Office of the Historian

44. Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles0

Washington, August 23, 1958.

COMMENTS ON MR. MURPHY’S MEMORANDUM OF AUGUST 15, 19581

1.
I would rather put it that Nasser as leader of the popular dynamism of Arab unity has been brought to realize that this dynamism should express itself in ways which do not shock the consciousness of mankind and violate the principles of the Charter. I doubt that there is a “balance of power”. I think that predominant power is still with Nasser and is Pan Arabism. I do believe, however, that there is a lull, of which we should seek to take advantage.
2.
OK.
3.
OK, if practical. Perhaps the “guarantee” will have to be implied rather than formally expressed.
4.
I generally agree [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
5.
I doubt that this is feasible or perhaps desirable.
6.
Ditto.
7.
I suspect that there are already secret understandings which will draw Iraq into the Egyptian orbit. Perhaps, however, this orbit will find its expression through the Arab League, the revival of which has perhaps been the most significant aspect of the recent UNGA.
8.
Agree generally but again suggest that this may be through the Arab League.
9.
This might be a long-range objective, but it will take time to get any agreed “frontiers” and even then I doubt that Israel would accept “neutralization”, although that word has many different connotations.
10.
OK.
11.
I doubt the wisdom of a “manifesto”. I believe that the strength of the oil position is to be found in the need for markets and the keeping alive of alternatives. I believe that there will be sufficient selfish and competitive interests in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia so that it is unlikely that all three will act uniformly and at the same time to “put the screws” on the consumers.
12.
I agree about Nasser’s personality. I doubt whether we could “destroy him”. On the other hand, he has certain ambitions as regards [Page 158] Israel and the outlying Arab countries which we could scarcely support. An intermediate policy of flexibility is perhaps inevitable. It is barely possible that the present moment is one whereby cooperation we could exert an influence, but this, given his character, is highly problematic.

These are quick reactions, not to be given great weight.2

JFD
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/8–1558. Top Secret.↩
  2. See the enclosure to Document 41.↩
  3. This sentence was handwritten by Dulles.↩