercises in the northeast Africa-Arabian Peninsula area.
- 23.
- The Federation was originally formed to link Southern Rhodesia,
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland politically and economically. It was
also hoped that the Federation would provide the basis for a middle
way between the extremes of black nationalism and the inequities and
tensions generated by apartheid to the south. If the Federation can
avoid both of these extremes, it will have great importance as a
stabilizing factor (and a good example of racial cooperation)
throughout Africa. However, in the Federation such a middle way has
not yet been achieved.
- 24.
- The trend of events since 1953 has been marked by a growing
African belief that Federation simply means continued white
domination, despite real gains made by Africans in the economic and
social fields. The mass of Africans, especially in Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, are increasingly vehement in their demands to govern
themselves as they see the advances made by Africans elsewhere on
the continent. The response of the European administering
authorities and the settlers to African demands has so far been too
little and too late.
- 25.
- In this situation, unless efforts now under way achieve some
accommodation, there is a strong probability that strikes, boycotts,
intimidation of “moderate” Africans, and eventual general violence
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may occur. The Nyasaland
disturbances of February-March, 1959, in which 51 Africans were
killed, have so far led only to mass arrests and detentions, and a
token reorganization of the Nyasaland Legislative Council. The
results of a constitutional conference to be held in October, 1960
will be crucial in determining whether there will be widespread
civil strife. At the present time, there are no serious
Communist-inspired or inter-tribal, threats to peace.
British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda,
Tanganyika, Zanzibar)
- 26.
- The strategic and military importance of the area lies in its
geographic location and the presence there of important British
military facilities. It contains port facilities (particularly at
Mombasa) needed for the most effective defense of the Red
Sea—Arabian Peninsula area. It also contains extensive air transport
and telecommunications facilities, which are valuable if alternate
routes through the Middle East are denied us. The British have
announced that Kenya will be developed as a staging area for a
mobile striking force that could be used in the Middle East. In view
of Kenya’s geographic position, port facilities, rail lines, and
cantonments, it is the logical place for such a staging operation.
Although leading African nationalists have opposed military
development of Kenya, it is probable that at the present time they
are principally concerned at the prospect of having such facilities
used to ensure internal security before self-governent is
won.
- 27.
- The area produces raw materials (cotton, coffee, tea, sisal,
diamonds) in quantities which make East African production a factor
of some importance in world trade in those commodities.
- 28.
- The area’s political importance stems from its strategic location.
It is a region whose 21 million people are, with notable exceptions,
generally backward, poor and fragmented into disparate and
contending groups. Without British protection, the area would be a
virtual power vacuum under present circumstances.
- 29.
- The greatest threat to peace arises from the determined drive for
independence by the Africans and, in Kenya, from racial tension,
primarily between Africans and Europeans, although Asians are also
involved. As it becomes increasingly clear that Africans will
control the government in other East African territories, the
pressure on Kenya African leaders to keep pace with African advance
elsewhere is growing. Despite a growing realization on the part of
many Europeans that African rule in Kenya is inevitable, it is still
probable that the Africans will feel compelled to resort to strikes,
boycotts, and other measures in order more quickly to achieve their
goals. In an atmosphere of high racial tensions, such tactics can
easily lead to general violence.
- 30.
- There is strong and widespread African dislike of Asians, who
control much of the commerce and industry of East Africa. To the
extent that this dislike continues to be expressed in actions such
as the 1959 boycott of Asian traders in Uganda, it may be expected
to cause a flight of capital, with consequent economic
disorganization.
- 31.
- The possibility of inter-tribal conflict is great, especially as
British authority is withdrawn. Further, an effort by the Somalis to
implement the “Greater Somalia” concept would certainly create
difficulties in northern Kenya.
- 32.
- Penetrations by the UAR and the
Soviet Union are potential threats to political stability, but the
possibility of subversion by both countries, particularly the USSR, may become greater as the East
African countries eventually become independent.
