41. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Murphy) to
Acting Secretary of State Herter0
Washington,
August 15,
1958.
Dear Chris: I hesitate to burden you with
another memorandum, but I have included in succinct form in the attached
memorandum some thoughts regarding a Middle East settlement. The present
opportunity would seem to be the best that has presented itself for a
long time to make progress in this complicated problem. If we could
settle on the lines of a program for the area, we might have some chance
of success. Without a well defined line I should think our chances of
losing out would be very much enhanced.
[Enclosure]1
Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Murphy)
Washington,
August 15,
1958.
From numerous conversations with a variety of personalities and
information from other sources in the Middle Eastern countries
visited by me during the period July 16 to August 12,2 the following thoughts emerge:
- 1)
- A temporary if precarious balance of power has been achieved
between the determination manifest by the United States and
United Kingdom in the deployment of military forces on the one
hand, and the
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popular
dynamism of Arab unity as symbolized by Nasser on the other. This
breathing space should be utilized to launch a program which
will promote a constructive era and peace and stability in the
area.
- 2)
- Propaganda. The United States should make an effective effort
to appeal to the Arab masses, to their desire not only for
better economic conditions and especially their craving to be
treated with dignity and as equals.
- 3)
- Lebanon. Coincident with the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces,
and the establishment of law and order, some form of
international guarantee of the independence of Lebanon should be
provided.
- 4)
-
Jordan. This is the focus of the present danger in the
area. The untenable position of the U.K. forces in Jordan
requires that we carefully synchronize our withdrawal in
Lebanon with theirs if possible. [10-1/2
lines of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text)
not declassified]
[3 paragraphs (21 lines of source text) not
declassified]
- 5)
- Middle East Neutralization. With any success in dealing with
the immediate problem of Jordan, the Conference could propose a
neutralization of the area. [2-1/2 lines of
source text not declassified] A more ambitious program
might include guarantees of the boundaries of the U.A.R., Saudi
Arabia, and the Gulf Sheikdoms. An inherent feature of the
program would be the establishment of a form of international
control of arms in the area.
- 6)
- A treaty would establish the Middle Eastern settlement. Its
provisions could deal not only with the political features of
the area but the economic and financial as well. It would
contemplate large scale economic development and raised
standards of living.
- 7)
- Iraq. It may well be that the present group in power may prove
to be a transitory Kerensky type element. At first blush I
believe a treaty of neutralization of the area would appeal to
them especially in the light of their recent protestations. Iraq
would disappear from the Baghdad Pact. That in itself would
promote stability in the area.
- 8)
- Saudi Arabia. There seems little question that Saudi Arabia is
moving toward neutralization.
- 9)
- Israel. If Israel’s borders were assured perhaps the Israelis
would favor a regime of neutralization plus guarantees of
frontiers.
- 10)
- Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Obviously nothing in the foregoing
relates to the neutralization of these countries.
- 11)
- Oil. The basic consideration of the United Kingdom is the
guaranteed control of its present Persian Gulf oil rights. It
wants the backing of the U.S. power to protect these rights.
U.S. privately owned rights in that area are of major
importance. The British hope for some form of US-UK manifesto of
joint intention to defend those rights. A suitable decision
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on that question so
vital to U.S. national security should be made prior to the
convening of a Middle East Conference.
- 12)
- Nasser. This difficult
personality is the core of much present day anxiety and
effervescence in the Middle East. A psychological study, a
complex of emotion, personal charm, and crusading ardor,
Nasser has been at
times the subject of American sympathetic support and at others
the target of our antagonism based on our belief that he is
guilty of duplicity and subversive activity in other Arab
countries. There is no doubt that for many he symbolizes Arab
unity and collective security, and that he has inflamed the
imagination of millions of Arabs. Perhaps a vice of our policy
is that we have never decided to go all out in a purpose to
destroy him as a menace to peace, or to build him up (as has the
USSR) in the hope that he
may prove in the end a useful element which could be
contained.
